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New Zealand law has long protected in'-·entions, trade marks, 
designs, copyright and other intellectual property rights . 
Those rights confer on proprietors and their licensees 
exclusivity of use. In the trading context , for the duration of 
the rights, the freedom of competitors is restricted to the 
extent of that exclusivity . 
I 
With the passing of the Commerce Act 1986 and in particular the 
trade practices provisions in Part II, ~ew Zealand has 
i n t rod u c e d , rather 1 a t e c o m pared w i t h m o s t o the r rl. e ·, e 1 op e d 
countries , the legal base for a policy to turther competition. 
As has occurred in other countries, there will be debated in New 
Zealand whether there is a conflict between the market 
exclusivity afforded by jntellectual property rights on the one 
hand and the restrictive trade practices controls on the ot her. 
So as not to beg the question as to conflict , the issuRs are 
referred to as arising at the interfa ce of intellectual property 
laws and competition laws. 
This paper examines the sc pc-: and nature of ":ew Zealand· s 
intell ec tual property rights with partic11lar r eference t o their 
competition jmplications. 
011e of lhe first problems encount: red i11 reldling the legal 
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concepts of patent, trade mark and other rights to the economic 
language of competi.tion policy is that of semantics. In 
p,1rticular the term "monopoly" is used in a different sense in 
each field . A clear understanding of this use of the same term 
to co nvey significantly different ideas is essential to a proper 
analysis of the issues . 
Pengilley , the well known Australian co mmentator in the trade 
practices field, has noted in respect of New Zea land's C. E . R. 
partner, that ''if United States experience is any guide, the 
Trade Pra c ti ces Act will furn ish fertile grounds of def ence to 
l. 
patent infringement actions''. Presumably he would take a 
similar view in relati o n to other int e llectual property rights . 
The Commerce Act 1986 is based on the Australian Trade Pra c tices 
Act 1974 but the two statutes do not deal with the relationship 
betw ee n competition and intellectual property rights in the same 
way . The f e rtility of the grounJ in ~ew Zea land needs separate 
examination. 
The Australian 1nr1ustric1l Property Advisory Committee has 
re c o rrn n e n de d t hat pa t e n t r i g h t s s l, o u 1 d b P a c co rd ed no s p e c i a 1 
tr1:H1trnent what soever u nder trad t: practires legis lation .
3 That is 
cP. r·tainly not the present position in New Zeal a11d, nor ind ee d in 
..\ 11<.;trctlia. 
ThP. paper reviews the ~elevant sections of the Co mmerce Act 1986 
all d e x a In i. n t-: s t h ~ s c op e o f t 11 e s µ e c i f i c e x c e pt i o n s t o t he 
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restrictive trade practices provisions available to proprietors 
and licensees in the exercise of their int e lle ctu al property 
rights. 
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_!_I _ _ ~~  INTERFACE IN POLICY 
A. The Two Areas of Law 
1 . Intelectual Property Rights 
The term "intelectual property" has broadened in scope over 
time. It was taken to refer to the rights conferrect by the 
grant of a copyright in literary, artistic, and musical 4 works. 
More recently it has taken on a much broader meaning, including 
among the colection of disparate rights those known as 
. . l 5 "111dustr1a property'. 
In the United Kingdom "intelectual property" has been defined 
by statute. Section 72(5) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 (U.K.) 
states that 'intelectuftl property' means any patent, trade 
mark, copyright, registered ctesign, technical or commerci.:d 
in f o r met t ion or o t her i n l e l 1 e c tu a 1 property .'=> 
In t hi s paper t h e term " i n t e L l e c t u a 1 property 1· i g h t s " i s taken 
to mean the proprietary rights conferred by statute in the 
7 8 Patents ~et 1953, the Trarle ~arks Act 1953, the Designs Act 
9 /0 1953, the Copyright Act 1962, and the Plant Variety Rights Act 
I 1987, and a L so those i.nteres t!:> in goodwi 1 L, get-up, trade 
secrets and confidential information, protected at law or in 
eq1;i_t-y by the action:; for pa.s':i.ng off, injuri.ou3 talsehood, 
12. pPrhaps even a tort of uulair competition, and breach of 
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f . d ll con 1 ence. 
2. Competition Law 
The term "competition law" is taken to include those laws 
advancing competition policies ~ the predominant legislation 
,~-
being the Commerce Act 1986. ~cGonigal has described the 
1 lo 
economic goal of competition law as being: 
'' . .. to establish a competitive market place in which there 
will be pressures on participants to mRke the maximum use of 
available resources and to search for more efficient 
management, production and rnarketing processes or to develop 
new and better products". 
The emphasis of competition policy is on the assumed public 
interest in free competition between traders, since free 
compet i tion within markets is assumed to offer the most 
efficient means of allocating resources and of ensuring that 
quality goods and services are available to consumers at best 
prices and in sufficient quantities .
17 
Certain provisions of the Commerce Act 1986 l1ave particular 
relevance to intellectual property . The Act has as its 
objective the promotion of competition in markets within New 
18 Zealand. The Act does not affect the granting of intellectual 
property rights, in the sense of overruling the specific 
statutes which confer the rights. However the Act may affect the 
way thosP rights are exercised and restrain the conduct of those 
holding the rights . 
- 6 -
Section 27 of the Commerce Act 1986 prohibits and renders 
unenforceable contracts, arrangements a11d understandings which 
have the purpose or effect of substantially lessening 
competition in a market. Where the nature of a particular 
market is such that an intellectual property grant confers 
significant market power, the licensing or assignment of that 
right may well be subject to attention under the Act. Section 
45 provides that certain provisions of contracts, arrangements 
or understandings in relation to the use, licensing or 
assignment of intellectual property rights are exempted from the 
application of the restrictive trade practices provisions in 
Part II of the Act. 
Section 36 of the Commerce Act 1986 prohibits the use of a 
dominant position in a market for anti-competitive purposes. It 
is conceivable that a person may be in a dominant position by 
virtue of a significant patent or other· intellectual property 
right where substitute products or alternative technologies are 
not available. A person does not contravene s . 36 by reason only 
of enforcing an intellectual property right. However other 
actions ctssociated wir.h those rights ma.y be challenged under the 
restrictive trade practices provisions . An e~ample might be 
a.ccumulating rights for· the purpose of restricting competition, 
in pRrticular patAnt pooling. 
There is some debate ,"ls to whether or not there is a fundamental 
conflict between the granting of intellectual property rignts on 
- 7 -
the one hand, and cornpetition policies on the other . There are 
largely two opposing viewpoints with the tendency often being to 
group intellectual property rights together and to argue either 
that on pol i cy grounds they should remai11 unfettered from the 
application of competition law being in themselves 
pro - competitive in the lor1ger run, or at the other extreme that 
intellectual property rights should be subject to the rigours of 
the competition laws without any special treatment. 
The position was stated by the Australian Industrial Property 
. 19 
Advisory Committee as follows : 
''The inter- relation between patent law and competition law 
appears to be widely misunderstood. On the one hand, it has 
been suggested that competition law must bow wholly to 
patent law , because any constraints applied to the freedom 
of patentees to exploit, as they think fit, the exclusive 
rights which patents confer wi l l detract from the fullness 
of the incentive to innovation which patent law is designed 
to promote . Conversely, it has been suggested that because 
patent law promotes monopoly, it is irreconcilable with 
competiton law which promotes competition, and therefore 
that patentees must be limited, wherever possible, in the 
exploitation of their patents". 
However intellectual property rights cannot be dealt with so 
simply. Intellectual property law and policy seek to grant 
e x: c l 11 s i v e p r· op e rt y r i g h t s to c re .,., t e an i n cent i v e f or 
techn,>logical innovation (patents), product quality and informed 
2.0 
c hoice (trade marks), a11d artistic de v elopm e nt (copyrights) . Thus 
t-ht-j common thread is the assumption that some price is necessary 
to encourage inventiveness and innovation . The law affords to 
the owner of an ir1t-ellActual property right the protection to 
- 8 -
ensure that there will be an adequate return on, and control 
over, the subject of the owner's ingenuity and inventiveness. 
Essentially the protection given to owners of statutory 
intellectual property rights encompasses exclusivity limited in 
respect of territory and time . The proprietor is thus entitled 
to make best use of the right by himself exploiting it or by 
assigning or licensing its use to others, and to do so whilst 
imposing conditions on the licensee so as to protect his 
legitimate monopoly control . 
Competition, trade practices, or anti - trust policy seeks to 
preserve free from private regulation and monopolisation a 
self - adjusting, self - regulating marketplace operating on the 
premise of freedom of choice, freedom of opportunity, and 
2. l 
competitive rivalries. The ideal of free competition really 
means that the market mechanism should operate at its ~ptimal 
level, ~ithout restriction on competitive behaviour . It is one 
fundamental aspect of this free market view that competition and 
its resultflnt benefits are lessened or negated b3· the existence 
of n:unopolies or partial monopolies, for then the market is 
taken advc1ntage of and monopoly profits are made, with a 
resulting lack of incentivR to i11 c rease efficiency and product 
quali t y . Similar ramifications occur where individual traders 
r· e a c h a gr e em e n t a in on g t hems e l v e s f i x i n g nt a t t e r s s u c h a s p r i c e s , 
prorluction quotas, territories of operation, and boycotts of 
other f i. rms ~2. 
9 -
It is not surprising that there is a continuing tension between 
these two seemingly conflicting legal and economic policies. 
The conflict is such that ·war' and ' battle' metaphors abound in 
discussions about the relationship, especially between patent 
. lJ 
and anti - trust law in the United State · . 
Each intellectual property right to a greater or lesser degree 
is capable of restraining competition . Professor McCarthy has 
said "to boil it all down to essentials, while intellectual 
property law strives to induce technological change and promote 
'fair competition', anti - trust law strives to preserve 'free 
24 
competition'''. The conflict may be seen as one between public 
and private interests. The public interest which competition 
legislatiott gives effect to, is the preservation and maintenance 
of competition and the provision of restraints over abuses of 
market power. The privat e interest is that of ensuring the 
owner1-; of intellectual property rights r ece iv e tbe just 
rernuneratio11 and protection flowing from their ownership and 
2S" 
possession of the rights . 
It is the exercise of the right to ctssign or license an 
ir1tel lectual property right which draws the o wner into the rei:llm 
of the public interest anJ hence within the 
•• 1-
ctffiOl c. ot competition 
laws . The c o n c1i t i o n s i m po s e d s h o u 1 d be c o n s i s t en t w i t h t h e 
scope of the monopoly co 11ferred upou th proprietor . A 
pdrticulnr aspect of i11t e ll~ctual property proter·tion which does 
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not sit comfortab l y alongside competition law is the statutory 
term of protection . It seems, from the competition policy end 
of the tunnel, that a system which provides that all instances 
of innovation within a particular statutory category of 
intellectual property shall have the same period of protection , 
is inherently u ndesirable . The years of protection may in some 
cases substantially exceed the years measured in the worth of 
the innovation . Competition may be restrained for longer than 
is necessary to sufficiently remunerate the right owner, since 
some innovatjons pay for themselves within a short period 
whereas others may require far longer than the sthtutory term of 
protection to recoup the cost and effort expended . 
The recent United Kingdom White Paper entitled "Intellectual 
Property and Innovation'' referred to the arbitrariness of the 
2b 
patent term . The term is arbitrary , both in length and in 
effect on different industries ''since some products require, 
inherently or by regulation, more time than otliers to be brought 
l7 
to the market''. The ;"\ew Zealand Industrial Property Advisory 
28 
Committee (IPAC), in two reports to the :Iinister of Justice, has 
recommended that ally change to the term of patent protection in 
New Zealand should be dependent on harmonisation with the 
corresponding provisions in Australia, and also that the most 
desirable situation for ~ew Zealand is a term for patent 
protection of sixteen years with provision for casR by case 
prolongation with a maximum ~xtentio11 of four years , where it is 
shown that the effe~ti,·e term has been shortPned by regulatory 
- 11 -
constraints preventing or restricting exploitation of the 
29 
invention by the patentee. 
It is necessary for the duration of a property right to be 
ascertainable at the time of its acqui~ition . However, a system 
incoporating a term of protection determined by the judicial 
exercise of a discretion by the Comn,issioner of Patents may 
provide a workable solution at least in respec t of those 
statutory intellectual property rights that require 
· t t · ~o reg1s ra 10n. 
B. Int ellectual Propertv Rights and their Policv Goals 
Amongst t he arguments in favour of intelle ctua l property rights 
it is said that although costs will increase in the short term, 
ultimately the gain will be transferred back to the consume-r in 
the form of better goods and services . It is also argued that 
co r11petitors wil L get access to technology and be able to use it, 
albeit after a dP.lay, when otherwise that technology may hnve 
been secreted forever by an owner unwilling to divulge the 
invention . Intellectual property rights thus enLourage the 
o wn er to take the short term gain whils t accepting that at ledst 
soJ11e of the innovation is now in the forum of the public . In 
connection with thi.s it is said that inno\·a tion js otten 
inhibi.tP.d by the threat of pirctcy . This in turn encouragP.s 
i11ventors or innovators to confine themselves to areas where 
secrecy can bP. maintained, using enforcem,nt avenues such as 
- 12 -
breach of confidence where necessary. 
On the other hand critics of intellectual property rights argue 
that they l edd to protection motivated research rather than more 
fundamental innovation to do no more than circumvent others' 
intellectual property rights. Also the nature of intellectual 
property rights effectively di~courages those who know that 
their research is behind that of their competitors; the 
unsportsmanlike 'why spend your money when you are going to lose 
it anyway' . Such altruistic considerations perhaps overlook the 
hard facts of research investment decisions . 
It is necessary to look at each intellectual property right in 
turn. 
1. Patents 
"The patent system ... added the fuel of interest to tr.e 
fire of genius." Abraham Lincoln, lecture, 22 February 
1860 . 31 
In New Zealand the grant of letters patent for an invention is 
an exercise of the prerogative of the Crown . In practice it is 
effected by the Patent Office and is regulated by statute, 
3).. 
nn.rnely the Patents Act 1q53 and tltf) Patents Regulations 1954. 
The term "letters patent" mec111s open letter, and is a document 
addcessed to all the subjects uf the Sovereign advising them 
that an exclusive granl of privilege has been made in favour of 
- 13 -
a particular person. 
legal terms a chose 
A pate11t grant is a property right, in 
• +- • 
111 ac,_1on, and is enforceable by the 
patentee in the courts . ·rhis property right is also 
transferable either in whole or in part by means of sale, or by 
the granting of licences. 
.33 
To be patentable ctn invention must be novel. This requisite 
element for patent protection effectively means that the grant 
of a patent monopoly does not deprive the public of anything 
that it had before. In fact the applicant gives something to 
the pool of public knowleJge which it did not previously have. 
The grant of a patent is not needed to permit the i11ventor to 
use the invention. This is a right whic h is automatic , so long 
as the use of the invention ia not contrary to law and the use 
does not infringe another patent . The grant of a patent gives 
to the patentee the right to decide who else may use the 
invention, and on what terms. The grant confers on the patentee 
the exclusive right to make, use or sell the invPntion . Thus 
the patentee may dispose of his right by selling or assigning 
the patent outright to another per·son, he rn~y share it with 
o t her s , or he in a y gr an t an e x c l u s i v e or non - e x c 1 u s i \," e 1 i c e n c e t o 
others . 
Patent~ are granted for inventions, and tl1e term invention is 
defined in the Patents Act 1953 as "a manner of new 
.34 
mcinufacture'' . This definition derive.., from tlte English Statute 
- 14 -
of 'lonopol ies of 1624 from which the modern patent system 
descended. In simple terms an invention relates to the 
practical arts rather than the fine arts . Unlike copyright it 
must relate to commerce in some way . Nothing can be patented 
which is already in the public domain , or which is obvious . 
Obviousness must be judged against the common general knowledge, 
and what is known and has been used in the p1-.1rt i cul ar brattc h of 
technology at the time the application was lodged . The other 
requirement of an invention to obtain a valid patent is utility. 
It is easy to see the tension between the grant and use of 
intellectual property rights, in this case patents, and trade 
practices laws when one considers that a patent system can be 
seen to promote many of the evils which tradP. practices law 
attempts to proscr i be or limit. 
35 
particular : 
Pengilley referred to four in 
(i) Non - avai l ability of product to some sections of the 
mc1rket: 
(ii) Objections by businessmen that they are precluJed from 
certain markets; 
(iii) Views l1y econoniists that the patent system does not 
give the most 11seful al location of resources; 
(iv) General complaints that prices are higher pursuctnt :o 
mono po J y t l1 a n t hey w o 11 l d l: e 11 n de r c o m p e t i t i on . 
3b 
Turner ha"' said that : 
"The basic rationctle of the pi'ltent system can be simply 
put . The economi.c case r·ests upon two propositions : 
fjrst, that we s1101ilcl have more in,·entior: and innovation 
t- ha n o u r e con o In i c s y s t e rn w o u l d p r· o v i de i n t i1 e a b s e n c e o f 
specidl inducement ; and second, thct the granting of a 
statutory monopoly t-o inventors for a period of y,~ars is 
the best method of providing suc:11 speci,:1 l inciucement . " 
Pro f e s s o r M c"C n. rt h y i de u t i f i e d L w o w <1 y s t o s U mu 1 a tic~ i. n c en t i v e ; 
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either by direct government funding of research and development 
or by the creation of a private property right in certain new 
technology for a limited time i.e. !7 a patent . An important 
advantage of the latter is that the value of the patent entirely 
depends on consumer demand for the goods or services produced as 
a result of the use of the patented technology . 
The patent system is said to Le justified since one of its 
perceived roles is fostering innovation and since there are 
public benefits associated with the shari11g of otherwise 
propr·ietary informati on disclosed through the granting of a 
38 
patent. 
One question often debated but seemingly virtually unans"erable 
is whether a patent is really financially necessary to stimulate 
inventors. It might be said that the fact that we have a patent 
system at all demonstrates that it is accepted that there is a 
causative link between the patent systern and inno\·ation. 
In the recent Department of Trade & Industry discussion paper on 
3'3 
intellectual property it was said that: 
'' A b a s i c j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r t he p ,,. t e n t s }- s t Pm i s i t s r o l e a s 
an econolllic instrument for encouraging ind11striai innovation 
find the transfer of technology. In the first in!:>tance i t is 
argueJ tliat research and development leading to innovation 
inherently ca1-r-ies with il. higli risks in terms of the 
likelihood of technical success, and commens1l!'ate risks 
applied to the commerci.'11 viability oE the innovation . 
In11uvat:ive activity is very c:n!:>tly in terms of the resources 
required and the investment would not be ma<le unless the 
rewards Eor s11c:cess adequately cornpensc1i"e for the 
possibility of fail ur e . The pcospect that dl1 innovation 
- 16 -
might be copied , thus reducing the potential rewards, may 
provide a disincentive to innovation . One function of the 
patents system, therefore, is to give exclusive rights to 
the patentee to exploit an invention as an encouragement to 
undertdke resenr-ch and development and suuseqLtent 
manu fctcture." 
In the discussion paper it was said "while the economic 
justification for the patent system has been clearly defined in 
theory, the actual effects of the system on innovation and 
40 
technology transfer are complex and not well understood" . 
Presumably it is an incentive for at least some inventors, for 
dS has been often stated inventors cannot invent on empty 
41 
stomachs . A related question which is somewhat easier to answer 
is whether it is necessary that there be a financial incentive 
for investors . It is considered that invention is but a small 
pctrt of the techno l ogical break- through , injection of capita l is 
42. 
often also required . .r\ patent prevents imitators from ''reaping 
without sowing" , not only in respect of skill and innovation but 
cdso of risky investme11t . 
The situation is really like the chicken and the egg metaphor; 
"'13 
which came first the patent incentive or the invention? One 
attempt at empirical analysis, 
44 
a 1976 Canadian study, found that 
70% of Canadian companies qllestioned thoitgllt thctt patents bad 
4S 
little or no effect on their decisions to pursue research. In 
fa c t competition itself w<1s said to be the gre.:1test factor 
influencing Ca11acJian research and development expenditure.4b 
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Competition does promote innovation . If a firm does not 
innovate, it will be pushed out of the market by those that do. 
Pengilley concluded from this Canadian study that inventiveness 
is not stirred primarily by patent law but for other reasons . 
47 
From this study Pengilley said: 
''[o]ne·s co nclusion could be that innovation is something 
like a lottery - it is only the high prizes which count . If 
you have a high enough pr i ze, then perl1aps it is valuable 
for its intrinsic merit, for its competitive advantage and 
its market place advantages rather than because it is 
subject to a statutory monopoly. An d , indeed, in v iew of 
the rapid dating of technology, it may well be thought by 
many that the best way of explo it ing a patent is immediately 
to produce the article rather than delay such prod11ction 
becaus e of patent procedure . " 
Patents do create an incentive to disclose the results of 
innovations . Lack of secrecy it seems is an accepted cost of 
patent protection . That is the rights afforded by the patent 
system are provided in return for the public disclosure of the 
invention, providing information to others as a step towards 
further innovation. Hen ce the description of the in ·e ntion is 
made public and the period of exc lusivity is limited, in the 
c ase of New Zealand, to sixt e en years 
The grant may be considered as a bargain between the applicant 
and the Crown . In return for disclosing the invention to the 
Crown, the applicant is r e warded by the grant of an exclusive 
48 
right for a limited time. Thus the patent system may be seen as 
a means for inducing inv e ntors to disclose their inventions, 
- 18 -
which they may otherwise elect to keep secret . 
However, Pengilley has doubted the effectiveness of patents in 
~9 
encouraging disclosure . It is true that often a pcttent does not 
necessarily inform the public how an invention will work in 
pract i ca l terms . Such "know - ho w" is often kept highly secret . 
5o 
Pengilley drew from the Canadian study as to the extent of this 
p:::.-actice . That study cited a reseflrch project undertaken by 
George Washington University which showed that about 50% of 
United States patents studied hctd to be supplemented by 
"know- how'' details before the patents became viable . From 
experience Pengilley was of the view that this figure may even 
understate the position . His conclusion was that given the 
small proporti on of inventions that would be practically 
workable in the absence of "know- how" the patent policy of 
compe lling inventive dis closure is not as effective to promote 
51 
competition as it at first seerns . That is, many pa.tentees 
ga i ned the benefits of a patent without paying the price of full 
disclosure . 
I n a cl d i t i on a v c1 i l a b i 1 i t y i n t h e p u b 1 i c do rn a i u et ft e r e x p i r y o f 
the patent was undermined by copyright , which in many cases 
provided a form of product protection extending beyond expiry of 
52. 
the patent . The Copyright Amendment Act 19 85 now provides thn.t 
the copyright in an artistic work will not be infringed by 
copying int o three dimensions the dra wings of an expired patent 
or registered design of which drawings the arcistic work forms 
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part . Copying actual products embodying the invention may still 
S3 
give rise to infringement. 
While considering the arguments that patents do not bring the 
benefits it is said they do, it should be borne in mind that 
benefits will not Eall evenly across all fields of technology . 
Consider the pharmaceutical industry . Research and development 
is immensely expensive , disclosure is essential on public healtl1 
grounds, and copying is relatively simple . The costs of 
developing new remedies would not be justified without market 
exclusivity for a period. 
The transfer oE technology value of patents should not be 
o,·er1 ooked . The know - how is usually licensed along with the 
patent and so the level of technical competence of recipients is 
increased . This is how Japanese industry was re - activated after 
Wo rld War II . T1tis intert1ntional transfer of tec1inology has 
pnrticular import ance for ~ew Zealand at its present level of 
in du strial developmettt. 
Wj tr-1out a. p.:, tent system, reseach and development would be 
directed towards innovation that could b e kept confidential . 
Additional funds would be spr:nt on security measures, for 
exctrnple attemplir,g t o prevent. pt·rtctices such as rev r~rse 
engineering . Protessor McCart hy is of the view that a nation 
wit-}10 t1l: d pdr e nt sybtem would suifec a "lower standard of 
i n no v r:i t i o n , in dust r i a 1 d t_ v e 1 op m P n t cm r1 s tan d a r cl o t l iv in g , w i t h 
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54 
a few modest innovations elaborately guarded by secrecy'' . Such 
countries would fall behind nations with patent systems in 
tecJ111ological de,:elopment. Certainly there would be more 
secrecy . Perhaps competitiun would ensure that there was still 
innovation. 
The conferring of legal property rights on the holder of the 
patent may also be said to encourage the transfer of technology, 
by providing a financial incentive to trade in the property . 
Thus the patentee may license the manufacture oE the invention 
covered by the patent and receive the benefit of the royalty 
SS 
pay,nen t s . 
It is often argued that the grant of intellectual property 
rights has the same public policy objectives as does a 
competition statute . Professor Bowman has regarded the common 
objective a.s the desire "to maxim1se wealth by providing what 
s~ 
consumers want at the lowest cost'' . 
57 
rts follows : 
Eagles has explained thi -
"Anti - trust law does this by dismantling combinations 
or practices which would enable producers to raise prices 
or r-educe output without fear of cornpetitio11 . Intellectual 
property a c b i e \' e s the ~ , 101 e we a l t h m d x i mi s i n g end by 
paradoxically allo"ing a pr-esent monopoly price or 
reJuction in output to secure greater choice at lcwer 
cost ,:it some time in the future . " 
Sa' 
Pellgille,:, has summarised it thus : 
"The c1rgument goes that a patellt grant encourc1ges 
inventiveness and the pt1blic disclost1re oE the knowledge so 
obtained. A pHtent right is the incentive the inYentor needs 
to invent. It is the i.ncen 1 jve lre neP.ds to disclose, rather 
th..-;n J1ide, his new - found kt1owleclgA . This disclosure is said 
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to be basically pro - competitive. Hence, the argument runs, 
there is nothing inconsistent, on the one hctnd, between a 
competition statute bannir1g anti - competitive restraints of 
trade, anti - competitive exclusive dealing and rnonopolisation 
and, on the other, a Patents rl.ct gi.ving the pat-entee a 
sixteen - yectr statutory monopoly ... " 
Neither, it is said, is there an inconsistency in a competition 
statute providing for specific exemptions 1n resp ect of 
conditions in li cences or assignments of intellectual property 
5"9 
rights . 
Pengi ll ey doubts this because of the different mechanisms set up 
60 
under patent law and competition law . In the case of patents 
there is a set term during whi ch the form of exclusivity is 
absolute . Also, unlike copyright , independent conception of the 
patented process is caught . ln the patent system there is no 
regulatory body set up to review profits made by patentees on 
public policy grounds. In addition there is a specific 
statutory exemption in the competition legislation itself . 
Pengilley did accept, however, that the framers of patent 
legislati o n saw in it a prn - c ompetiti.ve influence . He stated 
that "the whole "rnison d'etre'' of patent l egislation assumes a 
heighteuittg of inventiveness and greater disclosures. In this 
sense the patent legislation is assumed to gi,·e a posith·e 
c ontribution to tlte e co nomy - a pro-competitive boost by the 
"' injection o[ new technology". As Pengilley assumed, patents 1n 
their pr~sent form must bP. accepted as desirable. The 
legislature hc1s said so . It is not for the Courts to doubt thot 
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general proposition . Pengilley concludes that the patent laws 
should be interpreted with this positive object and intent in 
rninJ, that is that pro - competitive fctctors are the ultimate 
objectives of patent laws. 
Consistent with this an interpretati on of patent and competition 
law must be taken which a.l lows each area to achieve the 
pro - competitive ends asserted for it . In ~ew Zealand, as in 
Australia , i t must be assumed as a mctt ter of statutory 
interpretation that both pieces of legislation can live side by 
side . 
That is not to say that competition l Agislation should not 
provoke a reading down of patent rights . In this regard 
&2 
Pengilley accepted the view of the United States Supreme Court 
'13 
in Standard Sanitary Manufacturing Co . v U. S. that : 
"Rights covered by patents are indeed very definite and 
extensive ; but they do n ot give , any more than other 
rights , a universal licence against positive prohibitions . 
The Sherman Law is a limitation of rights; rights ½hich may 
be pushed to evil consequences and therefo:::-e restrc:tined'' . 
To ,:1rgue tha.t such a reading down of patent rights is n.n erosion 
of a pate11tee's freedom of action pursuant to the pa ~ent ignores 
the view that a patentee's rights may be seen as carrying into 
effect the proper pro - competitive objectives wl1ich patent 
legislation hcts sougl1t to ctchieve by grant of patent . 
patentee exacts ct restraint, unrelated to his rights as 
If a 
patentee, which if exacted by a covena11tee outside the patent 
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context, would breach competition legislation, the11 the exaction 
of that restraint is an abuse of market power in competition 
64 
terms. As Pengilley said, 
"It has riothing to do with a person's rights as a patentee 
to utilise his patent ash~ sees fit. It is not the rights 
in respect of the patent which are improperly exercised but 
the restraints attached . These arise not because of the 
patent itself b11t because of the abuse of power which the 
patent holder may carry into effect." 
The Gnited States Supreme Court has said that ''[t]he dichotomy 
between personal liberties and property rights is a false one. 
,s 
Property does not have rights. People have rights". 
These matters lead Pengiiley to the concl usion, or mo re 
appropriately to a starting point or ground rule in the alleged 
patent/competition conflict, t11at patents have no more right 
inherently to special protection from the ambit of competition 
law than l1as any other device by which mRrket power or dominance 
is achieved . " The protecti on entitlement of a patent must be 
directly referable only to enctbling its statutory purpose to be 
60 
carried out and not otherwise". 
2 . Trade :'·1 ct r k s 
(a) Registered Trade ~arks 
In modern Law a trade mark is a mark used in r e lation to goods 
to indicate a connection in the course of trade between the 
b'r 
goods and the proprietor or registered user. A mark "includes a 
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device, brand, heading, label , ticket, name , signature, word, 
60 
letter, numeral, or any combination thereof;". Thus a trade mark 
right is a Legal right protecting some symbol which 
distinguishes goods; it does not protect the goods themselves . 
In Champagne Heidsieck et cie . 
b9 
Monopole Societe Ano!:!..Y_me v Buxton 
Clauson J said a trade mark is a badge of origin, not a badge of 
control . Then goods can be identified by the consumer as 
perhaps having a reputation or as having been satisfactory in 
the past. The infringement of trade marks generally is 
determined by reference to the likelihood of confusion of 
70 
customers . 
To be registrable a trade mark must primarily be distinctive, 
71 
either inherently or by use. "Dist inctive'' is defined as 
meaning ''adapted, in relation to the goods in respect of which a 
trade mark is registered or proposed to be registered, to 
distinguish goods with which the proprietor of the trade mark is 
or may be connected ir1 the course of trade from goods in the 
case of which no such connection subsists, either generally or, 
where the trade mark is registered or proposed to be registered 
subject to limitations, in relation to use within the extent of 
72.. 
the registration." 
The Trc-Hle Marks RP.gister is broken into two parts, Part A is for 
those marks thftt are inhP.rent]y registral1le and Part B may be 
used for marks which do not }1ave the degree of distinctiveness 
required for registration in Part A, although they may be 
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capable of becoming distinctive at some time in the future by 
73 
their use . The primary distinction is that a Part A 
registration shall after the expiration of seven years from 
registration be taken to be valid in all legal 
74 
proceedings . 
Registration of a trade mark confers upon the registered 
proprietor exclusive right to the use of the mark in respect of 
the nominated goods, subject to any conditions imposed by the 
Commissioner of Trade Marks, and enables the proprietor to 
obtain relief in respect of infringement of the mark . Unlike 
patents, trade marks may be registered indefinitely, subject to 
the payment of renewal fees. 
Trade markh can be seen as furthering a dual purpose, that of 
protecting the owner from commercial loss and that of protecting 
the consumer from being misled or deceived as to the source of 
. 75 
goods or services . 
C . J . Markey s a i d i n J E?,_n:! e s B.!::!.!'.' r o u g h Ltd . 
76 
Inc. "[a] ·trademark' is not that which 
,. Si-_gn of the Beefeater, 
is infringed. \'ilrn t is 
infringed is the right of the public to be free of confusion and 
the synoymous right of a trRd e m~rk owner to control his 
product's reputation" . This second right means in effect that a 
trade mark owner has an in c entive, or more appropriately a 
pr e ssure, to create and maintain a good reputation for his 
goods . So it is argued that without trade marks product quality 
woqld decrease . + . t. 77' In his book Trade ,"larks and Unfair Compe..i 10n, 
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Professor i"lcCarthy said "If all may take a free ride on the 
successful seller's mark and reputation, there is no incentive 
78 
to distinguish one's own goods and services . " 
Professor McCarthy has also argued that trade marks reduce a 
consumer's cost of acquiring information about products and 
. 7j 
services . A consumer adverse to risk will purchase a brand 
familiar and proven . McCarthy acknowledges that product loyalty 
is often seen as a barrier to entry to the market . He points 
out that the opposite can in fact be argued, and indeed was in 
the U . S . 
Ko 
Supreme Court in Bates v State Bar of Arizona, a case 
involving the marketing of attorney fees, where the Court said 
attorney advertising should be permitted ''so as to aid the new 
competitor in penetrating the market." It does seem inherently 
undesirable that a 'barrier to entry' that comes about through 
consumer preference and choice can be advanced as an argument 
that trade marks are anti - competitive . Competition law was 
never intended to inhibit etficient, successful, 
non-discriminatory tradjng. 
(b) Unregistered or Common Law Trade Marks - Passing Off 
Passing off occurs when a person represents his goods or 
services as those of the plaintitf, or holds himself out as 
having some association with the plaintift, so as to cause 
dc1rnage or likely damage to the plaintiff's goodwill or 
reput,ttion through the resultant confusion . 
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Originally the principal subject matter protected were trade 
s, 
names and trade marks. This was gradually extended to cover 
8 2. 
other distinguishing features, such as get - up aud packaging, and 
to any conduct tending to associate the plaintiff's business 
with that of the defendant . 
The nature of the interest protected by the action of passing 
off is now taken to be the property in the business or goodwill 
8.3 
likely to be injured by misrepresentation . In Cadburv-Schweppes 
Ptv. Ltd . & Others v Pub Squash Co. Pty . 
84 
Ltd. Lord Scarman, 
delivering the judgment of the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Cuuncil on appea l from the Supreme Court of ~e w South Wales, 
f':r 
Equ ity Division (Powell J), said: 
"the tort is no lollger anchored, as in its early nineteenth 
century formulation, to the name or trade mark of a product 
or business . It is wide enough to encompass other 
descriptive materiRl, such as slogans or visual images, 
which radio, television or newspaper advertising campaigns 
can lead the market to associate with a plaintiff's product 
provided always that such descriptive material has become 
part of the goodwill of the product . _.;nd the test is 
whether the product has derivert from the advertising a 
distil!ctive character which the market recognises . " 
The elements of a passing off action have been ,1. u thoritatively 
8, 
identified as : 
(i) A misrepresent,,.tion; 
(ii) Made by a trader in the course of business ; 
(iii) To prospective customers of his or ultimate consumers 
of goods or services supplied by him; 
( i V) Which is calculated to injure the businPss or goodwill 
of anuth1~r trader (in t11e sense thc1t this is a 
reMsot1ably forceable consequence) ; 
(v) Which causes rtctucil dc'lmage to a b11siness or goodwil 1 
- 2B 
of a trader by whom the action is brought or (in a 
quia timet action) will probably do so. 
The action also applies to the carrying on ot business in 
8r 
general . Holding out the goods or services by making a 
representation is sufficient, there need not be an actual 
88 
sale . 
The competition inplications of ur1registered marks are the same 
in principle as for registered trade marks. 
3. Registered Designs 
The Designs Act 1953 protects features of shape, configuration, 
pattern, or ornament as applied to articles . 
i<-J 
To be registrable 
under that Act a design must be ''novel" . It must not have been 
used in New Zealand or described in any publication available in 
New Zealand . Where an article's shape is due solely to its 
»o 
function , then it may not be r-egistered . 
Registration gives the owner, referred to as the pro~rietor, of 
a design exclusive right to make, import, sell or hire the 
9 1 
design . This includes materials unique to the design such as 
moultis . This right is assignable . Registration in ~ew Zealand 
is for fi\ ·e years with provision for up to two fi'-·e year 
92. 
extensions . 
Because wholly functional designs and principles of construction 
are expressly excluded, protection of designs would seldom have 
any relevance for competition purposes. This is not a 
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frequently used form of protection in \ew Zealand . 
4. Copyright 
Although a number of statutes in the eigtheenth and nineteenth 
ce nturies attached various forms of copyright protection to 
va rious products of literary, dramatic, musical and artistic 
93 
creat ive endeavour, the Copyright Act 1911 (U.K . ) was the first 
9 4 
attempt to provide a comprehensive code of copyright protection. 
9:>" 
Common law copyright had two purposes, firstly to provide 
protection for the investment of publishers, and secondly as a 
form of ce11sorship, particularly religious censorship . By the 
eighteenth century, with the spread of literacy, there grew a 
large and flo11r ishing publishing trdde and protection became 
more predominant in the area of protection of investment of 
printers and publishers. Copyright later became a means of 
securing protection not only for inventors but for creators as 
we 11 . In more recent timAs copyright protection has expanded 
into suC'h ctrea~ as broadcasting a11d here it is to provide 
protection for entrepreneurial activity . 
Now it may be snid tha t the purpose of the Copyright laws is to 
encourage and reward authors, cornposers, artists, desig1ters and 
ot11er creative people as wel 1 as the entrepeneurs su c h as 
publishers who risk their en.pita! in putting their works betore 
% 
the publi c . 
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The author is given certain exclusive rights to enjoy the 
benefit of the created subject matter for a limited time, 
97 
usually t11e life of the author plus fifty years . Copyright is 
not a right to do anything, but a rig11t to stop others from 
doing something. That which is susceptible of copyright 
protection is classified into "works", consisting of original 
literctry, drRmatic, musi cal and artistic works, and other 
''subject matter", consisting of creat ions of a kind which have 
come into prominence more recently such as cinematograph films, 
93 
television and sound broadcasts, and so1rnd recordings. 
As with patents, it call be argued that copyright does provide an 
incentive for creativity . However th is purpose is valid o nly in 
so frtr as it may be said that when you provide protection for 
creativity you also to some extent provide an incentive for it. 
In normal circumstances a right agninst copying will not 
interfere with the legitimate rights of competitors. However in 
'.';'e,, Zealand. infringement by three dimensional reproductions 
raises certai11 competiti on issues particularly in the area of 
9 9 
spare parts dealt with bRlow. 
5 . Plant VRrieties 
The Plant Variety Rights Act 1987 aftords protection by 
registrntion for new plant v,'\ri.eti.es in ~ew ZP..=1.l,1nd . 
will come into force on a clc1y to be fixed by the 
This Act 
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IQO 
Go\·ernor-(;eneral by Order in Council. All varieties of plants 
lol 
e.\CAlJt bacteria. fungi and algae can be protected. In general 
only reprodur.tive materjal is protected. ImportRtion of the 
prodtice of plants of a protected variety from a country where 
protectio11 is not afforJed for thRt variety is also protected 
,oz. 
under the legislRtion. 
For pres~nt purposes protection of plant varieties under the 
previous Plant Varieties Act 1973 can be taken as substantially 
similar . 
A variety is considered novel if reproductive material of the 
variety ha~ n ot previou~ly been sold for a period dependi11g on 
/OJ 
the type of plant. A variety must be distinguishable by one or 
more character i stics from any other variet)· whose existence was 
,o,,, 
a matter of common knowledge when the application was made . A 
variety must be stable whi ch means it must remain true to its 
description in respect of cycles of reproduction o r 
10 5' 
multiplication after repeated propagation or reproduction. A 
variety must be homogeneous having regard to the particular 
features of its sexual reproduc~ion or vegetRtive propagation as 
'~" the case may be. 
Proprietors lia\·e the exclu~ive right to produce for sale or sell 
10; 
reproductive mat eria l of the variety con,~ernP.d. They also have 
the rig11t to prupctgate for cornmercictl purposes fruit - producing 
101 
and or1Larnental vegetath:ely propctgated plants . They ma_) licen s e 
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10 9 
protected rights. They may also prohibit the importation of 
reproductive material of protected varieties into \ew Zealand 
/10 
from countries where the variety concerned cannot be protected . 
Plant variety protection is subject to the right of any person 
to propagate, grow or use a protected variety for non - commercial 
111 
purposes and to use reproductive material from a protected 
variety for hum~n consumption or other non - reproductive 
II i_ 
purposes . If the production of a hybrid or new variety does not 
require repeated use of the protected variety, any person may 
hybriJise or produce a new variety from the protected variety or 
sell any hybrid or new variety produced from the protected 
ill 
variety . 
The co mpetition implications of the plant variety rights 
legislation will be the same as those for patents as dealt with 
r,4 
above . 
6. Trade Secrets, Breach of Confidence, and Know - bow 
The terms "trade secrets" and "know- how" a.re really encompassed 
i n t-11 e term con f i den t i a 1 i n form et t i on w hi c h i s protect e d by the 
action Eor breach of confidence. 
Rights to prevent unauthorised use or disclosure of confiden1:ial 
i11formation have vAriously been attributed to e~uity, contract , 
tort, and property. Regarding equ_ity, Sir Thomas :lore once said 
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··th ree things are to be helpt in conscience : .Fcaud, 
11s 
;,, c c· i < 1 P n t a n d t h i n g s o f C o n f i de n c e ·' . I n s o me c i r c urn s t a n c e s 
~quity will rP.quire a person who h.:1s promised to keep i3. secret 
t o do so . So a court may grant an injunction to re
strain a 
prornisor from br1-sahit1g ,'I. pr·omise to keep a confidence or award 
llb 
darnctges unce it has been breached . 
Also ct pdrty to a contract may be bound by an express or implied 
t P rin to "i<.eep certain information confidentinl unless there is an 
Authorisn.tion to disclose. But fill obligation of confi
dence can 
nr ise in the absence of any express or implied contractual 
Ill 
re lationship . 
In the Lnited Kingdom the Law Commission has recommended the 
., & 
c reation by statute of a new tort of breach of confidence . The 
l cl w re l at i n g t o u n f a i r c o m p e t: i t i o n , w h i c h i s at 1 e a s t a n a 1 o go u s 
II 9 
t o tortious liability cctn be viewed as a source of procection 
fo r trctde secrets . 
A trade secret ccrn a 1 so be seen as property . If it
 is, then the 
rni.sctppropri.cttion rn,,.y giv2 ri.se to civil remedies ctnd crimi11al 
11 0 
s c1I1C t ions. 
In Fri-lse~ v 
ll. l 
Evar2~ Lord Der111ing explainer\ the r,-,t. ionctl - behind 
Ill 
rP.meriies for breach of confidence : 
"Tht> court wi.11 i.n a proper cc1se r e strain the publication of 
confidential i1tformati.on . The jurisdiction is based not so 
rn u c h u n prop e r t y or o n c on t r d c t- ,'\ , on t Ii e d 11 t .Y t o be ,J t good 
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faith . \o person is permitted to divulge to the world 
information which he has received in confidence, unless he 
has just cause or excuse for doi11g so . Even if he comes by 
it innocently, nevertheless on c e he gets to know that it was 
originally given in confiden c e, be can be restrained from 
breaking that confidence . " 
The idea must have some signifi c ant element of originality not 
/:U 
a l ready in the realm of public knowledge . It must be established 
tl1dt the occasion of the communication was confidential and also 
t hat the content of the idea was clearly identifiable, original, 
of potential commercial attractiveness and capable of being 
'""" re c1lised in actuality . 
12.s-
I n Thomas Marshal 1 (ExQ_orts) Ltd v Guinle Sir Robert "legarry 
\ ' .-C . t:1.'-
breach of confidence action in an industrial or trade setti11g: 
outlined per curiam the requirements for success in a 
( i ) 
( i i ) 
The information must be information the release of 
which the ownRr believes would be injurous to him or 
to the advantage of his rivals or others; 
The owner must belive that the information is 
c onfidential . The i.nforrna.tion need uot in fact be 
c onfidential; 
(iii) The owner's belief under the two previous heads must 
be reasonable; 
( i V) The i11formatio1t must be judged in the Light of the 
usage and pr-actices of the partil: ular industry or 
trade concerned . 
Sir Robert ~Iegarry V . - C . saw t.hese recruirements ns a maximum 
threshold which if satisfied wuuld en t itle prore c tion. It rnuy 
b e that i.nforrn,1\-ion not sat· isf y illg ftl l the '.->P. reqitir e ments may 
still be e11titled to protection as c onfident:ial information or 
121 
t r· a de se c n~ts. 
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12 B 
In faccenda Chicl,en Limited_ v Fow_ler , a recent breach of 
conf idence case involving an ex - employee restraint of trade 
sit uation, it was held tha.t only specific trade secrets so 
confidential that even though they may necessarily have been 
l ea rned by heart they cannot be used for anyone's benefit but 
t11e maste r 's even after the employment has ceased, are 
dc tionable if they are di..sclosed without the authority of the 
12.9 
employer. 
An ex - employee must be able to utilis0 skill, knowledge and 
ex pP.rience gained in former employment. 
The line between this 
ctn d trade secrets must depend on the circumstances of each 
C' ase . 
,30 
I n SSC & B : 
Lintas New Zealand Limited v :lurphy Prichard J 
fo und that the categorisation of information employed in 
1"31 
Fa c c end a C"h i cl, e n L i r0.J-_!_~ d v F ow 1 e r d i d not re a l l y a s s i s t i n a 
situat ion revolving a.round the question of status to be accorded 
tu information pertctining to specific details ot transactions 
between employer and customer, particularly in the situati..on 
where transa ct jons were in progress at the time the transaction 
His Honour considered that tlw situation was entirely 
different and i..hctr informatjon should be pr-otected where the 
Prnployee bad taken ful l adv,,.nta.gt-! of his spe c ial knowle<lge of 
c1ct ivities of the l.iusiness in rP-lation ro its clients· affairs 
131 
in orde r to persuade those cljents to transfer their busi11ess. 
36 -
The very nature of intormation protected by the law of 
confidence and the fact that protection is lost through public 
djsclosure leave little scope for nnti-cornpetitive implications 
from agreements involving disclosure . 
7. Broader Policy Aspects 
I t should be noted that in some instances an innovator ot 
i n tellectual property may be in a position to choose which form 
of protection to seek , in addition tu making the choice as to 
whether to seek protection at all (such as in the case of a 
patent where it may be decided to maintain secrecy instead) . 
The Department of Trade and Industry discussion paper gives an 
e xample of the computer software industry where copyright has 
been used since it is more effective than patenting or design 
133 
r egistration . 
Sometimes one form of protection may replace another, 
e ffectively continuing the protected life of the product. In 
~ew Zealand copyright has often been relied upon after the 
13"! 
~xpiration of a registered design or pacent . This may be said 
t o upset the balance hetweP.n public benefit accruing from 
intellect11al property systems and competition policies . Trade 
111r1 r k pro t e c t i on rn a y a l so e f f e c t h· e 1 y rep l a c e pa t e 11 t protect i on 
upon tl1e expication of a patented product which is markP.ted 
u11d,~r ci trcicle nnrne . 
37 -
rt must be accepted that it is for Parliament to decide the 
cornplex socio - economic question as to whether intellectual 
property rights do indeed serve t-l1e ends of promotion and 
disclo sure of inventiveness such that they can be des cr ibed as 
pro - competitive. 
I t is impossibl e to maintain the position that agreements 
relat ing to intellectual property are outside the purview of the 
rest rictive trade practices provisio11s of the Commerce Act 1986 
s imply because it is the nature of intellectual property to 
c reate exclusionary privileges and th e refore re straint of 
compet ition. The two fields are not incompatible. Con flict 
a rises when intellectual prope r ty ri ghts are used beyond their 
l egitimate scope. The question is rather one of boundary : where 
does the patent privilege end and where does the unlawful 
!JS" 
rest raint beg in. 
There seeming to be at face value an i11herent confl i ct between 
1;,E, 
intellectual property and competit ion law, Eagles has said : 
''w11j le one may admire the ingenuity thus expended on these 
intellectudl set pieces a point has to be made with some 
fnrce is that they are utterl y irrelevant to an assessment 
of the proper interaction of intellectual propert-y and 
competition law (sic). Nowhere in the capitalist world does 
anti - trust law seek to do away with int e ll ectual property 
rights alt.ogether or even (in most cc1ses) pre\·e1tt their 
dggregation by a single holder. \a - one doubts that ½Orne 
sort of intellectual property regime is a soc ial necessity. 
\'one of this even begins to answ e r- the real question which 
is not 'is intellectual property on balance a good thing?' 
but rather 'i1,; it not rather- too much of a good thing in a 
particular case a nJ is competition law the mo . t appropriate 
rnectns of redressing the bala!lce?' 
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T11 i. s perhaps i s an over - genera 1 i sat i on . Different rights, even 
of the same kind, will have varying competition implications in 
differe nt business contexts according to commercial and economic 
circ umstances. Any view is difficult to establish empirically 
and att itudes to intellectual property rights in the competition 
b b
. t . l?,7 
area ecome very su Jee 1ve. 
This must in turn depend upon the perceived goals of both 
intel lectual property law and competition law . In ?'Jew Zealand , 
it is submitted , we have a very clear statement of the essence 
of the goals of our competition law set out in the Comme rce Act 
1986 . Competition law is not to be seen prima.rily to protect a 
sta.t us quo of many smctll entrepreneurs. If it were then the 
technological innovation and marketing success of some firms 
would be a threat to be dealt with harshly. 
The long title of the Commerce Act 1986 states that it is ''.:\n 
/3~ 
<\et lo prornote competition in markets wi tl1in New Zealand ... '' 
It is important to see the Act in the context of the 
/~£, 
Gov ernment's broad economic strategy which is tl1at : 
''the productive resources of the economy should be al located 
rnore in accordance with the demands of consumers rather than 
the demands of producer'=> . In o ne sense, the move is from a 
private enterprise approach to a free enierprise one. The 
Commerce Act 1986 is intended to underwrite this policy 
sl1i.ft and the dismflntli.ng of public regulation which the 
implerne11tdtion of this poli c y inv o lvRs, by pc-eventing the 
substi.t11tion of private regulation of competition in 
mctr1·ets, by means of trade pra c tices". 
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rt is fundamental to New Zealand competition law that 
co mpetition itself is seen as an ideal rather than the interests 
of competitors . 
In addition to the Government's deregulatory economic management 
pol icies it is relevant that the Commerce Act 1986 implements an 
140 
aspect of the C.E.R . Agreement, which requires harmonisation of 
commercial laws between New Zealand and Australia, by closely 
fo llowing the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Aust . ) . 
TI 1 e Au s t r a 1 i an I n du s t r i a l Pro p e rt y Ad\,- i s or y C o mm i t t e e ha s 
, ... 
st ated : 
"We see no reason why competition laws proscribing conduct 
which has substantially anti-competitive e f fects should not 
have full application in relation to anti-competitive 
conduct which involves patents. In those cases where the 
patent of itself creates extreme monopoly power , this will 
mean that the patentee must limit the exploitation of his 
exclusvie right so as to avoid substantially lessening 
competition . In some circumstances, this could mean that he 
will be obliged to li cense othe rs on reasonable terms. 
What is critical, however, whether patents are the sole 
factor or one of multiple factors co ntributing to rr.a.rket 
power, is that the circumstance attracting the operation and 
s d n c t i ons or rem e d i e c; o f t he c o m p e t i t i on 1 a w s ho II l d be t 1-1 at 
the cond11ct in q11esti.on is calculated substantially to 
lessen competition, and not merely that it involes a patent 
or the exercise of patent rights . There is no reason for 
special treatment of patent - related conduc t as such, by wcty 
of either special prosciption or special exemption. 
As Professor ~cCarthy has noted, it is also important to bear in 
mind that as the 'main-stream ' of compet ition or anti-trusi: law 
1nd po1icy c hanges, so also does its impa ct upon intellectual 
prop e rt y change , f o· r t he " i n t e 1 1 e c t u a 1 prop e rt y - fl n t i - t r u s t 
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illterface is but a tributary of the main stream of anti - trust 
14-l 
law''. 
c. Interpreting Policy Goals 
In giving effect to the statutory pro,·isions the New Zealand 
courts will face questions of construction in the light of the 
unde rlying legislative policy . The traditional methods used by 
coinmon law conrts to interpret statutes raise concerns about the 
broad policy concepts involv2d in competition 
143 
law cnses. This 
co ncern is exacerbated when reference is mnde to economic 
cu ncepts, which, it is said, must be read into the wording of 
cer tain provisions. How does this fit with canons of 
co nstruction such as natural and ordinary meanings? A 
pa rticular manifestation of this problem occurs when considering 
t-he role that lay members or expert witnesses may play in the 
de termination of such questions of ''law". 
It is to be hoped that early cases will be argued 
l . accorc.1ng 
c learly establishRd economic concepts rather than competing 
to 
t heories, and that economic jargin will be avoided. With the 
r1dv antage of experience acclllnulated in overseas jurisdictions in 
de aling with such issu es , the courts in ~ew Zealand should hav e 
l ittle difficulty in finding the correct balance in applying 
ec onomic principl es and tlte law to commercial situr1tions . 
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In addition to fears as to the use of statutory construction, 
Peng illey has said that the patent rights/competition confljst 
may be seen as involving essentially a question of personal 
14,f 
p r operty rights. He regards the property analogy as designed 
mo re to enable the patentee to sell, lease, or licence the 
rights rather than for any other reason, and the property 
analogy incomplete since, firstly tangible property , without 
property rights in it, would cease to be manufactured and sold 
whe reas a patent invention would not cease if patent monopolies 
we re abolished, and secondly because a patent property right ma~· 
ca rry an inherent position of market dominance, unlike tangible 
property . 
l4S' 
Pe ngilley concluded by saying: 
D. 
"For you do not have an absolute right to do what you like 
with your car. You must register it, keep it mechanically 
safe, it must have certain equipment in it and you must not 
drive it after indulging to excess. Your rights to deal 
with your car 'as you think fit' are large ly circumscribed 
by other rules. Why should patent rights not similarly be 
c ir c umscribed by competition rul es even if there is a basic 
right to deed witl1 your patent 'as you see fit'?'' 
Intellectual Pro~rtv Rights and :'lonopolies 
The intellectual property statutes anJ common law principles 
gr nt legal property rights in a variety of forms. Although the 
inJividual components of this system differ, in scope and 
du ration, it is usual for an inv e ttt o r or similn.r develope r of 
i ntellectual property to be given at1 exclusive right to the 
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object or idea he or she has developed . It is these exclusive 
rights whi eh raise concern as to the detriments which are 
no rmally associated with the exercise of monopoly power. 
I t is important to distinguish between "monopoly" as it is used 
in economics and competition law and monopoly as it is used to 
d~scribe intellectual property rights. 
In economic 
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terms in the context of ~ew Zealand competition law 
"monopoly'' means a true market mnnoply which, in terms of the 
ro mmerce Act 198fi, would generdlly give rise to a dominant 
position in a market . It connotes market power . 
I n the intellectual property context ''monopoly'' is used in a 
d ifferent sense , that of a property monopoly or monopoly in a 
particular product , process or method . 
14-1 
~c:1gles has said: 
''[I]t is true that patented goods often face competition 
from products outside the scope of the patent. Tl1is does 
not , as has sometimes been argued, make the patent any less 
of a monopoly . All it dernonstrdtes th r1t a monopoly is not 
the sctme as market dominance (sic) . One may have a monopoly 
on the production of glass bot t les in New Zectland. Tbis is 
of little 11se if bottles face stiff compRtition from cans . 
In such ct case having the patPnt for bottles (if such a 
thing wP.re pos':>ible) wo11ld be of little consolation . '' 
Tlte writec· would arg-uC= thr1L the word "monopoly" is misplaced in 
Ei:lg-les · exarnple, sir1ce the writer regards a monopoly as a state 
u f affairs in,) m1-trket, and if suL>stitutes <:1re availa.ble, there 
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i s no monopoly . If so does not Eagles· example fortify the view 
that a true monopoly is quite different from the exclusivity of 
an intellectual property right? 
The strength in market terms of an ''intellectual property 
monopo ly'' is dependent on factors such as the nature of the 
product market. Debpite intellectual property protection other 
pd rticipants in the market may be able to providA sufficiently 
clo se Sttbstitutes to prevent a serious lessening of competition . 
Mo reover in a dynamic market the commercial Adva ntage of legal 
do minance is not necessarily long l asting . In addition the 
" s t at e o f t he art " i n the pa rt i c u l a t ' prod u c t are a w i l l de t er mi n e 
the degree of competition. The effect on compet ition will be 
muc h less in respect of refinements in technological terms than 
wi ll be the case in respect of massive innovation '.
48 
An exc lusive right which cannot be avoided by substitutes or 
alte rnative technologies may well significantly inhi bit 
lO mpetition in a particular market. 
It is necessary to louk to the extent to which each intellectual 
pr ope rty right confers a true monopoly . 
1 . Patents, Registered Designs, and Prote cted Plant Varieties 
I n B r i t i s h Le y 1 a n d : I o t or C or 12.Q r a t i o 1 1 Lt d . L'< A 10 \-her v Arms t r on g: 
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14') 
Pr1 t~_I:J_t_s~_:___1-td. & Anothe_!::_ Lord Bridge of Harwich said "[t]he 
rights conferred by the 1977 [Patent] anJ 1949 [Registered 
De signs] Acts are clearly distinguisha.ble [from the position 
un der the Copyright Act] , i n that they are truly and expressly 
15"1 1s·o 
mo nopol i stic'' . I n Ha rt f o r d - Em Q_ i re C o v L' 11_i_ t e .-9 _?_ t 9 t ~ ~ Rut 1 edge 
J , though dissenting , sa i d "[b]asical ly these [patent laws and 
ctn ti - trust laws] are opposed iu policy , the one granting rights 
,si. 
of rnonopo l y , the other forbidding monopolistic activities" . 
,.,~ 
Th is i s clear l y Eagles' view also . 
In t h e Department of Trade and Industry Discussion Paper on 
I ntellect u al Property it was said that ''the patent system 
l;i°~ 
c reates a temporary legal monopoly for inventors" . 
Professo r McCarthy regards the v i ew that a patent is a monopoly 
a s a mi snomer . 
15".5' 
He has stated : 
"The term "monopoly" to a11 economist generally means nothing 
more than a seller who has some legal insulation from 
cornyet it ors and faces a tte ga t i , ,e l y sloped demr1.nd curve . A 
patent is certainly "prop e rty·• in the sense that it is a 
Legal right to exclude others from ma.king, using or selling 
that slice of technology defined by the pat e nt claims. The 
problern i s that the lerm "monopoly'', largely neutr .. il to the 
economist, is not n eutral wlien used in a11 anti - trust 
co11t0xt . It connotes thc-Jt pa.t: e nts are somehow inherently 
anti - competitive r1nd anti - soci ,"11 . But a. true "monopol_y" 
takes something from the cousumer that already existed . A 
patenl does not take away competition in a technology which 
previously existed : il gra1tts a limited term exclusive right 
in a new technology introduced by the i11vP.ntor . 
Cnfortunc1tely , thtc! worcl ''monopoly" lias been devalued by it:s 
c; r>n':itant u~e as a sloganeering epithet by anti - patent 
zealots . 
A tc 11 e "a11ti. - trust monopoly" consists of very substantial 
market: power in a relevant economic market: . A pc1tent does 
not define it':-> own rele ' cHtt economic mc rket and in most 
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cases, a patented piece of technology faces considerable 
competition from alternatives . Without a searching relevant 
market analysis, one cannot state tliat the clctims of all, or 
even many, patents automc1tical ly define a true ''relevant 
eCOllOnJic market" . 
[15"6] 
As Bowmc1n observed : 
''A very large percentage of patents granted, even those 
whic h invo l ve nonobvious invention and result from 
substantia l investment i11 innovative activity, may be in 
fields where substitute patents or non patented 
sub~titutes are so close that in economic terms the 
"patent monopoly" may be very limited or even non 
existent" . '' 
},1 1 example of the distinction may be taken from the facts of 
1:.7 
:1 ons ant o Co v ~_tau f fer Chem i c a l Co . , w hi c h a l thou g l I not a 
competitio11 law case , provides a set of facts which can be 
an alysed using competition law concepts . In that case the 
P laintiff had a monopoly right in a particular chemical 
herbicide , Round - Up, but that would not automatically translate 
15"8 
i nto a domincrnt position or monopoly in the herbicide market. 
The same considerdtions apply to protected plant \·arieties. 
I n the Departmental Discussion Paper on Intellect,1al Property it 
was said that the Designs Act 1953 ''providP.s the owner of a 
design with monopoly protectio11 on trade in the article 
CO!ltaining the design when that design is registered under th8 
159 
Act" . 
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2. Trade Marks 
loo 
A trade mark is not a monopoly. A registered trade mark does 
no t prohibit the manufacture or sale or a product identical to a 
c ompetitors so long as that product does not bear the 
compet it or's mark . 
lbl 
McC arthy has said : 
"the only market power a trade mark really gives is the 
right to prevent customer confusion .... 
A "trademark" is created only in the public mind. 
trademark does not force anyone to buy anything: 
And a 
"The most a successful trademark can 
consumer to try the product - once. 
not have the monopoly power to force 
something i t does not want . " (, l.:a.) 
do is to persuade a 
A trademark does 
the public to buy 
Thus , to define all trademarks as "monopolies" in the 
absence of an exhaustive relevant market analysis is 
meaningless . The vast majority of trademarked products are 
in severe competition with other trademarked products . It 
makes no sense to say something like: "The Ford Motor Co. 
has a monopoly of FORD automobiles." FORD brand autos are 
not a r e levant economic market. The [United States] Supreme 
Court observed th,:lt: "[T]bis power thdt, let us say, 
automobile or soft - drink m~nufacturers have over their 
trademarked products is not the power that marks an illegal 
monopoly. Illegal power must be appraised in terms of the 
compet itive market for the product . " (,,31" 
Ho wever, that trade marks in the shape of a bottle would ~011fer 
a monopoly, presumably in the intellectual property se~se, led 
+he House of Lords to refuse to allow an appeal against the 
Pe gistr .u· of Trade ~larks· refusal to register the CCJco - Co la 
')o t t 1 e as a trade mark .'~ 4 
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J. Copyright 
,c,s 
Lo rd Griffiths referred to copyright in British Le\·lancl as ··a 
r ight in the nature of a monopoly" . Further his Lordship said 
"if, as I must for the purpose of this argument, I assume that 
Parliament has, through copyright, given a monopolistic right to 
''" t h e manufacturer in the shape of his spare parts". 
Th is appears, with respect, to miss the point that copyright is 
on ly ever infringed where the copyright work is substantially 
co pied . Indeed a work identically emulating a copyright 
protected work does not infringe if it can be shown to have been 
r eated independently, sinc e, for present purposes, the 
re stricted act is reproducing the work or a substantial part of 
''7 i. t. 
Ho wever, Lord Griffiths may have been referring only to the 
re ality of the particular situation in that case that an exhaust 
system which was c o mp c1tible with a British Le_:,land car could 
only be designed economically by r e sorting to copying or some 
f orm of reverse engineering . 
re ferred to by Lord Bridge !~ 
This reRlity was expressly 
Lo rd Bridge took a somewhat diff e r e nt \·iew of the artistic 
co pyright code. His Lordship said that it ''doe1:; not purport 
ro confer any monopoly, only, so far as relevant for present 
purposes, to protect the copyright owner from reproduction by 
- 48 -
,451 
co pying" . The way in which his Lordship distinguished copyright 
f ro m patents and registered designs also indicate this 
. 170 
view . 
~! cC arthy also makes the point that the owner of copyright in a 
wo rk does not have a "monopoly" in the sense that it must 
s u rvive in a market amid a plethora of competitive works .n• 
It is submitted this fits in with the writer's view that 
copyright does not create a true market monopoly, but only a 
"monopoly" in one particular work such as a certain novel . 
It is just a matter of degree which here makes the ordinary 
pe rson reject the idea that a particular novel has a "monopoly" 
si nce copyright only confers a ndrrow "product monopoly" . 
Ea gles points out that the view typified by ~cCarthy may well 
s it well with novels, but becomes unsound in the case of 
co pyright protection for three - dimensional industrial ob j ects, 
172. 
as exist in New Zealand . 
4 . Trade Se c rets, Breach of Confidence, and Know - h o w 
The concept of trade secrets, c onfidential informr1tion, or 
k now - how, by its very nature (secrecy), can give rise to 
e xclusivity of products or servi c es . In som e c ircumstances 
lec1inical advantage gives rise to mark e t power. 
:.\ product or service bdsed upon l r a.de secrets o r kll o w- how will 
r arel)· enjoy a position in a mark e t in whi c h there are no 
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r e asonable substitutes. But as in the case of patents, there 
ma y be circumstances in which such products or services occupy a 
se parate market so as to constitute monopolies . 
Be fore lec1ving this discussion of monopolies, it should be 
me ntioned that nowhere does the CommP.rce Act 1986 refer to 
"monopolies" or ''monopolisation". Section 36 which in effect 
controls (but does not prevent) monopolisation, refers to a 
IH 
"dominant position in a market" which represents a lower measure 
o f market power than does a true monopoly. 
I n certain circumstances statutory monopolists may have 
c ompet i tors and conve rsely it does not take a true monopoly to 
f ette r competition . For example we have seen that trade marks 
d o not confer a true monopoly, and yet a trade mark may well be 
u sed as the vehicle for an anti-competitive scheme . This was 
r ecognised by the European Court of Justice in Pronugt_in de 
17-4 
Paris v Schillgallis, where the mark, in that ca~e, at ledst in 
part , identifying c.1 franchised service, operated as the 
i ncentive to draw franchisees into an anti-competitive 
f ranchising agreement. 
Tl1ese comments as to the accuracy with which the label 
'monopoly" may be attached to various intellectual property 
r ights must be borne in mind in applying the statutory enactme nt 
o f :'Jew Zealand 's competition poli c y . Semctntics can Lead to 
f lawed conclusions. 
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III LAWS ADVANCING COMPETITION POLICIES OUTSIDE THE COMMERCE 
-- ACT 1986 - -- --- ·--. -
- -- ---·--
A, Competition Poli_ci_es Promoted in the Intellectua_J_Prq~t.Y 
Statutes 
Ea ch i ntellectua l statute has particula r threshold requirements 
fo r protection which ensure that only "worthy" subject matter is 
p r otected . 
So me of the intellectual property statutes make provision for 
l he regulation of certain ant i-competit.i\·e co1tduct on the p<:1rt 
of right owners . Often this regulation is by way of compulsory 
lic ences . Although anti - competitive behaviour is not the only 
subject of these provisions, for they relate generally to the 
wider notion of tl1e public interest, conduct such as refusal to 
li cense or otherwise failing to sati!:>fy the reasonable 
re quirements of the public for access to those rights c an be 
prevented . 
rt should also be noted that, with the exception of co pyright, 
rP gistration is required undP.r each of the intellectual propert y 
!:> t a tu t e s be f ore t he i n v e n t o r or d e s i g n e r· li et s any e n f or c e a b l e 
le gctl rights in respect of the int e l le c tu,1.l property. 
in t apply to pa s sing off and breach of c on f id e n ce . 
This does 
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1. Paten ts ,\ et 1953 
The requiremP.nts for reg is tration in themselves prevent 
unjust ifi ed appropriation of rights of exclusivity . 
l7S' 
already have been dealt with above. 
These 
Sect i o ns 4 6 - SO of the Patents Act 1953 pruvide means for 
avo iding abuses of patent monopoly rights and prote cti ng the 
pub lic interest. 
Sect ion 4 6 of the Patents Act 1953 provides for compulso r y 
endo rs ement or li cences permitting others to use the pcttented 
17(. 
inve ntion on application to the Cornr11issioner or Patents . This 
pr ov isi o n prevents patent holders from suppressing inventions as 
a sou rce of cornpe t it i ve ctdv antage . The grounds upon which 
ap pl i ca ti on may be made a r e certa inl y wider than for the purpose 
of promoting competition . They really apply where the 
re asonable requirements of the public in relation to a patented 
in vent i on are not being met . 
177 
( e) : 
They are outlined in s . 4fJ(2)(a) -
" (a) That the patented invention, being capctble of being 
commercictl l y wo rked in ~ew Ze, 'I.L1nd, is n,1t b~:ing 
co mmerc i ally worked therein or i. s 11ot being -,o worl-:ed 
to the fullest extent that is :;:-e,1so 11 ably practica:)le : 
(b) Thctt a dPmand foe the parented in :,Jew Ze<1 lc1nd is not 
being met on r easonable terrns : 
(c) Thc:tt t-.he corn 1n erc:in.l working of the inve11ti<)n in >iew 
Zeal,'lnd is being prevented o r hinclereJ by t-he 
import cit ion of the pc1te11ted art-icle : 
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(d) That by reason of the refusal of the patentee to grant 
a licence or licences un reaso11able terms -
( i ) 
( i i ) 
A mctrket for the export of the patented article 
mctnufactured in >lew Zealand is not being 
supplied; or 
T1te working or etficient working in \ew Zealand 
of any other patented i nvention which makes a 
substantial contribution to the art is prevented 
or hindered; or 
(iii) The establishment or development of commercial or 
industrial activities in ~ew Zealand is unfairly 
prejudiceJ : 
(e) That by reason of conrlitions imposed by the patentee 
upon the grant of licences under th<=> patent , or upon 
the purchdse, hin-·, or use of the patented article or 
process, the rnanufacl..ure, u.se, or srtle of m,-,.terials 
not protected by trw pc1tent , or the estabLishement or 
devel()pment uf commercial or inJustria.l activities in 
New Zealdnd is unfairly prejudiced . '' 
The grounds do ltc:tVP. over-tones ill terms of competitiol!.. 
Pciragraph (c1) is intenc'ied to prevent patents being sealed and 
t hen held unused by the proprietor . This in effect means that 
t he holder ought to make use of the patented invention rather 
t han merely endec.1vouring o prevent c1nyone else from doing so . 
Paragraph (b) provides that an application may be made on the 
6 rounds th<1t tit~ supplier of thP. patented article i:,, not meeting 
d <~ :n a n cJ u n re a s on ,'l b 1 e t er rn s . Al though reaso11 _=:1.ble does not 
ne 1: eshc1.rily eq11<-,te with competitive, anti - competitive conduct 
c oulrl well be said to be uureasonc:1ble. 
P11.cagra.pl1g ( c ) relates to the en c; our1gement of Jomestic industry 
e111pl1asising t:lie desirability ot pctteni..s being worked in \ew 
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,i'.Pd la.nd rather than any pro-competition grounds. From a 
compet ition point of view it does not matter wh et her the 
competition comes fr·om within \ew Zealand or from imports . 
Pa ragraph (d) relates to refusHls to licence. Certainly 
ant i - competitive conduct may afford a ground for an application 
for a compulsory licence under this head. For example if a 
pa tentee refused a licence under d. patent over a unique form of 
mac hinery for t1se in paper mills or did so only on onerous terms 
t his would prejudice the cl1r:rnce of compet itors to compete . 
wo uld either have tu continue to op rr1te less etficiently 
They 
without thP. machinery or pay the price for tile licence , in which 
~a se they would still be operating inefficiently by paying too 
muc h for the use of the technology . Those competitors might 
have the right to apply under s . 46 although preslimal:dy some 
ev idence of inadequate or abusive use of the inventiou by the 
owner would also be necessary . 
Pa ragraph (e) applies in similar c irc11mst11nces where c onditions 
pre judicing commerci<'ll or industrial activities c1re imposed by 
t he patentee upon the grant of a licence . .-\n example wo 11ld be 
ctl l attempt to r estrict or control further manuf..:1cture using the 
t) a t e n t e d prod u c t a s an i 11 gr I"! d i e n t . 
173 
Subject to certa in exceptions the Commissioner, if satisfied 
t lla.t a ground is rnctde out , may order that li ce nce be granted, 
upo n such terms as he or she thinks fit. Section 47 allows the 
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Commissioner to order the grant of licences to customers of tl1e 
. •1S> 
dpp l1cant also . 
Sec tion 48(1) outlines the general purposes which the 
Commissioner should endeavour to secure when exercising the 
po wers under s.46 : 
" (a) 
(b) 
That inventions which can be worked on 
a commercial scale in \ew Zealand and 
which should in the public interest be 
so worked sha. L L he worked therei11 without 
undue delay Hnd to the fullest extent 
that is reasonably prdctica.ble : 
That th8 inventor or other person 
beneficially entitled to a patent shc:tll 
rec e ive reasonctble remuneration, having 
regarJ to the nature of the invention : 
(c) Tltat the interests of any person for the 
time being working or developing an 
invention i.fl \Jew Zealand under the 
protecti o n of a pAtent shall not be 
unfai.rly prejudiced." 
..\ ga i.n, w11ilst being much broader than merely advocating 
c CJ m pet i t i on h y 1 i m i t i n g the u s e t h 1:1 t c r:11, be m d de o f a patent , 
hese c riteria al Low, or· indeP.d require, the Commissioner to 
t ake into a ccoun t matters of com petition policy thc1t can be s.::dd 
t o be in th e public interest aud to ensure that re ,,so na1i l e 
r- P. rn u 1 1 er ,1 t i o n i s g i v en t o i n v e n t o r::, ; excessive remuneratio11 is 
not prohibited, but lhere is sc ope for the Comrnissionet· to look 
rt t r}iat . 
ThP. ext e rrl uf the pro - competitive effAct of the grc1nt of cl 
co mpulsory lice!lc depends of co urse on the terms that the 
55 -
romrnissioner imposes . However the grant of a licence 1s itself 
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ct gra11t of 1 i.n,i ted monopoly. 
In the last resort a patent may be revoked . Two years after the 
making of an order for the grant of a licence under s.46, any 
person i nterested may apply for the revocation of the pa.tent 
1#1 
upon the same grounds as for the order made s. 46 . If the 
Commissioner is satisfied that n.ny of those grounds are 
e stablished and tl1e purposes for which an order may be made on 
a n application under s . 46 could not be achieved by making s11ch 
a 11 order as is authorised, he may order the patent to be 
r evoked . Such an order can be made conditional on a failure to 
amply within a reasonable period with certain conditions .
111 
Section 66 of the Patents Act 1953 also provides that certain 
r estrictive conditions in a contract for sale, lease, or licence 
,u 
o f a particular article shall be void . These are conditions 
wh i eh purport : 
II (a) 
(b) 
To require the purchaser, lebsee, 
or licensee to c1cquire fror11 the vendor, 
lessor, or li c ensor, or his nominees, 
ur pr·ohihit him fr-om a c quiring from any 
spPcified person, or from a c quiring 
e x c e p t f r o m t he v e n u or , 1 e s s o r· , o r l i c en s or , 
or his nurninees, any articles other than 
the patented article or an article made 
by the patented proce~s : 
To pro 11 i b i t t I I e p u r c ha. s er , l e s s e s , or 
licensee from using 6rticles (whether 
p,,tented or not) which are not supplied 
by, or aoy patenled pro c ess which does 
not be l on g t o , l· h e Ye n do r , 1 e s s o r , or 
li. c ensor, or his nominees, or to restrict 
tlte rig11t of tl18 purc!tas e r, Jessee, or 
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licensee to use any such drticles or 
process . " 
Pc1ragraph (a) t-1xpressly forbids tying arrangements ( of a "third 
li4 
line forcing" type) such as a provision requiring the purchase 
o f unpatented ctrticles from the patentee as ft condition of the 
sale of the patented articles . Thus there is a provision which 
d irect l y invalidates a common anti - competitive practice . 
Paragraph (b) is aimed at exclusive dealing provisions, another 
c ommon form of anti - competitive conduct. 
Su c h a. condition is not void if the vendor , lessor, or licensor 
ltS 
pr0ves that at the time the contract was entered into he or she 
\lfl S willing to sell, lease , or licencP, as tl1e case ma.y be , to 
h e p11rchasor, lessee, or licensee, on reasonable terms 
s pecified in the contract and without the condition; and the 
l atter may, under the contract, relieve himself of liability to 
observe the condition upon giving three months notice in writing 
d r1d subject to payment t-o him of compensation rletermined by an 
''" ct rbitrator . 
Ho wr]ver, a condition is not void hy reason only th,'\t it 
prohibits someone from selling good . other th n tlose supplied 
by a ':ipecifiecl person , or, where the contract is for a lease or 
l icence , that it reserves the rigl1t: to supply the pdrts required 
1(7 
to kept the i:rntented article in repair . Tliese e»:ceptions fit 
l1-1 ss easily into modeni compelitjo11 policies. 
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It i':i unnecessary to show that the likely effect of the 
con dition will be a substantial lessening of competition as js 
rt>qu ired in s.s . 27 a11d 28 ot the Commerce ,~cl 1986 . However, 
the scope of s.66(J)(b) is limited . In Transtield Ptv . Ltd . v 
1ft 
Arl o Inte r national Ltd. the appellants c l aimed that s.112(1) 
of the Pa t ents Act 1952 (Cth .) as amendeJ , which was, for 
pre ':ient purposes the same as our s . o6(l)(b) , rendered void a 
cl ause requiring a licensee to use its best endeavours to 
rromot e the licenced technology . It was argued that it 
prevented the appe l lant from using an article or process 
s 11 pp l i e d or owned by some person o t her t ha :1 the 1 i censor . 
The ma j ority of the High Court of Australia rejected this 
ar gument . 
,o 
Stephen J r eferred to the "obscurities of drnfting" 
i n the section and confined his analysis to the fact thctt 
1/iO 
s .ll'2( l )(a) applies only to the ''using" of artic l es or 
/511 
pr ocesses. His Honour regctrJed the clause in thR licence as 
co nirtining no express pr o hibj tion or restriction on use . The 
t lctuse did refer to the"selling'' of the pn.tented c1rtic le and did 
re<1uire the energeti c promotion ctnd Jevelopn1ent o f t11e greatest 
po ssible m,"trket for the patented. article, cHtd here it entered 
t he area o f implied prohibition Llnd restraint , at l east to the 
ex tent th ttt the offering for sal~ and selling of compet itive 
192 
.~ r t i c l e s w o t i 1 d p r· e j u d i c e the s a. l e o f t l 1 e pd t en t e d art i c 1 e . 
1-ln wP.ver Stephen J held thctt tl1 e s . 112(l)(n) r e f ere n ce to ''using" 
, 1 r· t i_ c l e s or ..., p r o c e s s w a c; n n i c on c r') r n e d ·.v i t h t he i r " s a l e " . H i s 
Ho rt o 11 r TI--! l i e cJ on Too 1 i"l et rtl ~I ;i 11 t I fa c t u r· i i-i a Co . Ltd . v Tung~_!:-~ 
- SH -
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I +- • C g: _e c , r 1 c o . Ltd . and also the limitation placed on s . 112 in 
r.,.ll2(7)(a) which in effect e\:cludes from the prohibition in 
c:;ub s . (1) a condition prohibiting the convenantor from selling 
go ods other than those of particular persons . Thus the 
re,-,pnndenls were free, to impose tlie ''best endeavours clause" . 
In New Zealc1nd s.66(5) incorporates the same exclusion . However 
il i.., sornewhctt linii.ted in application by the phrase "by reason 
on ly" . That distinction means the _.;ustralian position can be 
t istingu ished when there is some other aspect of the condition 
thdt is not protected by s.66(5) . 
-;'h e Aust ra 1 i. Elll I ndus t r ic::d Pt·operty Advisory Committee l1c:1s 
rec ommended that s.112 should be repealed so that, if the 
ex emptions in the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Aust . ) relating to 
i ntellectua l property were also repealed as recommended, the 
l-y pe of conduct ca ught by s . 112 would be reguld.ted under the 
1<il4 
~rade Pra c tices Act instead. 
Pe gular renewal fees for patents also discourage unnecess a ry 
re tention of patent rights. 
In ~cidition the Pat en ts Act 1953 prevents a patent l1 o lder from 
e"'>.: t-ending his rights beyond the 1 i Ee of the patent , for at any 
ti me after the patent has ceased to be in force , the contrflct 
·o r sale or lease of the pai.ented article, or for licen ce to 
ma nufacture , use, or work a pa.t-e nt ed arti cle or process , or 
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relat ing to any such sale, leas e , or li ce n cP. , may be determined 
not withst anding provisions to the contrary in the agreement or 
any other cont ra ct , by three mn n t h's not i ce in writing. 
The saf egu a rds are designed to protect the publi c interest and 
have the effect of making a patent monopoly a qualified rather 
than absolute mo n opoly . 
2 . Trade Mdrks Act 195 3 
The requirements for registration of a trade mark rest ri ct the 
l9S' 
a nt i - competitive us e of t h e system. 
Sect ion 14(3) provides ''in determining whether a trade mark is 
adapte d to distinguish as aforesaid, the Commis sioner or the 
Cour t may have regard to the extent to whi ch -
(a.) The trade mark is inherently adapted to distinguish as 
aforec,aid ; and 
(b) By renson of the use of the trade mark or o f any other 
c ircumstances , the tra.de marh is in ta.et acla.pted to 
dis tingu isl1 as aforesaid.'' 
,9, 
I rt Sm ith Kline , ..=1 tcade mark case under the very si.mi lar United 
I , . . . . 
197 l 1 D. l k b . ,g! , 1ngC1o m prov1s1on , ,ore 1p oc · o servell : 
"The reference to inherent ad,1.pt.-1.i:Ji.lity would at first 
c; i gl1 L c1ppea r 111 ore c1 pt wltere th e ma r·l;: bas not al ready 
bP.en 11sed hy the dpplicunt in t.he courc,:e of bi.s trade 
be f o re t he cli·1 t e o f t he ,.., p p 1 t c ft t i on . Howe , · er , 1 , Jn g 
before tlle r eference to inh e rent ddapt db i 1 i. ty lia.d been 
i. n c or po r ,1 t- r~ d i n t h e c u r re n t s t- rt t u t e s cL~ a 1 i n g ·.v i t l I t ra d c 
marks, it had been held on grounds of public polic)· 
t11 a t a. t r· a eh: r o u g 1 1 t n o t t o be ,9 l l owe J t o o b t a i n by 
registruli.on uuder the Trade '-ldrks Act" Ll monopoly i.n 
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what other traders may Jegitimdtely desire to use." 
His Lordship referred to the ''classic statement of this 
199 
do c t r i n e " i n t he s p e e c h o f Lord Parker i n Trade ''la r k s Re g i ~-t r a r 
Zoo 
v W & G du Cros Ltd . Lord Parker stated that the right to 
re gistration should ''largely depend on whether other traders are 
like ly, in the ordinary course of their business and without any 
improper motive, to desire to use the trade mark, or some mark 
ne arly reasonabling it , upon or in connection with their own 
201 
goods.·· 
Lo rd Diplocl-; noted that the reteren ce to ''inherently adapted" in 
,02 
~ .9(3) has always been treated as giving statutory expression to 
t he doctrine as previously stated by Lord Parker . 
2.o3 
The system for trade mark protection clearly is directed to 
d istinctive or fancy features and will not permit traders to 
ac quire exclusive rights in matter in the public domain. Tl · ..,_ ,11 S 
rtv nids rompetition concerns . 
The Trade Marks Ac t 1953 provides n o system for compulsor)· 
l icensing of marks . Provisions to prevent trafficking in trade 
ao+ 
111 ii r k s and t o en a b 1 e expunge men t of trade m d r k reg i s t rat i ons for 
.:lo.S-
no n - use are i n c 1 u ri (J cl i n the Act t o p c even t: rt b u s e s of the 
s tdtutory rights . 
..\ n ctrtempt to iri1rod11ce an element of compulsion into a 
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voluntary trade mark licence proved unsuccessful when the High 
Court of Australia helJ, in respec~ of similRr legislation, t hat 
the RP.gistrar l1<-1d no power to require, as a condition of 
reg istration as a registered user, that the user undertake to 
manufa c ture in Australia the goods in respect of which the mark 
10, 
is registered . 
3. Designs Act 1953 
Th e requirements for registration of designs preclude protection 
fo r wholly functional arti c les a.nd principles of construction . 
Th ese requir e ments avoid monopoly rights in features which 
competitors must- be free to use (it1 the absence of properly 
granted patent protection) . 
Se ction 14(1) of the Designs Act 1953 provides that any time 
ctf ter the design has been registered a person may apply t o the 
rommissioner for the grant of a compu lso ry licence in respect of 
the design on the ground that it is not Applied to a reasonable 
ex tent i n !"iew Zealand by any industrial process or means ·co the 
cl rt i c l e i n re s p e c t o f w t i c l 1 i t i s r- e g i s t e re cl . 
ma y make such order as he o r she thinks fit. 
The Commissioner 
Thus if the rights 
ire insufficiently exploite<.J., a compnlsory licence mr1y be 
Jra nted . The registration cannot merely sec1l up tlle market by 
preventing competitors using a design the registered proprietor 
c hooses not to use . 
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4. Copyright Act 1962 
fair dealing rights and rights ot use for educational purposes 
fetter the power of publishers and other copyright owners or 
licensees to exercise their rights contrary to the public 
interest . 
I n respect of musical works, the Copyright Act 1962 makes 
provision for compulsory licensing . S . 22(1) provides that the 
r opyright in a musical work is not infringeu by a person making 
o r importing a record of the work intending to sell it by ret.a.il 
or supply it for retail sale or use it to make copies which will 
b e so sold so long a.s records of the work, or of a similar 
207 
oddptation, have already been made in or importeLl into :'-Jew 
Zea.land or Australia for retail sctle by or with the licence of 
t he co"pyright owner, and so long as the person gives notice to 
t ltA copyright owner of his intention to mal<.e or import the 
n ~cord and poys rhe owner the presrribed royalty. The royolty 
i s prescribed in s.22(2) a.11d was ctroended by tlie Copyright 
:l,og 
'1. rnenc!ment Act 1986 . The new rctt.e is 5 . 6%, but is to be read as 
"i .37o until 31 December- 19fl7, presumably to prnvicit=i A transition 
period . 
The Governor General ro,3y, by ordPr in council, preticribe the 
rn anner in w11i.ch ancl the ti.rne .,t which sueh royalties shall be 
209 
[>rti.d. The Copyright (Recocd Royal ti.es) RPgulntions 1963 were 
<..; ubsP.quent ly issued . 
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Section 22(4) provides that the copyright in any literary or 
dran1atic work comprised in the record shall not be infringed if 
e ither cop)right does not subsist in the musical work, or if it 
docs, the considerations referred to above are satisfied so lon~ 
a s the previous records were made or imported by, or with the 
l icence of, the owner of the cupyright in that literary or 
d rnrnatic worl,, and the other considerations referred to are also 
s atisf i ed in relation to that copyright owner . 
The Copyright Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear a person who 
c lc:tini!-:> tl1at the copyright owner has unreasonably retused to 
1gree to some method of payme11t other than that prescribed by 
order in couuci 1 , "or hdc; made his agreement subject to 
unn~asonable conditions", and may approve some other method of 
i,o 
payment as it thinks fit . 
~1 • Pla.11t Vct1·iet:,: Rigi1ts ~.\et 1987 
fl 1e n~w Plcrnt Varieiy Rights Act 1987 also provi<..les .tor 
... ., 
compulsory licences and sales. After three years from tile 
rn c1 k i n g o £ a gr an t any person ni a y re q \le s t t he Con, m i s !:::> i oner t o 
co nsider "whet11er or not reasonable quantities of r-2productive 
mater i al of a reasonable quality of the ~ariety c on c erned are 
ct \ <' lilCJble for purcriase by rnemb ;-:rs of tcte publi c at a reasonable 
1 / l. 
1Jr ice" . 
I f the Conirnisbio11er is satisfied that there are not available 
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5 uch quantities, he or she shall issue a compulsory licence for 
t h e reproduction and sale of reproductive material of that 
\ a riety or an order requiring that grantee to sell to that 
213 
pe rson reproductive material of that variety . 
In considering whether or not such quantities are available, the 
Commissioner is not to take into account any reproductive 
ma terial "available only subject to the condition that all or 
any of the produce from that material must be sold or offered to 
a specified person, or to one of a specified group of persons, 
.a. 14 
or to a member of a specified class or description of person'' , 
Thus the Commissioner is directly to look at whether ther e is in 
reality sufficient quality material available at a reasonable 
pr ice. This certainly allows the Commissioner to grant a 
l i c ence if there is insufficier1t competition due to the right 
be ing exercised in a particular manner. 
Th e Commissioner is to specify fl royalty or paym e nt that th e 
2,s 
l icensee or purchaser is to pay to the grantee . 
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B. The __ Spare Pa.rts Exempj: ion 
ln the recent decision of the House of Lords in Brit-.ish 
Levland Motor Corporation Ltd. 9-Q_Q_.fl1=._C'?_r_~1,_1;_g_:_ v 
Armstrong Pc1tents Co. Ltd. and Arfl}s! __ !:~~-!1g Equipf05" __ ~~- 1:_i_g_:~'" 
the majority of their Lordships held that the 
Plaintiffs were not entitled to us e their copyright 1n 
such a wa.y as to maintain a monopoly in tl1e supply of 
spare parts for their cars . It has been said that this 
prinicple "contradicts the very idea of copyright 
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protection . " 
Throughout the speeches of the majority reference is 
made to the fundamentals of competition policy. Lord 
'llr 
Scarman said : 
''the manufacturer of an article such as a motor 
vehicle or other 'consumer durable' cannot by the 
exercise of copyright preclude the user of the 
article fro,n access to a _fre~ m._ cket for spa.res 
necessary to maintain it in good working ordei- ." 
:ll9 
Lord Bridge sairt : 
' ' wha t the ow11P.r needs, if his right- to repair is to 
be of value to him, is the freedom to acquire a 
previo usly mnn11factured rep1 ctce,nent exhaust system 
in .:in unre"tricte d mc1.1·k~t . " 
Uo 
Fur t he r on h i s Lo r· d ':, h i p s a i d : 
"Ei ther the co11r-t must allow tlu" euforcernent of the 
c op yr i g 11 t c l cl i rn t o ma i n t .:, i ll et m o t 10 p u l y i n the 
s u pp i y o t c; pa!. e par t =- for t l I e c n p yr i g h t o \\ n er an c. 
his li.c1-:? nsee!::i, r·eg-cir·dless of nny adverse effect of 
tl 1 (J rn o ll o p u L y on c a r ow ll er !::i , o r t he r i g 11 t o r c a -:.-
owners t:o c1 free mctrker in spare parts r,ecessctr_y 
for t'COl1<lrnjcal repair sho1ild prevail it seems 
t,) n1e ,\ithin the cc1pacity of the common law to 
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adapt to changing social alld Pconomic conditions to 
counter the belated emergence of the car 
mntrnfc1cturer·s ctliemp1, to monopolise the spare 
pa r t s m ,-1 r k e t i 11 .re 1 i an c e on c o p yr i g h t i n t e c h 11 i c a 1 
drawiagc., by invoking the necessity to sategunrd the 
pu':>it-ion of the car owner . '' 
Lord Templeman, referring to the practic of the car 
Z21 
manufctcturers, said : 
"Ford 11ave asserted copyright in their replacement 
pdrts a!ld have adopted a poLicy of not grdnting any 
licences tu manufacture or sell, thus asserting a 
monopoly which has been stigmatised by tlie 
MoT1opolies and Mergers Commission as an anti -
competith-e practice which tends to keep prices 
up . ,, 
Even Lurd Griffiths, who found for Armstrong on the 
ground that the Copyright Act 1956 did not extend to 
confer protection against indirect copying of 
mechanical drc1wings , focused on competition . His 
J::14 
Lordship said : 
"This bizarre r esult is the consequence of the 
court's construing 'reproducing' in s 3(5) as 
including 'indirect copying in circumstances where 
it is not necessary to do so to achieve the purpose 
of the Act whicl1 is to protect the commercial value 
of the artist's work and labour and not to granc a 
monopoly to a manufa cturer . " 
Further, on the spare parts exception issue, his 
2.U 
Lords11ip said : 
" I t s e ems t u me h i g h 1 y i rn pro b a b J e t 1 1 c1 t et m c, t a r c a r 
manufacturer would exploit his copyright either to 
starve the spare pdrt5 mc1rkec or to i;1crease the 
fa i r p r i c e for hi s s lhl t -e pa rt s f (J r I car I i. 11 i n k of 
nothjllg more d..::im<'lging to his prospects of c.elling 
tile cnr in the first plnce . " 
T1h,uglt thes8 concepts 1rere to the tore throughout their 
Lordships· speeches, the decision of the mdjori ty was 
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bdsed by analogy on the principle of non - derogation 
from grc1nt and cannot really be seen as a stance tal,en 
on competition grounds . Ti1dt longstanding principle is 
that as between landlord and tenant and as between the 
vendor and purchaser of land, a grantor having given a 
thing with one hand is not to take away the means of 
enjoying it with the other. It was expressed tJy Bow2n 
LJ in Birmin__g_}Jam Dudley ,=rnd District Bc1nking Co. v 
1 .. 4 
Ross . 
Lord Templeman saw 110 reason why tltis principle shoul d 
not apply to the sale of a car . The grantor of a motor 
car sold with components which are bo1md to fail during 
the use of the car : 
"will not be allowed to derogate from his grant by 
using property retained by him in such a way as to 
render property granted by him unfit or materially 
unfit for the purpose for which the gra.nt w<1s 
made . '' 
l11. 
T l 1 i s , Lo r d Te ;n p l e rn a n s n i d : 
"pro11i bits the copyri.gltt owner of the drawings from 
e x e r c i s i n g h i s c op yr i g 11 t po we r s i n s u c h n way a s t o 
prevent the car from functioning unless the owner 
of the c,3.r buys replacPment pe1rts from the 
copyright O\\"llP.r or his licensee . " 
As Lord Scannan said, the principle applies not only to 
rriotur vP.hicles but also to other 
:.17 'consumer durables' . 
Tl1e law had long recognised th f~ right of a purchaser of 
ct prot-2ctecJ item to keep it i1t repr1ir without con c ern 
for brP.ach of nny rights - the "rigltt to repair '' . 
- 68 -
however did not extend to tl1ird party m~nufa ct urers of 
parts . Hence their Lordships used the non - derogation 
from grant principle to ensure the effectiveness of 
this r i ght to repair in the modern context . 
Unlike in its original t1se, the non - derogation from 
grant principle in i~s application to the right to 
repair a motor car , requires no privity between 
manufacturer and user . There need be no direct 
relationsip of granter and grantee . The copyright 
owJJer sells cars to dec1lers wh o in turn sel 1 to 
consumers . Also, though it does not effect the 
granter- grantee relationship, the grantee actually 
cont racts wi th a repairer who infringes the copyright , 
rather than the grantee infringing himself . The link 
though is in maintaining the usefulness in the 
grantees' right to repair . 
The right to repair binds not only the m<1nufacturer but 
also those sub- contractors ~hu made parts on their 
behalf . A 1 s o i t c o u l d no t b P. n e g ,-'\ t i v e d by c on tr a r y 
stipulation . i':either of these points ha'.·e been shown 
in the derogatioit from grant precedents . 
Pcoblenis of privity also led their Lordships to reject 
Annslrung' s al lernate submission that there wan an 
implied lic:e1t<:e . It apt)e<'lrs oclc.l that 11011 - derogation 
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Erom grant may be used by a third party independant 
manufacturer supplying the world at large. In land law 
a third party woulJ not have locus standi to bring an 
action restraining a landlord from engdging in conduct 
thrlt would render the tenant's demise unfit jnst 
because it is detrirnental to that third pdrty' s 
interests . "The e»sence oE non- derogation from grant 
is that it is a remedy that can be exercised only by 
the ·grantee' , it being merely a covenant implied into 
the contractuMl relationship between grantor and 
22.I 
grantee . " 
According to the landlord and tenant cases of }:9r:t v 
229 ~lo 
Griffiths and O'Cedar v Slough Tra.din_g_Co., causing the 
grantee to lose profit or increase expenditure does not 
constitute r\ derogation from the grant . Thus it is not 
clear that British Leyland did render their grant (the 
,31 
rights of ownership in cctrs) "materially less fit'' for 
its purpose. Re p 1 a c e n, en t part s we re re ct d i l y c1 v a i l c1 b l e 
from Briti'3h Leyla11cJ or trom their li censees , albeit dt 
a slightly higher price . 
It has also bee n said that the non-derogation f rom 
grct11t principle should be lirnih-:cl to lnnd law since the 
sum u f the pro t e c t i on t bit t Pd r 1 i ,,. men t h c1 s t ho 11 g h t i t 
necessary t o ciccor·r.1 t o a pur chc1S Pr of goods has bE'en 
em!Jodi.ecl in \-lte :-oale of goods legisl 
212 
t i 01 1. 
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It 1s of particular importance that British Leyland 
submitted that the conflict of competing rights between 
the copyr ight owner and the vehicle owner had to be 
reso l ved by reff-.!rerice to other l egislat ion directed to 
the cont r o 1 o f ant i - comp et it i v e p r act i c e s , i n 
parti cular the Fair Trading Act 1973 (C . K. ), the 
Competition Act 1980 (C . K.), and the relevant 
prov i sions of the E . E.C . Treaty . 
U3 
this una cceptab le, 
Lord Bridge found 
"If only for the simple reason that to accept it 
would impl y that , had the problem arisen before 
19 73, no answer could have been found to it in the 
combined operation of the Copyright .-'\cts and the 
common law .' ' 
However the force of British Leyland's submission can 
be seen. They were allegedly derogating from their 
grant by asserting a monopoly right in the replacement 
parts, thus enabling them to effectively control the 
price . Their Lordships clearly regarded monopolistic 
practice as inherently undesirable, but that is the 
problem specifi~rtlly addressed by Pflcliament in the 
compet ition l egislation . IndP.ed Ford have heen 
stigm,itised by i:be :"lonopoljes f\iHl :"lergers Lmnrnission 
fer not granting li cenc<:-'s to manufacture or sell 
repl <"1cernent prtrts for their vehicles, purs1 .11:ut to the 
H-i,. 
C o m p e t i t i o n .<\ c t l 9 8 0 . ( (..; . E . ) . 
It was submitted by Shindler thc1t Lord l3ridge·s ro::ason 
for r ejecting· British Leyland ' s submission ignores the 
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facts that copyright 1tad not extended i.nto this 
functionctl field before those Acts were passed, and 
that those Acts were passed pre cisely because there was 
2~-
11 0 rHmedy available. Shindler also noted that such 
reason ing was in co nflict with the sentiment expressed 
by Lord Bridge in the paragraph following, that it is 
''within the cap,1city of the common l aw to adapt to 
c h a nging social a nd economic conditions 
2~(, 
However, the de c ision does not provide a precedent of 
wide ranging effect. The spare parts rule is co nfined 
to restraining the use of copyright in s u ch a way as to 
main ta in a monoµoly in the supply of spare parts. I t 
cannot apply to patents or registered designs. The 
rights conferrert by the Patents Act 1977 (U . K.) and the 
Registered Designs Act 1949 (U.K.) are quite diffe r ent 
from cop_yri.ght . They are both "truly and expressly 
monopoli~tic . " Moreo\·er both ,-\ cts pcovide for the grant 
of co mpulsory l i.ce n ce s, ''w hich must be taken to provide 
sucl 1 safeguards as Pc1rlictment considered ne cessacy 
c1gainst tlte possibility of abuse of the monopoly 
ll8 
grc1n ted" . 
A1 1other difference, it was said, is that a patent is 
only infringe d, for present purposes, wl1er e the 
i 1 n- e n t i. o n i s a prod u c t , by a per s o n ma !, i n g o r u s i n g t he 
product wi t110ut the patent proprietor · s consent , not 
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2~9 
merely by repa.iring it . Copyright is granted in respect 
of the drawings and not in respect of the article ~~o 
Finally Lord Templeman also said that the copyright 
owner is in the business of selling cars, which require 
exhaust pipes to function, not selling exhaust pipes. 
And tlw cars call only be kept. in repair by the 
replacement of exhaust pipes which are not the subject 
of a patent . In such circumstances copyright cannot be 
as~erted to prevent repair ! 41 
Yet in such a cctse a co mpulsory licen ce might not be 
available Exhaust pipes were being manufactured under 
licence and there appears to be no evidence that t11e 
demand for licences was not being met on reason ,~1b le 
i.+:.. 
terms. 'Reasonableness' here is not synonymous with 
pro - competitive . 
The illterference with the copyright is said to flo w 
from the fact thc1t there might bt> less co fllp etition in 
the spare parts market if licences wer e required. As 
Locd Griffiths said this ''applies equLtlly to patented 
items anu item.., protected by design copyr ight cind is a 11 
obvious co n •.;equence of tlie grflnl of a. right in the 
n et I. u r<~ o [ a rn on op o l y . '· 
Lord Templemttrt sai.d thc1t- tlH:0 1-e i.s no in co tH,ist ency 
between, or1 tl1e one hnrtd, allowing 1Jctter1t rights to be 
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exercised to prevent the reproduction of an article 
covered by the patent and , on the other hand, not 
alluwing copyright to be exercised in derogation of 
grant to prevent the reproduction of an article whi ch 
144 
is not covered by the copyright . This seems, wj th 
respect, to be in turn i nconsistent with the notion of 
in fringing by indirect copying . Lord Templeman himself 
said "the exploitation of copyright law for purposes 
:l"'J-~-
w hi c h were not intended has gone far enough." It is 
submitted that , accepting the co11cept of infringement 
by indire ct copying, the law 'has gone too far· for 
their Lordships to retreat without going back on that 
J.'°'1-'-
propos it ion and doubting the cases which stand for it . 
In New Zealand it cannot be said that the law has gone 
too far, s in ce the Copyright Amendment Act 1985 
actually increased the protection afforded against 
indirect copying by prote c ting the copying of models, 
bringing the prote c tion given to those who design with 
their hands up to that given those who design by 
drawing . This must be seen as legislative endorsement 
247 
of the indirect copying cases . 
Huwever if the basic idea behind granting intellectual 
property rights is to confer monopolies , in a broad 
sen~e, in order to reward the proprietor for his 
ingenuity, ~kill or investment, 
2.Jf 9 
f\S Shindler observed , 
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then why does the non - derogation principle not also 
apply to patents , which confer a "true monopoly"? If 
t he d i s t i n c t i o 11 re s t s o n t he f a c t t l I at a pa t en t c on ;- e r· s 
a true monopoly and Parliament has provirled for 
compulsory licences, then tlte logical answer is that 
Pctrliament should provide for compulsory licences in 
respecl of this area of copyright, as it has done for 
249 
musical works . This was in fact suggested by Lord 
,.s-o 
Griffiths . Jt is not a true comparison to consider the 
public i nterest safeguc1rd of compulsory licences 
against the patent monopoly right_ '"1.s against th e 
nol! - derogation from gr,:rnt ex c eption to copyright . The 
complllsory 1 icet1CP. under- ct patent acknowledgt=>s the 
pcttentee's right and assures him remuneration . Th8 
non - derogation from grant principle does neither of 
t l-1 e s e t 11 i n g s £ o r the c op yr i g h t own e r . Assertion ot an 
effective monopoly 1s al lowed but asser·tion of a less 
effect i\,e morJ()poly is not . 
... s, 
;-:>hind let· a 1 so s ,1. id , 
"it is even less logi ca l, and also of doubtful 
jLtrisprudPn ce , t o prevent a p:1rty assertit1g 
statute - granted monopoly rights solely be c .:iuse to 
,,. l l ow h i m to d s s er r l he s e r i g h t s w o u l d con t er a 
1nono l upy 011 It i. rn." 
Tr1is does appear to ins11fficiently distinguish berween 
thP. tru' market monopoly, and that pcodu c t monopoly 
w h i <' r1 cop) r L g h t g i v e s . 
- 75 -
It appears that the House of Lords has, with the 
non-derogation from grant principle, done to the 
copyright law the very thing their Lordships say in 
.i.S"2 British Ley~and thct a copyright owner cannot do: 
"giving a thing with one hand and taking away the means 
2ba ~~  of enjoying it with the other. " As Shindler observed, 
there is perh,1ps a touch of serendipity about the 
2-s.s opening of Lord Scarman's speech: 
"I had intended to deliver a reasoned speech in this very important appeal. But I find myself in tota.l agreement with the speech to be delivered by my noble and learned friend Lord Templeman. " 
The non-de rogr1ti o n of gr/-\nt principle applies only to 
copying those parts of a manufactured article that are 
'-=-• necessary to maintain it in good repair. It is a 
mater of conjecture as to what constitutes a necessary 
rep<'\ir. It has been SF.lid that "Lord Templemal's 
extension and remodeling of the 'right to repair' 
defence, osren':>ibly botomed on impe,:cable Legal 
analogies, is in fact radical and prety nakedly < .,., 
Legislative. " 
The House of Lords declined to comment on another point 
regarding Article 85 of the E .E.C. ·reaty prohibiting 
cigreement tendi11g to stitle cornpetiLi.on. Armstrong harl 
disputed British Leyland's cl,im on the ground thct it 
iJLfringerl Arti.cle 85. The Co1irt of . .\ppeal had rejected 
rhct pled, finding that h o wever anh-cornpetitl.ve 
- 7b 
British Leylat1d's practice of entering into licence 
agreements with parts rnct11uiacturer!-, other them 
Armstrong, its illegalit y could not attect British 
Leyland ' s ftbility to assert its intellectual property 
2.H 
rights against those who refused to agree . This may 
have some relevance for the exemption provided ins . 
2, -.,· 3 
36(2) . 
It i s a pity their Lordships did not cornrne!lt on this 
point. The Co urt of Appeal's rejection does not fit 
comfortab l y a longsicle the Europe art Court's 
21.o 
jurisprudence . In Deutsche Grammophon it was held that 
national courts must refuse to allow a plaintiff to 
enforce otherwise valid rights if his object i to 
bolster an unlawful anti - compet iti ve practice or 
agreeme n t . 
In April 1986 tr1e U . K . Government stated in a ih1ite 
z,, 
Paper the1t it intended to narrow drr1stically t-he 'r igltt 
to repc1ir' defence enunciated by the House of Lords in 
~l,2 
British Levland . I t is proposed to protect original 
designs of all <'1rticles (i11cludLng spare parts) which 
are not artistic works b_y a new unregister-cd design 
right, and to provide a terrn of proteC't Lon 1111rier the 
new right of ten years frorn first n1r1rketing but with 
l i c P. n c e s a v a i 1 a b l P. a s o t r i g h t d u r i n g t- l I e s e c on cl [ i \- e 
years of the term . Conv<-~r-~ion JarnctgP.s nre t-o he 
- 77 -
a.bu li shecl . 
In :Jew Zealct n cl tl1e High Court has alrecidy co11siderecl 
2.b3 
the British Ley_l__9-nd_ decision . 
2"4 
Zealan!i) Ltd . v !'arinya In_qus_tri_e_~Lt _ _Q~ the plaint i ffs 
c laimed they had co py right in dra wings fro m which pumps 
were made . They claimed thdt their copyright was 
infringed by pumps imported from India . In late 1984 
Casey J granted an i nterlocutory injunction restraining 
the sale a.nd importa.tion of reprodl! ctions of the 
cop_yrig1tt worl-s.s . After the House of Lorcls decision 111 
~6 ~-
B r it is h Le y_l_anQ_ the s eco nd dP.fenclant moved to va.ry t-he 
orders contending that the spare parts except ion· 
enunciated in that c1-1se should be appliecl in ~ew 
Zer1land . 
Tompkins J refused to fo ll ow the House of Lords 
decision . His Honour noted that such decisions are not 
binding on '.'ie1r Zealand Courts ctnd where issu P.s of 
so c ial policy and l ega l phlisophy are invoh·ed .\ew 
Z e i'll trn c1 c o u rt s s ho ul d de r j d ~ w ha t t he po l i c y o f t· he l a w 
:1.1. 
here Oltgbt to be . 
Tompkins J then cor11pr1red tile legi_c;lr."d.i.\·e pro\·ic;iuns in 
t h e Un i t e J K i n g d o m r1 n d i. n \ t~ 1\ Z e LI l a n d , n n t .i 1 1 g t h ct t 
u n t i 1 1 9 8 5 t he re l e v r1 n t ..., t a t u t <":> 1 y p t· o v i s i on c., we re f o r 
l'-7 
.-:i I l p r· c.1 c t i ,_; a l lJ u r pose c; i. d Rn t i. c d l . 
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Section .'5 of the Copyright Amendment Act L9;-JS enacb~d a 
news . 208 whi ch provides for a special exception trom 
protection of artistic works which ha\·e br~en applied 
;;,i;.t 
indu<-,tcially. The making of an object in three 
dimensions (which incl udes d reproduction in two 
dimensio1Js rer1sor1c1bly required for the making of the 
object-) does not infringP cnpyright in ctn artistic 
work, if, when the object or reproduction is made, the 
artistic work has been lctwfully applied industriall y in 
~ew Zealand or elsPwhere for more than lb years. 
Subsection (2) defilles wli en an 1::11-ti.stic wo rk is applied 
industri,"'llly. Hence a. prodttct is protected under 
copyrigl1t agctinsr copying for 16 yenrs from 
co111merciF1lisat ion . 
The Amendment Act also significantly curtails the 
remedy of conversion dam,1ges where the in ~ringi.ng 
cop ies ace reproductions i.n three dirnen':iionc; of an 
a r t i s t i c w o c k , o r rep r- o d t 1 c t i <) n s i n t w o d i me n s i o n s 
t'easonably required for the making ot the reprod\lction 
1 n t- I 1 r e e J i_ m e n s i u n s , o r i n r e s p e c t o f ,'l. n y p l a. r 1--; 11 ::, r. d o r 
intent.l ed to be u eel for m.--1ki11g -those intringing copies, 
u tJ 1 e s s t he C o u r : o t he r w i s e o r d ,-.,, c s ha v i n g re g a r d t o t he 
sr,ecific n1r1t- ter set out in the s11bsP.crio11 . 
:. 6.9 
~70 
Tlle Amendment .--\et repealed section 2U(S) w!tich was 
identical to section <J(H) of t-l;e l"1 itecl l ingdom . \et, 
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the subsection which Lord Templeman said was defecti\·e 
to achieve the int-e11ded purpose uf preventing the 
extension of the scope of copyright i nto fields beynnd 
its main original i11tent . ClearJy the intention was 
that section 20(8) should be replaced by sections 20A 
and 20B . 
~., 
Tompkins J r.o n cluded : 
"thc1t the changes to \ew Zealand copyright law 
achie,·ed by the 1985 amendment have resulted in the 
l aw in :-Jew Zei.lland now differing from the law in 
the Cn ited Kingdom to s11ch a degree that it is 
inappropric,te for tJ1e :·,~w 2'.F!r1lancl courts to tol low 
t 11 e B r i t i s h Le y l a_~~ de c i s i on . '· 
Applying \ . Z . E . I . D . t - l t Ed . 272 v 1 re c _ or - (.:,en e r a o u c at 1 on , 
Tompkins J l ooked at the Report to the :linister of 
Justice of the Industrial P r operty Advisory Committee 
on the law of copyr ight as it applied in New Zealand to 
273 
industrial designs . That report makes it clear that 
the proposals were intended, inter alia, to modify the 
then excessively punitive pro,·isions in relc1tio11 to 
con\·ersion dam<1ges rtnd the terrn oE copyright protection 
when ,111 arribtic work is applied indnstr i ally . 
Tom p k i n s J not P, Ll t1 u 1~ ct l t h n \J g h L he re port d i d no t ci e a l 
e x p r· e s s 1 y w i t lt t Ji P. s pa re p rt rt s e ;, c e p t i on , w h i c h ha d n o t 
~uhrnic,½ions by the Fo1·d i'JotcJr Co . of .\ew Zeala1•d 
274 
re l a t i n g t o t he s p ,'l re pd r t s i. s s u <~ • Ford had been 
concer11ed ..:1t lhe dnnger that private m-anuL1cturers 
- 80 -
could select parts hctvi.ng high sc1les volumes and sell 
at significantly lower prices without lhe neeu to 
maintain quality or reputation. Rather than recommend a 
specif i c spare parts pro,·ision, however, the committee, 
in its fi.nal rP-commendation, made a rPcornrnendation 
2 7,.-
w}d c11 result-eu in ~ection 20B . 
- I . . . i 21, fomp,1ns J s.-11c: 
''in en,tct-ing tl at section the legislature not only 
expressly recognised the copyright resulting from 
drtislic work which ha~ been applied i.ndustrially 
w h at m i g h t g e n e r a l 1 y he re t e r-r P. rl t o a s i. n du s t r i a l 
cl e s i g 1 t - i t a l c., o e 1 1 a c i e d a me et 11 s by w h i c h t he 
previo11sly existing proLJlem ot the durdlion of such 
copyright sho11ld be solved, namely, by imposing a 
s i.xteen _vear term . It overcame the previously 
e .x i s t i n g pro b l em r rd a. t i n g t o c o n v er s i o n d am a g e s by 
enc1cti.ng the new s . 2'5(2A) effectively eliminating 
conversion damages i.n cases of industrial design 
unless the Court otherwise orders. So our 
legislature has expressly addressed itself to some 
aspects of the two respects in which Lord Bridge 
regarded the present law as highly unsatisfactory 
in the extract from his speech that I have already 
cited . Further, the repeal of s20(8) and its 
substitution by s . 20B indicates that the 
legislature has expressly set out to remedy the 
defect in the prevjous ldw to which Lord Templem n 
referred in his s pee c Ji. " 
177 
To follow Briti.slt LPylan .. ~~ in .\ew Zealand would result 
1 n t h e C o 1 1 r- t- s i m p o s i n )i a n e x c e p t i o n t h a t t h e 
legibldlure had not considered it appropri.ctte to enc1r.t 
wl1<·n it ha(l expressly addres!:oP.d itsP.lt to thi-· problem 
o[ copyright in industria.l design . Any further 
except io11, f0mpkinc.; J s,:;icl, should be enc1ctec\ by the 
2.io leg·isJature, noi by !lie (01.:rt. 
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Ironica l ly though , the Parliamentary Select Committee 
was advised to lea\·e any spare parts exception to the 
2t, 
courts. Tompkins J, it is respectfully subrnitted , 
should have had t11e courage to say the House of Lords 
wa<:; wrung and that 11e was 11ot pr·epared to fol l ow it . 
In addition to the difference in legislation between 
\ew Zealand and the Cnited Kingdom Tompki.ns J regdrded 
two mn tters as h aving some bearing on whether B_rij:j_s)! 
?..h. 2.i3 
Levlnnd should be Col l owed in \ew Zea lond . ThesP. were 
firstly that the mjsgivings expressed by Lord Gritfiths 
1H~rP. to a consideca.ble extent shared by Lord 
Edmund - Davies and were at least sufficient to prompt 
Lord Scarman to consider that the review of the law 
whic h h e underbtood was then being undertaken should 
lead to l egis l ation to bring the law back within what 
his Lordship rega.rded as the limits intended by 
Par· l iament . Secondly Tompkins J referred to the British 
White Paper entitleci "Intellectual Property cwd 
In n o,:ation" which indicates that the sp,'lre parts 
except i on , at lec1st- in its presen. t forin, will prove to 
bP. short live<.l . 
The case concernerl an application t-o vary an 
interlocutory order a!ld so the matter m.-1y recei\·e more 
detailed treatment in the future. 
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It is submitted that the (lecision of 1ompkins J is 
entirely appropriate for \e\\ Zecdancl copyrigl1t law. 
\vith regard to competition policy howeve1 · , it does 
indicr:tte that the snbrnission made by British Leyland in 
the House of Lords thnt competition legislatiur1 is the 
only mehns to enforce competition policy, is the 
corr<-!Ct ctpproach for '.'iew Zealand , at lec1st as far as 
copyright is concerned. 
;_1+ :-.,~-
British l_e vland and ~1_2.0..9_J\1m12._s_ were both considered by 
Smel 1 i.e J in ;Q~_I_J__IJ..i...son ~Janufi,cturing_Co_. _L~~other ,· 
:2'if. 
Alfred Holt & Co . Ltd . & OthP.rs . Thdt case concerned 
labelling tags or ctttachments in respect of which 
Dennison claimed copyright. The tags were used for 
attaching price labels to clothing . They were applied 
by means of a mechanical applicator, similar to a gun. 
Co u n s e 1 for the Second and Thi r d De fend c. n t s a. r g 11 e d t hat 
the Plair1ti[fs were drtPrnpti11g to obtain a monopoly in 
a f u ll c t i on c1 1 rn an u f a c r u r· e d pro cl u c t 1d I i c lt w a s no t 
susceptible of pdtent or registered design protectioll, 
rel} i.r1g on the exC'eption to cop~vrigl1t protection 
:!87 
ce('ugnist:d in Asitis_h_J-,:~vl~~1c!_ . li was arguPd Ute.Lt the 
?.. H' 
Plni.11tifts so11ght to c:1ssect : 
"c1 m11eh wicler monopoly thc!.n did Rritisft LeyL nd 
li e r. a u s ~ i t rn on o p o l i s P. s t It e m ci r k e t t o r s u p p l y o L 
t,1gs 1 not just for its own gu11s uut for tho e of 
its co1npPtitc>rs c1s well ... . ln the 12ri:.J·-l.!__Le~J,~d 
c d s (~ t h FJ. p u r c ! 1 a s e r c o u l d J t l e a s t u s P h i ~ c ,1 r u 11 t i l 
i t r: e e d e d re p ct i r a n cl i f h e f o 1 JJ .r1 t Ji e l.J t · i c e s c h u r g e d 
by L-l t' i t i s lt L e ~- L1 l t d U r i r S l i C P l1 S e e :.:; U ll et t t 1' d C t i \ P 
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purchctse rival make from a more tolerant 
ma n u fa c t u t' e r . Here t h e p u r c h c 1 s e r o f a De n n i s i on gun 
or n competitor's g1m cannot even t,~g_i_!..!_ to use his 
gun wi tJ1out buying tc1gs from l1c-rn1ison at whatever 
price in lhe cont<~xt of a monopo Ly it chooses to 
charge . 11 
Sm e 1 1 i. e J he 1 d t 11 c1 t the fact u a l s i tu at ion g i v in g r i .s e 
J.3 9 
to the spare parts exception in the Brit_ish Le_,ylanct 
case was clearly distinguishc1ble. The evidence was 
thdt tl1e Plaintiffs did riot sell their gur1s, rather 
they pro v j de cl them free to pot e n t i a 1 c u s tome r s . The 
only pr-otection the Pla ini iffs sought was in relation 
to t1-1eir attachruents and they raised no objection to 
tliose attachments being opµlied with guns mctnufactured 
by otlier pc1rties. Sniellie J held that there wc1s no 
sense in which the Plaintiffs, once having s,)ld the 
attachments, sought to curtail by way of copyright or 
2'JO 
ot herwise the purchaser's use of them. 
2SJ 
RP.ferring to :lo11o_Pumps, Smellie :1 found himsPlf in 
11 e t1 t i re a gr e em en t w i t h t h e c o n c l 11 s i o n re a. r: Ii e d by 
29Z 
Tompkins J " 
..29~ 
The B1·i_t j sh Lev land ci ecision has been considerPd in 
Auc;tralin. in \•:arrnan Interllat ion.,[ & Ors. v Envirotech 
2').q 
..\ u s t r a J _i o P t y. Lt d . & 0 r s_ . I n t l 1 a t c a s e II/ i l c o \. .J s a i d 
2 9 S' 
that the result achieved in British le, ' lLittcl " m ,1} fairly 
Le dPscriJ-Jed as rem.:irkc1ble''. l'."ithuut- deciding whether 
l o f u I l ow t-.11 e l-1 o u s e o f Lo r <I s , \-&J i l cox .J r P. f erred t o t h e 
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f ct c t t h .i 1- t he ,; u s t red i d ll Pa r 1 i am e n t had de a I t w it h t he 
inter - relationship between the Copyright Act 1961:3 
(Cth . ) and t!te DP.signs Act l':Hl6 (Cth . ) cis n '!ce nt ly as 
1 981 , intimating that t h e judicial intervention of 
4~, 
the i r Lordships may not be opp l iecl in Aust r alii1 . 
Z97 
Britis_h Levlan<:,1 v -~_rnistrong Pa.tents was not the only 
case during 1gs5 in which the Hous e of Lords stood firm 
,:1gainst rnonopol isation . I n Re Coca - Cola co·s 
29t 
-~l?J2JJ.~ c1 t i _o n s t he i r Lord s h i p s re f 11 s e d t o a l 1 ow a n a pp e a 1 
against the decisio n of the Registrar of Trade ~arks to 
register the distinctively shaped Coca - Cola bottle as a 
trade ma r k under the Trade Marks Act 1938 (U . K . ) . 
Lord Templeman, with whom their Lordships agreed, 
~99 
cornrnencP.d his speech : 
'':'ly Lords , this is another atten1pt to e.·pand lte 
boundari,s,c; of intellectuCtl property and to convert 
a protective law into a source of monopoly . The 
attempt to use the Copyright . \cl 1q56 for this 
p u r p o s e f tt i l e d r e c: e t 1 t l y i n 1:3 r· i t j :-o h L f- \ l iH1 c1 "i o t o r 
C o r _12_.l., t d v A r rn s t r o n_g__ Pa. t e n t s C o L_ _ t Li [ ! g 8 6 ] l A L 1 ER 
850, [ L 986] 2 WLR 4UO. Tlle pre Pnt al tem pt is 
ba.sed on the Trade :,1,1r·ks Act l9'J H . '' 
According to Lord Templemc1n Cuca - Cola clc1irned ''thc1t 
dnring and since the peri o d of protectio!l for the 
Coca. - Coln. i)ottle under tl,e 19l)7 [Patents and Designs] 
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Act the Coca - Cola Co . has been entitled to ,1 monopoly 
3 0 0 
in the Coca - Cola bott-le as a trade mark". 
The writer has already submitted that trade marks 
confer no market monopoly . Indeed Lord Templeman only 
referred to a product monopoly, in the Coca - Cola 
Lottle, and yet tl1e disdain demonstrated at Coca - Cola's 
attempt gives the impression that a market monopoly 
would have eventuated from the regjstration of the 
.J 0 / 
tradP. mark : 
"It is not sufficient for the Coca-Coln bottle to 
be distinctive. The Coca - Cola Co . muc;t succeed in 
the startling proposition that the bottle is a 
trade ma.rk. . If so, then any other container or c.ny 
article of a distinctive shape is capable of being 
a trade mark . This raises the spectre of a tor,:il 
and perpetual monopoly in containers and articles 
achieved by means of the 1938 Act. Once the 
container or article has become associated with the 
man11fdcturer and distinctiveness has been 
e s i. cl b l i s 11 e d , w i t h or w i t- ho u t the he 1 p o £ t he 
monopolies created by the Patents Act, the 
RegistereJ Designb Act or the Copyright Act, the 
perpetual trade mark monopoly in the contu.irier or 
,1rtir.le ca11 r;e achievPd . In my upinion the l93tl 
Act was not int ended to conEer on the manufn.cturer 
of a container or on the mani 1facturer ot an rirticle 
a s t a t 11 t or y m o no po l .Y o n l 11 e g r· o u n J t h d t t lt e 
mdnufacturer has in the eyes of the public 
e '-> t ct h l i s l I e d r.1 c o n 11 e c t i. o n be t we e n t l IP. c; b d p e o f t he 
cu11taLn "r or nrti.cle ancl tl1e manutac . U F1t-. A rivul 
mctnutacturer must lie fr-P.P. to sell any cont-,:ii.ner or 
.:i.rt-icle of si.mi tar shnpe providc-:!d the container or 
Article is labelled or p,1ckaged in a mu11ner \1·hich 
cl\. o i. cl.,, r, on f us ion r1 s i o the or· i g i 11 o t the goo cl s in 
the cont.c:tiner or the origin of the article." 
Lor·d Ten1plernan ,-ef~rred to the case ot Re James's Trarle 
Jo:!. 
,J ,1m e s \. 8_Sl_1:!JJ?Y where the PL:1intiEfs sold blr1ck 
lead in the forrn ot a 1orne . Their products were 
- 86 -
impressed with the representation of a dome and ~heir 
labels carried a picture of a black dome. They were 
allowed to register the representation of a black dome 
as their trade mark . They were not entitled to 
J o3 
register the article itself. Lindley LJ said: 
''Of course the plaintiffs' in this case have no 
monopoly in black Lead of this shape. Anybody may 
make black lead of this shape provided he does not 
mark it as the plaintiffs mark theirs, anJ provided 
he does not pctss it off as the plaintiffs' black 
lead. There is no monopoly in the shape, and I 
cannot help thinking t1rnt that has not been 
sufficie11tly kept in mi11d." 
Their Lordships also agreed that Smith Kline and French 
~ 04 Laboratories Ltd . v St_i:rl ~l_1g_ W_i_!l-_t)!_rop_ Grou_p_l,.i;_d-=--- was 
distinguishaule . In that case the Plaintiffs were 
allowed to register distinctive colour combinations as 
trade marks for drugs sold in pellet form in capsules. 
Lord Diplock there rejected the argument that a mark 
could not cover the whole of the visible surface of the 
Jos-
goods to which it was applied. 
Lord Temp 1 e1nan was of the view Joi. that the Smith Kline 
case only related to the colour of goods and had no 
cipplication to the goods therns e lves or to a container 
for goods. His Lordship said: "A colour combination 
may tend to an undesirable monopoly in colours but doHs 
not create an undesirable monopoly in goods or 
Jo7 
containers . " 
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Lord Dip lock in the ~mi_iti___t;_l_.iJ~e_ case , however, in no 
3oi way conf ined his reasonsing to colour only . A mark may 
be incorporated into the structure of goods, so long as 
it can be seen on visual examination . His Lordship's 
reasoning seems based on the ground that the mark must 
be '' capable oE indicating a connection in the course of 
trade between the goods and the proprietor of the 
.Jo9 
rnark. ,. The colour combincttions were seen as more 
relevant to the distinctiveness of the mark, than to 
whether there was d trade mark at all . Arn.l in 
~oca--::_Co_l~ it was assumed without being decided that a 
310 Coca - Cola bottle was distinctive. 
Turning to the Trade Marks Rules 1938 (U . K. ) Lord 
Diplock observed that R . 28 authorises the Registrar to 
accept a· specimen or copy of the trade mark instead of 
a representation by way of a drawing or other pictorial 
)11 representation of the mark. His Lordship said : 
"In the case of a trade marl, which is intended to 
be 11sed on 1 he ac tua 1 gocc.ls in respect of 1\h · e h it is to be rfigi stered, I see nothing in these rules to require a trade mar-k. to bP two - dimensional only 
or to e~c1ude fro m regislratiun a mctrk whi ~h covers tht-> whole of the visihle ..,,irfc1ce of the goods.'' 
312 Furthec on Lord D.iplock stated: 
"Tr-ade mc1r1's itt their or·igitt were mar-ks thr1t wer- e Elpplit-od to gouds by their rnrtker- so that a bn)er by 
v i s u ,::\l ex a rn i t1Ll t i u n o f t h ~ goo rJ s c o n l d t e L 1 w b o m ft de thP.m. :"ln"kP.rs · rnar1-,s on silver and go l j pJ a.te 
aEford some of the earlJP.st ex,'lmples . lv'ith the 
growth oE ad\'l,rtising , .rPpresentatioJJs ot trude 
m,:ir. ks h._ive become widely used in aclvertisemen s s o 
dS to fRmJ liar-ise buyers with the mark, but the 
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application of trade marks to the actual goods or 
to the packages containing them stil 1 constitutes 
their bdsic funrrjon . The mar·k m,1y lJe npplied by 
the maker tu whatever visible part of the goods he 
choose<:; as suilc1bl,-? . If he habitudlly places it in 
a pa rt i c u l et r po s i t i on o 11 t he good s , i t s 
distinctiveness in [act dS indicc.1ting that the 
goods are of his mar11 1facture may bP associated with 
the position i n which it appears on the goods and 
in tl1e case of markings of a kind which are not 
intrinsica.lly un c nmmon their distinctiveness ac; a 
trctde mark may depend on the position in w:1ich the 
m ,1 r k i n g s a pp e a r o n t he goo u c; ; a s , f o r e :-: d m p 1 i--> , 
bnnds of co]our or ~)'.'_ai§._~cl_ rr.'.._0~1_l_s::led _pat;_t_e_F1!.__F(21J_r_t_rJ 
t_~_ n_e c \::._ of_ 9_ \_:)9 t i J~.:___c o n_t 0 i_~l \ ng_ the_ m.::-in u i e1c tu l'F: r' s 
12.T_oduc:j:._." (:1} emphasis) . 
l13 Also his Lordship referred to Re_ Jam~s 's __ Tr;:9 de_ ."l'.3rk_, 
explainir1g rhat the pc1ssage or Lindley LJ later cited 
by Lord Templeman was delivered in the context of 
clearing up the erroneous view apparently taken by 
Pearson J at the hearing that the etfect of the 
rRg i stration of a trade mark in the shape of a dome 
would be to make it an inf r ingement of that trade mark 
Eor anyone other than its proprietor to make blocks of 
hlnck lead of that shc1re . This led Lord Diplock to 
collclude : 
"James s case does no in rny view throw any light 
on the question involved i.n the instc1t1t appe c1l; but 
even if Lindley LJ · s apot11egm were treat eel cts being 
of general ctppli c iition the 'thing niad:: ed' in the 
i n s t a n t c c1 " e i s t he p It u rrn d c e II t j c r1 l s u b s t a n c e i n 
pellet for.m within cc1psules and the ·mc1rk' is -U1e 
colour a[)plied to 011 e half of the capsule and the 
various colours applied to the individual pellets 
within the cc:1psule . ' ' 
.3.~ rt i.., Sllbrnitted thclt Re Cc,c;,1 Cola Cu_·s_ f.pp_l~cdt_iQ~1S can 
bl· seen more as anorht~r po} icy decision bc1sed on 
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competition policy grounds than a reasoned approach to 
the law of trade marks . The case is most helpful as 
being reflecti \·e of Lord Templeman's, r-tnd it seems the 
present House of Lord's, desire to restrict 
intellectual property rights within narrow limits . 
D. Passina- Qff _____ ,,,__ _ _ 
l . The Weighing Process 
31(,, 
In the Cad~~ry- Schw~.12~~ case Lord Scarmctn, after 
outlining the test for passing- orf, said : 
3 17 
"But competition must remain free; and competition 
i s safeguarded by the necessity for the plaintiff 
to prove that he has built up an 'intangible 
pro pert y r· i g 11 t ' i n t he advert i s e d d e s c r i pt i on s o f 
his product, or, in other words, that he has 
succeeded by such methods in giving his product a 
distinctive character accepted by the mark.et. A 
defendant, however, does r:o wrong by entering a 
market created by "1nother alld there cornpet ing with 
its creator . A line mcty bP. difficult to draw; btt, 
un 1 ess it is drt1wn, competitiun will be st:iflecl . " 
J1, 
Furlher on 11i. s Lordship sc1icl: 
"In reaching his conclusion of fnct that the 
respondent had 'sufficiently' disri.nguished its 
p r u d u ,: t f r o m · S () l u · , t h ~ J 11 d g e 1i a d no t on l ) t o 
conduct an elabor,-1te a11d detdi led annlysis of the 
e \, i cl en c e , w 1-, i c h h P. c er t a j n l y cl i d , b u t t o be ct r i n 
mind tlte 11ecessity in rhis branch of t:lte Jaw of ·tlie 
1:rn 1 c1 11 c e t o be nw i n t a i n e d bet w ~ e n the pro r e c t :i on o f 
a plctintiff'c; investment in his product nnd the 
protectioll of free~ competition. rt is on l y if a. 
plctintitf can ebtd.b[i.,,h tl1r1t a dete11ci..1nt hc1s 
i1naclecl Ji.is ':i,-1tF1ngible pr-riperty rig11-' in his 
product by misappropriating descriptions which l1ave 
becorni-, recugn i c;ed hy t I e mnrl~~t as dis t i net i ve of 
t-l,e prorl.ucl tlt,'lt ilw Lci.w wil I permit c n r11pf~titicin to 
be r· P. c., t r i. c t e d . ..-\ n y o t11 e r a pp r o cl c: Ii w o 1 tl d e n c CJ u r ,:i g e a 
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monopoly . The new , small man wuuld increctsingly 
fir1d l1is entry intu an wcist-ing market obstructed 
by tlw 1 ct r g e t r f1. de r s a L re c1 c! y we 1 l known c:1 s 
operat.ing i.n it." 
2 . Justification in Passing- Off 
. .\notber example of the flexibility of the courts 
enabling the prevention of the use of intellectual 
property actions where the effect would be 
antj - competitive occurs in the cause of nction in 
passing- off . 
)1~ 
In Erven ~arnink Lord Diplock stated that in an action 
for passing- off which satisfied each of the common 
law's requisite elements, the action may still fail if 
J i o 
there was also : 
"present in the case some exceptioncti feature which 
justifies, on grounds of public policy, withholding 
from a person who hc=1s sufferred _injury in 
co11seque11ce of tl,e deception prnctised on 
pcospP.ctive c11storners or consumers ot his prod11ct a 
rerned_y in 1 i'lW against the deceiver" . 
Lord Djl)lnck went on to reler to thP, development or law 
to tnke account- of modern business practices and 
ethics . This may suggest that a pro-competition 
em p ll a s i s may be bro u g h t to be a r i n t he a re ,,. o t t lie 
tort-s relating to fair tracling . 
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E . Other Possible _Co nstraints on ..\nti - compP.titive Lse 
of lnt el lectual ProJ)ertv Rights. 
Quite apart from the restrictive trade practices 
provisions of the Cumnierce Act 1986, the courts may, in 
some circumstances, limit abusive us e of intellectual 
property rights. 
In the case of covenants ftnd agreements in restra.int of 
trade, the co urts will s crut inize them for 
rea so r1ctb 1 ene s s . 
::,11 
In i"l icr!r1el ,;·court Tc1vlor v !3ot_9 __ wax T_.:rac_!iJ~_g_1_!._c.J . 
Somers J , delivering the j udgmenr: of the Court ot 
322. 
Appeal , stated : 
"It is well understood that the common law 
principles of freedom of contract must on occasion 
give way to policy considerations . One of the 
latter is freedom of trade . A bare covenant not to 
c o m p e t· e w i t h an o t her i n h i s b u s i n e s s or t r a de i s 
un enforceable : see e . g . '{_an,~o~ ve r ."la l L'.-'tnd_ S_9_kP_ 
Brewing Co . v Va_r:i.0?~1.:.·er __ Br_ewer_ies Ltd. [ 1.lJ34] J. . . C . 
186. I! is otl1erwise if tl1e covenantee l1as some 
interE::st or property \\'hi r.h hP. is entitled to 
protect" . 
A covenRnt in restraint of trade, so l ong as it is no 
wider than is necessary , may be exacted to protect 
trade secrets (confidentinl information) . However if 
it is too broad, o r of too great a duration o r 
geographi<~al eEfPcl, it will be void - subject only to 
being saved in modified form under the Il lega.l 
3.i.3 
Contracts Act 1970. 
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A d e f e ndctnt may be r e li eved of the obligation of 
confidence and so have a defence to an artio n for 
brea c h, if the discl os ure complnined of is helrt to be 
justified in the publ i c inter~st . Such mr1y be the c as e 
when to mr1i 11 tai n t}1e conf i. d1d n ce would be to conceal 
3:24 
iniqui.ty . 
Tl1is defence has been upheld i n proceedings for 
disc l os ur e of information tending to establish a breach 
32:.-
o f the trade prActices legislntion in Austrcilia. 
The publi c inte r est defence has been extended to sa~e 
pub l ication of copyright material where disclosure WbS 
Ji, 
justifi ed . Howev er the defence does not appear to have 
been extended beyo nd s i tuations in volving publication 
of material involving '' c ri.mec;, Ernuds rtt1d mis deeds'' . 
Tltere is no a \ltl10ri t y for a general publi c i nterest 
defence justifyi11g brec1ch of stat11tn1·_y i.ntell e c t:11ctl 
propPr t y rights un gruunds such as lack of compet ition 
or excessive pricing . 
:lurphy Jin the High Cu11rt ot .,\ustralia i.n 
I n t e r 11. a t i on a 1 Pa r c e 1 l::_:\J) re s ~ C_ o . v T i me L i E e 
3,7 
I l1 t e rn ci t i n n a l_ s 11 fg e ~ t e d i h rt t- con LI u c t i n vu l \ i n g b re a c h 
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of s . 46(1) of the Trade Practices Act L97~ (similar to 
s . Jf>(l) uf the Cornnierce ,.\et 1986) should be negated 
beforP. relief for- intrin 6 ernent of cop_-rjght is given . 
He referred to ''public equities" to be protected . 
Reference is made elsewhere to the defence of 
justification in pEtssing ofE . 
3:,.t 
sai.d in a pnssing off cc\se : 
Similarly Cas e y J has 
''lt wou l d follow that if '."'lutual's counterclaim £or 
passing- of£ had been for the protection of a 
gen1 1ine business interest in the name, there could 
be no objection to an injunction. Rut- for the 
reE.1sons set 011t c1bove, I am sntisfieci that it was a 
simple blocking operation, and the cnse c~n be 
fitted into that categc ry of ''uncle<'Jn hands" 
rn en t i one d by Spry w he r· e · he p t a i 11 t i f f i s at t e rn pt i. n g 
to abuse the process of tl1e Court. It would be 
wrong to assist this scheme to stitle legitimate 
competition by grr1nting relief inte11ded for the 
protection of a genuine New Zectlnnd business 
goodwill , and I would refuse the issue of an 
injunction against the Respondents . I emphasise 
tbctt this quite exceptional refusnl of a remedy -
otherwise justiEied on the c se made to the trial 
judge - is dictated by the equally exceptional 
r: ircumstun ces gi\·j:ig rise to this litigc\tion" . 
The rPfusc.1 of equitable remedies such as injun ct ion, 
and an i1.Ccount of profit is a means by which the courts 
c a r 1 , i n a p r; r o p r i c1 t f~ c a c; e s , r e g i s t ~~ r d i s c1 p pro v a l o f a 
.:n9 
succPssfu1 pJaintiff ' s conduct-. 
It 1s submitted h o wP ver , that in the c..:ise ot the 
exercise nf statutory righls, d~nirtl of remedies for 
infringP.r11eni- t)ll public interest gro1!11ds woitld occur 
only whPr-e i1nlawfulr1ess is involved . Ar>.y <..l i E [ en~nt 
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view would invo l ve grafti11g on to the right a 
limitRtion the legislature dirl not choose to impose 
when creating the right . 
For this reason the courts cannot be expected to 
p r oscribe the exercise of statutory intellectual 
property rights on anti - competitive grounds unless 
there is involved a brectch of the provisions of the 
Commerce Act 1986 or some other statutory provision. 
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lV THE COMMERCE ACT 1986 
...\. Section 45 
Section 45 of the Commerce Act 1986 provides exceptions in 
relation to certain intellectual property rights from the 
r e strictive trade practices provisions in Part Il of the Act . 
Se ction 45 itself does not apply in respect of practices caught 
under ss . 36 - 38 . Section 36 restricts the use of a dominant 
position i11 a market , and has its own intellectual prnpert}· 
JX1 
r•xception . Sections 37 and 38 dei:11 with resale price 
fll cl i 11 \- P, 11 r.:HI C e . 
Se ction 45 is as fol lows : 
''Exceptions in relation to copyright, patents, plant 
varieties, registered designs, and trade ma rks - (i) ~othing 
in this Pr1rt of this Act, except sections J6, 37 and 3R c,f 
tl1is Act applies -
(a) To the entering into of a contra c t or 
arrangement- or <:1rriving r1t a.n understa.nrl.ing 1n 
so far as it contains a provision relating to 
tlle use, lic1-:nr.e, or assignment of rights under 
n r e x i s t i n g b }" v i r t 11 e o f trn y c op yr i g h t , pa t e n t , 
pro t P. c I: e d p l ,'\ ri t v n r i e t y , r P. g i s 1- e re cl cl e s i g n , or 
tr-acle m.=1rk. ; or 
( h ) To any n c t done to g t v P. e f f e c t to a p 1· o v i ·.::; i o ll o f 
1:1 cnntrdct, nrran,gement or understc111cling 
refer-red to in pctrctgrap11 ( ,,) of this sub.::;P c tion. 
( 2 ) F o r t l , <~ p 'l r po s e s o [ s u 1 is 8 c t. i o u ( i ) o E i ll i '=> s ,., c t i. r, !I , a 
provi..,in11 reJc11- .,c; to the ll'>P., lic e nce, or ctssignmi~Jll: 
: )[ ,1!1_\· rights ur,cler or i·:,isting by \-irtue ot Any 
<~op yr i g 1 1 t , pat e n p r- o t e c: t Pd p l ,_.ir; t v i'I r i. e t y , r r: g i s t e re cl 
dPs tgn, or trcide mc:.,rk if -
( n. ) I l c o 1 r t r o l s r he n .:1 t u re , e "\" l ell l , t- err i t or y or 
p e r· j o d o f l h ~! e '< P cc i. s e o t t ho s e r i. g h t s o r t he 
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type, quality, or quantity of goods or services 
to which those right!::> relate; or 
(b) It imposes restrictions for the p11rpose of 
protecting the interest of the owner, seller, or 
licensor in a technically s.::itisfactory 
exploitation of those rights ; or 
(c) It consists of a.n obligation on the part of the 
licensee or a party to the contract to exchange 
experience, or to grant li ce n ces for 
improvements in, or applied uses of, an 
irl\·ention, design, or plant variety, in so far 
a.s the obligation is identical to an obligation 
of another party who is an owner or seller or 
licensor of those rights; or 
(<l) It consists of an obligation affecting 
competition in a market outsirle New Zealand, 
which obligation does not remain i n force beyond 
the expiration of tliosi-: rights . 
Th is section is modelled on sections 20 and 21 of the Gesetz 
ge gen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen 1957 (West Germany) - Law 
:HI 
Against Restraints on Competition (hereinafter "GWB"). Although 
.n1 
Ea gles regards this as "less than fair to the Germans'' . 
Th e Australian Trade Practices Act 1974 also makes specific, but 
di fferent, reference to dealings in,:olving the transfer ctnd 
exe rcise of in tellect ual property rights in s . 51(3) . 
It appea.rs c1 rnattP.r thcit wi 11 have to be addressed early when 
th is provision comes before the Hi.gh Court is tlte relationship 
be i we e n the t w o s 11 b ~ e c t j on s o [ s . L; 3 . Sub~eclion l2) seem~ to 
1nerely define the c ir cum~t-,,.nces in which a pro,ision "relates to 
t-he use, lic ence , or f1ssignrnent of c-ir1y rights under or existing 
by vir:-tue o[" the inlel lectu,d property rig!,ts referred to . It 
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is clea1· subsectio n (2) effect i ve l y deems certain types of 
pro \·is i ons to so relate, and thosP. come withill tl1e protection 
df forded by s . 45(1) . Eagles even has doubt as to this 
to nstruction since he regards all the paragraphs in subsection 
(2 ) wi t h the exception of (d) n.s c l early coming within 
s ubsectjon (1) anyway , th11s making a deeming prov i sion 
,JjJ 
si1 perfluous . He then questions whetlter subsection (2) may be "a. 
mea ns of extending the scope of the protected rights themselves 
ra ther than a way of expanding tlte class of protected denlings 
.3 34 
in t11ese rights'' , But, as Engles adn1its , each paragrapn, e xce pt 
[M r a graph ( a ) , ten cl s r ,-:1 t l I er to be ~1 i me d a. t n rt c r u w i 1 t g t he r i g h t s 
r nt1ter tlrnn extending thr>m . It is subrnitted that the 
e gis l ature could not have intended, in the co ntext of an 
ex emptio11 in a competition statute, to extend the scnpe of 
p rotection beyond that available bef o re the Ac t was passed . 
The section leaves unanswered whether s u bsect i on (2) operates as 
1 11 exha.u tive list- of su c h provjsions, or whether it is merely 
i 1 1 u s t r a t i \. e . The writer rPgards s . 45 cis in capdb l e of the 
ro nstruction that the matters i_n s . 4'i(2) are mere ly 
i I lustrc1tive . Although " for t 11e purposes'' is n ot as indicative 
of excli1sivity dS ''if and only if", i t se e ms untlii11l,nble that 
Pa rlinrnt.·nt ·u11lcl, in allowir1g .:.i pctrtic11lar specific exceptiun 
t o an o t he nv i. s e ell 1 - em b n~ c j t1 g pi e c t.' o f 1 e g i_ s l .J. t i on , l ea v P- open 
1 11 e ~ x t e 11 t u [ t h , 1 L ex c r> pt i o 11 by p r- o v i cl i n g o n l _y a 1 t i l l 11 s t r 11 t i \. e 
Ii s t • 
In the de f ir1it-i o 1t pro\·i.si ons of the .~ e t tlie phrase " for ..:, ,_ n e 
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3~., 
purposes of'' is used in a clearly exhaustive context . The fact 
thctt the phrase is used in a definition section should not 
..1ffec t its meaning, since s.45(2) is itt effect a defini.tjon 
section itself , in the writer's view . Further, the matters 
re ferred to i11 s . 45(2) do seem to exhaustively cover those 
as pects of provisions relating to the use, licence, or 
a i.,signment of intellecturtl property rights which could be worthy 
o f exception from the restrictive tr,1de practices code. \o 
o tl1er interpretation fits comfortably with the repeated examples 
in the Commerce Act 1 986 limit-ing the scope of exemptions . 
Sec:tion 45(1) applies to "the entering into a contnlct or 
r1r rangeme.nt or arriving at an understanding in so far as it 
c'o ntains a provision" of the type in issue . Thus should the 
co ntract , arrangeme11t, or underst-anding contain other provisions 
wh i c h , or ':ihollld those same provisions otherwise, breach Part 
I I, then s . 45 is not of assistance . Another exnmple is in 
s .36(2), whi c h i.n effect pr·ovides ctn exception o s . 36(1) . A 
pe rson does not- use a dorninant position for one of the spe c ifi ed 
L 11rposes "~~2 _s_c~tl_OXl_ly'' of e nfor c ing an inle Jectual property 
r ight. 
Th us it is submitted s . 45(2) does prov1ch~ an exhdust i ve list of 
t hose provisions which a.r-e protected under s . 4 5(l)(r1 ) . T hat is 
t1 1ose acts of entering into .:-1 co nr rrtct or Ftrrang~ment, or 
1 .r r i v i n g a t an u n d e r s t and i 11 g i n s n f a c a s t be y c o n t a i n s u c h ,:1 
r,rov inion, or of giving effect to suc:1 c1 provision, f.lre 
prot ecled . 
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such a construction does leave the question : why is s . 45(1) 
r c> qnired at c1ll? It- seems the answP.r to this liPs only in the 
ro mplexity required to drctfr s . 45 in a single subsection since, 
c1 s not e d a b o v e , the acts wl1ich would coiltravene Part II a.re 
protected, not the provision itself . 
.H6 
:L1 ny oE the terms used 111 s .4 5 are defined elsewhen~ in the Ac t . 
l . "Relating To'' 
..\s we hc1ve sPell, to be protected undec s. 45 t-he pro\·ision must 
n date to the use, licence, or assignment oE the intellectual 
property right. The degree of closer1ess required in this 
r·e lcttionship or connection is not altoge t11er c l e ctr . Section 20 
ot tl1e G½B ex c ludes all restricti o nc.; o n license e s or assignees 
th at "go beyond the scope" of the right. Se c tion 45 seems 
in tentional l y broader than that . 
TJ I e Trade Pc act ic e s Act l 9 7 1+ ( ,\us t . ) cu nt a ins a s ; rn i. L a r 
e x c e p t i on f o r i n t e l l e c t u ell pro per t .r r i g l 1 t s , t h u u g h t h e re et re 
important differPnces •Nhi c h ma k e the wholec.;ale nppli c ation of 
Au ':itr ctl i a11 c ase lr1w in this ctred tT ctught- with diffi c u l tie · . 
l t h o 11 g h s . 3 l o f t he T r ,1 d e P r d c t i c 1' s .~\ c t L 9 7 I+ o r d y pr o t e c t s 
< o II t.l i t i o n s o t l i r.: e n c e s and a c; c.; i g rnn <-' r I t s o f: i n t e 1 l e c t u et J pro p e rt y 
rig ltt-c,, su c h c1 r· o 11dil· ion is p t·utP cted "tu_ l1! 1, __ f·:--t- P 1lt_ \ _!:1c1t __ J:h~,. 
,u nc.Jitiu11 t·e l ril- Ps t o '· (my empl trl '=>L=i) 
c i-, r L -'1 i 11 i r ii_ e l 1 e c L u ctl prop e rt y c i g 1l t c, 
t he s u b j P. c t nk t t 1- e r o f 
3"37 
·1 h us th r e is this 
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<:,imilarity with s . 45 enabling t1s to turn to tlte single 
.\11stra lian case on the provision for assist cince. In thett cr1.se , 
338 
T1·c1nsfiP.ld Ptv Ltd. v Arlo Inter-nat-ional Ltd . , ~rlo W<'1S 
e11t itled to certain rights cts l j cen~ee of a. patent for et procec;s 
for the mRnufa cture and erection of electricity pylons. Arla 
granted Transfield an exr.lusive sub- 1 icence througho11t ..\.ustral ia 
w h i c h con t a i n e d R " !) e s t e n de a \' o u r s c 1 au s ~ " , t-11 n. t- i s a c l au s e 
co mpelling the (sub- )licensee to, at all times during the period 
uf the 1 i cence , "us e its best endeL1vours in and towar-ds the 
dP sign fabrication i11sretllation alld sPlling'' of the patented 
,:1r ticle throughout the lic e r,si-,d territory and "to energetically 
prumote c1nd develop the grec=1t e '->r possible mctrket" f o r that 
pct~e nted article . 
Tran sfield later tendered successtully for the construction of 
ctn electricity transmission line using poles of its own design. 
Ar lo brougl1t c1n actior1 clr1 iming br eEt c h of the best endeavours 
c I n.use . ."lectres J 1wld that Tt·ctnstield did brf?,1cl: the clc1use <111<.J 
On appectl U1e Co urt ot Appeal Division of 
~u preroe Court of \ew South \A.ales in the jllrlgmP.nt of the Court 
de lievered by Reynolds JA refused to allow the c,ppe ,1.l . The 
he 
lppellant's r1.ppPr1l t o ti1e High Cour-t o f Austrr1lia wc1s limited to 
359 
de fences bdsed on s .il'2 (l) of the Pett e 1tts .-\ et 1 95 2 ctnd s.4S of 
t-lu~ T:-ade Prct ct ic e!:> . ; et 1974 . Thi "' s er · o 11 d de I.' enc c was t- h (1 t s . 4 5 
r-e ndeced unc~nfor·ceab le c1c. agt1i ,1=ot El corpor·<ttion LI pro\·ision of a 
ro ntra.ct 1,hi..c ·ll l1dc! l11e LJl!rpusi-• , () r haci , o r ,1as li l.:::.eiy to hctve 
l I c1 d , t he e £ f e r; t CJ f c; u b s t- et n r i a l l y I e s s e 11 i.. n g c o rn p e t i l i o n . 
- 101 -
The nppeal was dismissed by the majority of the High Court o f 
. \ustral ia. 0 n t he q u e s t i o n o f w he t l 1 e r s . 4 :-3 a pp 1 i P. d :la s on J , 
ob iter, referrt-~d to the nie,1nir1g of the term "relates" . The 
dppel lant ltc1d su1)1nitted that the clctuse rlid not only relate to 
matters comi ng within s.51(3)(a)(iii), but also to matters going 
l.H1 _yon c1 the t er ms o f t ha t s 11 u - p R. r a g c a p h , t ha t i s r e l ,'I t i n g t o no t 
using any other pylons . 
340 
:1 a s on J s a i d : 
''This submission in part reflects all inlerpretat ion of [tli e 
best endeavours cli:rnse] which I 1ta\·e rejected and in part 
cittributes to the word "relat e s '' a rnea11ing whi c lt is too 
narrow, th e reby giving sec. 51(3) an O\·erly restrictive 
operation . 
In bridging the different policies of the Patents A ct anJ 
the Trade Practi c es Act , sec . 51(3) re cogni ses thctt a 
pcitentee is juc,tly entitled to impose conditions on the 
gr an t i n g o £ a 1 i c en c e o t' ,'\ s s i g n rn en t o f c1 p u t e n t i n o c de r t o 
protect the patente e 's lega.l 1nonupol_y . E"en under ..\n1erican 
.-\nti - Tr-ust Ldw, wht're tliere is 110 equivalent exception to 
sec . 51(3), the patentee is entitled to exer c is e some measure 
of contro l over tlte li cen see consistent with the scope of 
the pcttent rnonopoly, rho11gh tl'w -e hc:1s been some cont r ,,ve rsy 
,'Is to ! he scope of permissible control : see Donn Ld & He _ydo u, 
Trc1de Practi c,3 s Law , Yol.l (l<J7 fl) , pp . 117, llfl; \•,'c:ird S 
B u 1Hn c1 n , .J r . , P.-1 tent u n d Ant. i t r us r Law ( 19 7 3 ) , <. h 7 &. c h 8 ; 
P . ,\ r e e d a , A n t i t r u .'-> t . .J.. 11 d J -' · s i s 1 9 7 L, ) , 2 n d e d . , pp . 4 Li e r r . 
Se c t i o n .5 1 ( 3) determirte':, the scope of n~strictiu11s tl1e 
pa tent e e may proper 1 y i nip o sf:: o ri t iHc u '-> ,~ o f t he p t1 t en t . 
Co nditions which see!, to g-ai.11 ,1ch ,:in ldges c-.9L lctrt':ra_L to the 
r f t t· e 11 r d re n tJ t c u " e r e d by s <1 c . ':i l ( 1 ) . S e ,; t i r) n P. ( 4 ) o t the 
Rt!slricfj1e Tr.Jde Pra ct ices '4ct , L95 6 (l; . h . . ) con t.::1in ed ,, 
c l n 11 c; P. i n s i m i l r1 r· t e r m s t o s e c . 5 1 ( J ) ( et ) ( i :i i ) ( s e e 
1,· . :1 . C . Gurnmow , (1976), 7 Syd . L . Re,· . 3'39 ,it p.357)" (:-1y 
e rn p11asis) . 
'11su 11 J w.'-t ·.,; of t:l1e view that s . 51(3) ·soulc.! pt·ovich~ a dt>it:-:nce to 
<1 c ci c:; e o f c o 11 r r , 1 v e 11 t i o n o f s . 4 5 ( 2 ) c, r i -; i n g o u r o r t li .:~ p r e s e n c P. 
r f t 1 t e b e s r e ll cl e rt v o u r s c li 1 u .,, P. L n t- 1 1 "· c1 g r e e rn c- 1 1 r . 
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\•, il s o n J w d s o f t he v i e w , o b i t e r , t ha t t Ii e c l au s e f e l l s rru are 1 y 
3+1 
1d l 1 1 i n s . 5 1 ( 3 ) . The o t l 1 e r J u cl g e s , i n c: 1 u d i n g t he d i s s e n t i e n t , 
~urp h) J , did not address the point . 
Altho ugh the High Court of Australia did not subject s . 51(3) of 
t 11 e T r a.de Pr act i c e s Ac t 1 9 7 4 t o a de t a i 1 e d and r i go r o us 
Px .-1mi1Lat ion, it nevertheless appears to hctve rej ecte d a narrow 
an d legalistic approa.cb to s . . 5 1 (3) a.nd re cognised the couflict 
bet ween trade practices and pfltents legislation . In addresssing 
t 11 at c on f 1 i c t :VI a s o n , J . co n c 1 u de cl r ha t t he mono po 1 y gr ,,. n t e d 
u 11 d er t 1 1 e Pa t-_ e n t s A c; t l 9 5 2 ( .A. u s t . ) mu s t bf! g i v e n e f f e c t t o a n d 
t- Jrn t t he T r a c!. e Pr a c t i c e s Ac t l 9 7 4 ( Au s t . ) , at 1 e a s t i n t he 
circu mstances of the case before the Court, would come into 
n0eration or1ly if th · re was an ~ttempt made to extend the patent 
mono poly into col l ater,11 fields as opposed to operating to 
n1r r o w the monopoly granted under the patents legislation 
JH 
i he l f. 
T~e Australian Indu~trial Property Advisory Committee has 
recornmP.11ded that: t:, , Sl(J) , in so tar as i t relates to inventions 
343 cove red by pcitents and pt1tent applications, should be repe aled . 
Though outside its t~:rrns of r efere nce, the Committee said 
s j m i J d .r rH· gum I-! n t ·,; may we l l a pp l y t o c Clll cl t I c t re l at e d t o 
.l"t"t t''g istered tr.-ide marks and d1~signs , and to cop}Tigh t 
Slor 1c~ has s~id the1t th e ''relating to'' test co11ld be retromRd as 
d "})lJt [or'' te<,l : ·' w o u I d t h e act f n r h i d den by t lw c J au s e i. n 
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q u e s t i o n i. n t: r i n g e tl~ R pet re 11 t r i g h t i f t 11 e 1 i c en c e d i. d no t 
3..,. ~-
P. ist". This wuulc1 have its aovanrc1c;es and disach:c1ntages, as 
z ... , 
E:..igles lias poi11ted u11l. Tt would be easier to operate tili1n a 
te<ot ba-;ed on ge_g_!'ees ot relatedness . B11 t it wou 1 d not answer 
al l potential questions satisfactorily . Such a "but tor" test 
cJ uld not cope with pos i tive requirements or covenants on 
licensees or pur chaser s. An example is the best endea-vours 
3Ji7 
cl,:111se in the Trarisfield case . 
'f\1 e re q u i rem en t t ha t the pro v i s i on re l ,,. t e to t he us e , 1 i c enc e , 
or assignment must, it is submitted, be an objective rather tl1an 
subjective test. There i s no h i_ n t u f s u b j e c t i v i t y i n t he p 1<1 i n 
meaning of s . 45 . The pro v i s i o n s re f e r-r e c1 r o i n s . 4 5 ( 2 ) ( a ) , ( c ) , 
nnd (d) are all described by reference to their content rather 
thflll their purpose. A subjective const ru ction would be contra ry 
1-o the scheme of the Act, whjch is concerned with r esults . 
S,,ct i()ns 27 and 28 refer to "purpose , or ... effect" . Section 
30 1leems certain conduct to co me wi.thin t-}1.Jt· phrn.se .-i nd in 
s(•1: t-i.ons 29 and .3 6 certain purposes are cc1ught without there 
np,·essar·ily being any actual effect . P<:irngrc1ph (b) sµecifical ly 
nife rs to purposP but in respect of the provision, r,:1ther than 
u[ <1 persol! in the sense of et mot-i.ve . 
2. Purpose - SP.ction 45(2)(b) . 
:-ii>c tio1t 45(2)(b) n.s WP bt1ve seen refers to t·estri.ctions imposed 
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'' f or the purpose of protecting the interest oE the owner , 
~e l ler , or licen:ior in a techniccii Jy sati '.:=;factory exploitation 
oc those rights" . Section 2(5)(a) provides : 
"A provision of a contri:lct, arrangement or understanding, or 
a cov e nant shRll be deemed to have had, or to have, a 
particular purpose if -
(i) t l1e provision Wei s or is included in t-he contract , 
arrangement or understanding, or the covenant was 
or i s re q u i red t- o be g i \ .en , for t 11 at p u r po s e or 
purposes that included or include that purpose; 
and 
(ii) that purpose was or is c1 substantial purpose" . 
Tit us r:1n owner, seller , or li c ensor ill order to get the 
pro tectiun of s . 45(2)(b) mu;;t- show thc1t the provision imposed '1 
Ci-> !' Ltin re-,triction for the substa11tinl purpose of protecting 
hi ;; interest in a technicctl ly satistaclory exploitation of che 
i n tellectual property r i ght . That there was another purpose, 
wl1 ether· anti - compet i tive or not , which may also have been 
sJbstantial, will not prevent s.45(2)(b) from saving the 
pro vision. Just as a s11bstantic1l anti - corn pe t i tive purpose 1.; 
f' 11 c) u g l 1 t o c a t c h a pro v i s i on u t I Li e r t l 1 e c e s t r i c t i \ e t r a J e 
pr·cJct ices code itself, so too is a subst,1n t ial purposP it 
nc cord crnce witl1 s . 45(2)(b) ::,11ffi c i.ent., even if other 
d,t l: i - competiti v e purposes are present . 
I is subrni ted tlt,1.t "purpose'' ought to be gi,en t: 1e sam e 
34 i 
m <~ a n i n g t h r o u g h u u t the A e t . Ill C . I.R . 
uc;e d in the income trtx l egislciti.oll, w<ts lteld to mf: dn ; onl or· 
oh j P. c t i v e , r a i I I er l.11c1 n i mm Pd i. ,J t ~ i r I h., n t i n n . A pur~os~ nePd not 
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bP ,1cl1ieved, for it to exist is sutficient. 
T11 a t- i s not t o sf.! y t hat " purpose ·' must be deter rn i n e d i n the s d rn e 
wa.y in different provisions of the .-\et . 
~9 
.Aut11ori ty v :lut11<-1l Rental Cars (A11chlc1nd .-\irpor__!J__Ltd. & Others 
Barker J held that s . 2('i)(a) provides for an objective te!:>t, 
c i t i n g D <'1 n dj, Po w ,~ r E tl_ll i l_) rn e n t P _:Lv . L t d . v :'·1 e r c u r L: I a r i n e Pt v . 
2,:,0 
Ltd . In tha L case Smi tl,ers J relied 01 1 tax cases in which th,~ 
sl!bjP-ctive purpo!:,e, mot i ve or intention ot a trn:payer was held 
to be irrelevdnt in interpretating tax evasion legislation which 
"as concerned with the character of acts done and with 
tt·cit1Sdct iotts, anJ concluded tl1at the equiv,tlenr provision o[ 
,,.2( 5) in the Australian Act should be interpreted objectively . 
B1d:,e r- J held tltat ''purpose" 1rn1st be i11terpreted objectively 
l$"1 
11 ,de r ss . 27 and 2'--l . 
This sePrns, witli respect, entirely correct with regc1rd to the 
pllrpo se of a ''p rovision''. This niay be contt·asted witlt s . 36 
3S".t 
wlier-e U1 e relevc1nt purpose is thnt of <'.t pPrson. It is submitted 
tl1r1t "µurpose'' i11 s . 45(2)(b) ought to be determined objecti\'elj' , 
i n t he s flfn e 1H1 .Y that s . 2 7 h c1. s b P. en i 1 t t er pre t· e d . 
3 • R e '=> l r i c r j o n s o n t he R i g h t - I-1 o l d c~ t' 
':-lt>cl ior1 4 ,"i(l) seems to F:x.l.e nd to protect obli,guti r:n1s t11e ri:5hi-
l I o l de c i rn p o s e s u [J o n h i rn s e l f , ,:t s w c l L ,,. s t lv J s P. p L <'l. c P. cl o n o t he: r s . 
- J 06 -
\lhile , uf cour s e , a. right - holder cr1 nn ot in fri n ge his o wn 
ini e l leclua l pr·operty right he mt1y grant. a 1 icensee such rights 
JS'J ~ .§"41 3 S" ~ 
cts a veto over new l i.cences, a c;<ty in the sP.lection , remo\,n.l , or 
r e place me nt of fellow licensees . 
Ect gles formed the view that ei ther the ''bu t for" test cou ld not 
u s efully bi.: r)pplied to such clauses or tl1at itll such clauses 
j5"(. 
foi L the "but for" test . This 3~7 Latter view wac; tn.ken by Stone . 
I f it we re correct, as Eagles µoinls out , each of the aho,·e 
cl r1.use.s would be outside s . 43 as wnuld an agreement hetween 
l ic en:c;or aud licensees thn.t a prospecti,e li censee be cr1arged a 
3H d; sproportinnately hjgh royd l ty because of i ts m rket dominance. 
I t i:c; subn,i rtP.d that such r es1Ilts n.re ent.in:dy appropriat-e . 
Tl, ese c lauses ma y well not breach s . 27 anyway , since they could 
po te nti,:1ll y be pro - cornpet iti ve in certa i.n instances. Eagles 
t ho ugh t· so i f such a c l alls e w cH, t he u lL 1 .Y w R y i n w :1 i c h a s m n. L L 
i 11 11ovc,tive but under - capitol ised licensor- could 1:1r tr.=1ct 
3S'9 
l i c en'.,,ees . 
4. The Section 45 Prote c tion Afforrlerl to Ea c h Intelle c tual 
P r opert:} Right . 
Sf-(· rion 45 on i ' s fdce might e t,=1ken to apply only t o the 
~tu tutory int-ellPctnal prop1:::rty rigilts : coriy right, p,1.tents , 
Pr o t e c t e d p 1d11 t v c1 r i e t i e s , reg i s t ere d des i gn c, , r1 n rl trade m c1 r ;.;: s . 
Th ,i t o n l y s t d t u l o r y i tI t e 1 L e c t- u ft 1 p r- op e ,- t y r i g l i t s ,, n~ pro t e c t Pd 
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by s . 45 is supported by the fact that "trade secrets", which 
~bO 
ct ppeared in tl1is clause of the Commerce Bill, was omitted before 
t he Bill w,1s enacted. 
Th e rationale may be that it was only proper to create 
ex emptions for those rights Parliament has seer1 fit to enshrine 
i n legislation. However, it is naive to think the other rights 
are any less real, nor in some cases, any less certain or 
a <ic ertainable . Also s . 7(2), which leaves unaffected the law 
rP lating to breaches of confidence, is inconsistent with such a 
vie w. It does not seem that the rey11irement of registration is 
de terminative of whether each right is included, for copyright 
ve sts automatically . Copyright was n o t protected by the 
equivalent provision in the GWB. The German provision protects 
on ly patents, registered designs, and seed varieties, so it not 
on ly omits all unregistered rights such as copyright, 
un registered designs and trade marks, but also registered trade 
::. 1o1 
m1 rks . Co pyright is exempted, how e ver, by virtue of S.102a. 
The drafting ins. 45(1), and the differences between s . 45(1) 
a11 d (2), me,;n that there are pcirti.cul,1r ambiguities in respect 
ot the followi.ng c1r e as 
(a ) Unregisl ered flesi gns 
Sr• c t i or 1 4 5 ( l ) 011 Ly pro t e c t s reg j s ~ ere d de s i g 11 '=' • A design that 
is never regish-irerl., or no longer rt"gistere d, may sti.Ll be 
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protec te d under the law of copyright, and so would be protected 
unde r s . 4 5(1) under that limb . 
However , a problem arises under s . 45(2)(c) which protects 
prov isions obliging a licensee or contract u al p n r ty "to exchange 
expe rience, or to gr,:1nt li cences for improvements ill, er applied 
uses of, an invention, desj_gn , or plant vc_triet_.:::_" (my emphc1sis), 
~o the extent thctt there is a mulu al obligatio n itt ex i stence 
req uired of another party who is an o wn er , seller, or licensor 
of those in tel l ect11dl pruperty rights . It is not clear whether 
s. L+5(2)(c:) also applies only to registered rlesigns . 
~~ Eagles has pointed out there is no mention of registration in 
342 
s.45 (2)(c). Whilst t11e term "those rights" refers back to the 
list i n the part of s.45(2) before paragraph (a), Eagles i s of 
the view that it merely i dent ifi es potential licensors, and does 
nol expand the permissible subj ect matter of the obligation . 
This , i t i s submitted , must be cocrect . The reference to "t t10se 
rights" does not i.n ,'tny way refer back to the "invention, 
d-->si gn, or p l ant variety·· in s . 45(2)(c), b11t to the list ot 
inte ll ectual property rights in the tirst pdrt of s . 45(2) . 
Jj,J 
E,g les then stated: 
" I t mi g h t there fore u"" s c:1 i. d t h c1 t th e ex e rn pt ion of re c h no l o gy 
P.XCh<lrtges su1iplPmP.nting the parent right m,1kes -,en~e only i.n 
so far [ rtS J s ,, eh exchfinges co nee rn pd t P.nt eel i 11\'en t i 011s or 
protected plant vc1rieties if only bec,1use it is n ccessc1.ry to 
i cl P. n t i f y p r e c i s e l _y 1\jl_ c1 t i. t i ~ w 1t i c h i s b e i n g i m p r o v P d o r f o r 
which <'l n e w use has been fou11J''. 
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filgle s is of the view that there are two alternative 
J ,~ 
co nstructions that may be placed Ott s . 45(2)(c) . The firsc is 
t hat the p r o v i s i on e n c o m pd s s e s o n l y re g i s t e red i n \. e n t i u 11 s , 
design s and plant varieties, and cxclurles all other copyrig1tt 
art icles (designs or otherwise) . The second is that it reEers 
t o both registered and unregistered inventions, rlrsigns or plant 
vi rieties but excludes all copyright works other thnn designs . 
In the latter case "design'' would bear its ordinary mecrning 
rather than that provided in the Designs Act 1953 and may 
3,s 
inclurle shapes dictated solely by function. 
\\ith respect, the second alternati\·e would be a nonsense . Of 
t 11 e t h re e t e r ro s " i n v e n t i on ·' , re f e r r i n g t o p ,"t t e n t s . a n d ·' p : a n t 
\-lriety" could only possibly refer to rights registered and 
(pe rhaps) the subject of pending applications . It cannot be 
sd id that each term includes unregiste red n1atter, for whi ch the 
la w prnvicJes no protect ion. Foe thi.c; rr; ct siln the imm e di,=1te 
context does not assist th e co nstnHtion of the wurd "design" . 
i•, It e t lt e r t ha t i n c l u de s u n re g i s t e red de ':, i g ll s p r ot e c t e d h y t h e 
copyright law is a mor e cJifficul t qttesrio11. 
ltt s.45(1)(a) anu t-he introdu cto ry words o t ..:;,Lf5(2) r e te1·e11ce is 
ni et de t- o r 2 g i s t e re cl d e s j g n , w_lw r e ,1 s j n s . 4 5 ( 2 ) ( c ) o ll l y '' de s i g ll ·' 
i.., ;r1e11 t io1wd. 
..,,1ch drafting. 0 n t 11 e o n e h , , 11l.i , " de ..., i g n " n s op po :-, e cl t u 
"1-eg ist-ered cle.,,ig-n" may be int-endP.cl t o inc l ude unregi.sterE·d 
l : s i g n ::, a s \\ e l I . On i l ie ot!H-i r h,n1d uccur1· in g ,b it does in 
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l1rtt·<1gt·aph (c) of ,'l c,ubsect i on which has already referred to 
"registered design" 111 that part before ectch of thP. paragrapl1':>, 
"design'' mc1y merely be an a!Jbrev icttion of ''register·ecl design" . 
Even thuugh s .4 5(2) is an explanatory (rr1ther than a true 
d 1~ e rn i n g ) pro v i s i o n , ,1 n d s o c o u l d we l 1 e x pa n d t h e e , t e n t o E 
1:,.43(1) , such a clear inconi:>isrency with ihe worcli11g oE s . Li.5(1) 
must not have beP.n contempldted . r n t he ,~ o t1 t e x t o [ an e x c e pt i on 
t o the restrictive trade prc1ctices code, such a construction 
'A n uld reqiiir-e \·pry clear- Jrafting, ,1nd in rhe face of such an 
i11cons i½ teuc_y, it is submitted, tlie onl:/ course is to limit 
'=> • 4 5 ( 2 ) ( c ) to reg i s t ere d designs . That interpretation fits with 
t h e ecirl ier o1Jst:r\'atinn that '=> . 45 is 1 imi ted to those 
i 1tellectu,1.l property rigl1ts en-;hrined it1 statute . 
( 1i ) Copyrig11t 
I t l':> n1~cec,s,1ry nPxr Lo co11sidPr whether some ot tllose 
u 1c egi_.stere.! desi..gns ma.y be still protected FIS copyright , or 
n1o re generally, wbet11er s . 4S(~)(c) appl i es to cop_,right at all . 
" Co pyright-" is not in cluded in l11e provision . There i-, no 
p1rt i cul<'lr refPrP11c ;e tu the si1bjPct rn<'ltter ot copyright , U':>Uctlly 
r · fe r red i o dS r1 "work" . 
. ..\ ~ first sig11L it cll) l:-H~ars cup)-righi mLty hc1\·p bPen excluded since 
i t i,-, 110!: rPgisl. rable and sinr:e design unl_y refers tn reg·istered 
d ":,igns, both on t!iP. grouncis ot precisjon . However, nPither 
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unregi.stered design or copyright ar·e necessarily any less 
precise than registered designb . Eagles gives the example of a 
cnrnp uter programme - which i!::> ~ctpable oE giving rise to e\a ct ly 
tlie type of mutual exchange of informatio11 that s . 45(2)(c) is 
aime d ctt protecting , and yet though it may b e the subject of 
JU 
copyr i g h t , i t could not be a design . 
It perhaps was thought that obligcttions to exchange experience, 
or to grant licences for improvements :in , or applied uses of, 
i11\·entions would not be .i.pplicable t o copyright . However, tha.t 
it not so , especially n o w that copyr ight can protect 
tl ree - dimensionctl industrial designs by virtue of antecedent 
367 
drrlwi ngs find also modc~ls. 
Tlie re seems to be no good reason why copyright works are no 
i nc luded within s . 45(2)(c) . Clearly they were not intended to 
be encompassed within "invent ion'' . 
(c) Cnregistered Trade ~ark~ 
We ha v e s e e n t h ,-1 t s . 4 5 ,'t p p 1 i e s , i n t e r a 1 i a , t o '' ri~gi stered 
.}(,g 
dP-.ign or trade mr1r k" . It is n ot c l ea r wh e l1er ··tr ilcie m,,rk'' 
mPrtn!:o regist- ered trdde rnar 1, on l y o t- in c lu des unregistered m'1 r k.s 
e1fo r ce d by th e co rnni o n lfl.w net-ion of pdssing- off . Section 
'+'i(l )( a) in c lud P."" d c<>rnrn,1 bPt-WP.P,n ''regi sr t!rr1cl design , or trctdP-
111ark ", rmli"ke s . J6 (2), \\·hi ch l i~t<:> lhe s<1me sta1:lliocy 
i 11 • P 1 l e c t-i 1 ,1 I proper- t y r i g h t s . Th~ d i "" t i n c i on . i 1 no 1 ft c1 r a t t i n g 
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oversight in respect of s . 36(2), could mean that "registered'' is 
t o quality "trade mark" as well as "design" only in s . 36(2) and 
n o t in s . Li5(1) . 
Th is would meRn that unregistered marks are within the 
e xcept i on . Ho wever , it is a rule of statutory interpretation 
Lhat punctuation should be ignored: In 1 cind Revenue 
349 
Commissioners v Hinc!::!L But in some cases punctuation has 
i n fluenced construction : Committee of Fruit M_a_!'_k_etiru{ v 
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~ 0_U_i n_~ ; 37r Byde :lunici.12al Council v Macquarie _Universit ·. It may 
be argued that as trade marks whether registered or not do not 
create true monopolies, the intention of the legislator may have 
b e en to protect common law marks as well as statutory registered 
md rks . This is especially so since service marks are not yet 
372 
r e gisterable in ~ew Zealand . Eagles, referring to this 
pu n c t u at i o n d i s t i n c t i o n bet we e n s . 4 5 ( 1 ) ( d ) and 4 5 ( 2 ) on the· one 
·hand, and s.36(2) on the o her, made the point that if a 
co nscious distinction was i1tter1ded 1 "it is diffi c ult to see on 
37..3 
wl1ctt- policy grounds j t was being made '' . 
E1g les refer-red. to t 1le £act thd.t n o w some unregist e red mar k s n1c1y 
J74 
b P enforced under the Fair Trading . \et 1986, in parti c ular s . 9 
wh i c h provides that it is unlc1wful to enffag-e in "conduct that 1s 
37S 
n1i sleading or decept i ve or is likely to mislead 01- decei\·e" . 
The . .\us t r a. l i an e q u i v a l en t , s . 5 2 o f the Trade Pr d c ti c e s Ac t 1 9 7 4 
h r1 s be e t, u s e d w i t h c on s i de r a b l e e f f e c t i n t h i s a r e a . 
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Section 9 proscribes conduct fa r beyond passing off, and so, 
e,·e n assuming s . 45 does protect u11regi stered t rade marks , to the 
exte nt that s . 9 goes beyond the scope of trade marks , for 
e•a mple into the area of misleading conJuct outside the realm of 
goodwil l, s . 45 will pr·ovide llO protection to anti - competitive 
attempts to licRnce or assign . However, it is difficult to see 
l 11 e nd e van c e of s . 9 o f the Fa i r Trad in g ..-\ c t 1 9 8 6 to s . 4 5 . I t 
i s submitted that it does not really add anything to cons ider 
the Fdir Trading Act 1g 86 when consideri ng whether unregistered 
trctde marks fall withi11 s . 45. Section 9 cannot be said to 
pr·ov icle ct statutory protection for such rna.rks in the same sense 
cts uther intellectu ctl property rights are conferred by statute . 
37, 
Edgl es also stated that : 
"s . 45 also appears to envisage that the mark may be 
transferable in itself . The interest protected by a passing 
off ~ction cannot as a matter of law be assigned separately 
from the business they ctre designed to protect (and the 
right to bring proceedings ur1cler the Fair Trading Act is not 
dssigna.ble dt a l l). Sec1iou 4'5 has created ror its own 
purposes a rnu tan t r i gli t un knowl! to the genera 1 1 aw and 
djffering itt importu.nt re-;pe cts [from] its st-a.tutor:· 
cou~in . ·• 
l t i s not c o r.· re c t t o s t a t e t ha t t 11 e i n t e re s t pro t e c t e d by a 
pc1c.,s ing off actioll cctJtnot be trc1nsf e rreJ SP.pdcate Jy from the 
bt1siness in wl1ich it is used . A registered proprietor of a 
l r d J e m c1 1.· k c a n a s s i g ll u t1 r- e g· i s t ere d ma r k s ,:d o n g w j t h re g i ~ t e r- e d 
rnctrl.;s al rhougl1 a11 u11ri~gistered mnrk cannot be assigned 
'if [Jdr'n.lely . 
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(d) Trade Secrets, Breach of Confidence, and Know- How. 
s ~ct ion 45 clearly does not expressly protect contracts , 
arrangements or understandings containing anti - compet iti ve 
pr ovis i ons relating to the use, licence , or assignment of those 
ma tte r s that have beco me known as trade s ec rets, confidentjal 
i ll for rn at i o n, or know - how . As we have seen trade secrets were 
s pec ifically includ ed in c lau se 45 of the Commerce Bi ll, but 
we re omitted dur in g th e passage of the legislati o n throug1i the 
H)U~e . This om issjon was justified since co n tracts, 
a r-r a n gem en t s , or u n de r s t c1 n d i n g s gr a n t i n g r i g h t s i n t: rad e s e c re t s 
or k now-h ow cannot be anti - competit i ve as their very essence is 
s Pc recy - thus to el!te r into a contract , arrangement, or 
under standing granting right s in re spect of the information 
(whic h must involve disclosure) enhances competition . 
These intellectual p roperty rights dre relevant for 
cons id eration here s in ce restrictions on the use may be 
i t'c or porated in li ce n ces or assignments of those int e ll ectua l 
properly righ ls whi c h are e_-press ly protec ed by s .4 5 . 
Stc tion 45 protects provisions "reiating to the use, licen c e , or 
as s ignment of rig11ts under or existiJJ_g_bv v irtu e of'' (rny 
cnnp bctsis) ce rt,"'l in int e ll e c tual pr·oµerty righ ts It ma y be 
a r g u P. cl that t I I i s i n c l u des t 11 e '' know - how '' \\ h i c h we have seen 
s 11 rro un Lis many inte ! l ect ual proper-ty rights . 
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s. E:\isi·ence 
Pctrtict1Jctr problems arise since s.45 only applies where the 
i nte llectua l property right itself actur1lly exists. Au 
except i on occurs ins . 4 5(2)(c), where the term ''invention'' is 
us e d s o t ha t i t rn i g h t i n c 1 u de a pen d i n g a p p 1 i c a t i on , w hi cl, may 
be a state of ctffr1irs that lusts for year<:, . 
I t is not always cledr, as litigation often shows, whether 
pc1rticular intellectuc1J property is in fa c t validly protPcted . 
Hence a. pe r son , believi11g he is the owner of: n1arerial whi.ch is 
protected, may enter into a contract for the exclusive licence 
of the right with a pP.rson wl10 a.lso belieYes the right to exist . 
I f subsequently it is found that the right does not exist or is 
i11vctli.d, not o n ly can the licensee avoid the contrctct, but the 
l ic ensor would not be able to rely on s .4 5 and hence would be 
subject to the respective trr1.de practices provisions. 
6. Application of Section 45 
I t i. s , o f co u _r- s e , e v id en t t ha_ t mere 1 y because r" t pro v i s i. on i s 
oui. sidP. the exception in s . 45 does nor meE1n thdc it is 
OJjectionable or unenforc:er1ble . lt means only the1t it i':> then 
P t11njnable agr1i.nsl: th e provisions of Parr. l l, particulc1rly 
'- S .27 - J(), 
.\ pp l y i t1 g t lt e p r o \ · i s i o n .s o f s . 4 5 t o p ,) r t i c u l tff p r o v i s i. o n s 1 n 
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li c ence agr-eements wi. l l be nn simple task . Take for example a 
p n H· i s i u n i. n a l i c en c e re q u i r i n g t he 1 i c en s e e t o p u r c h c1 s e r a w 
rnrlterial from the licensor. In some cases tld s might be 
essential to preserve the integrity of the licensed prodnct by 
eusllr ing thr1t the liceusor·s manufachiring speci.ficati.ons and 
quality controls are complied with. In other cases the 
n-it1te rials will be quite standacd and the requirement will be 
i mpo sed to tie the li censee in a manner which may well be 
anti. - c:ornpetitive . 
S im ilarly a provisio11 not to purchase materials tram, o r employ 
the services of, designated suppliers rna y be motivated by 
q1al ity considerations or by a11ti - compe t itive intent. 
In c ases of doubt it can be expected that th e prote c tion of the 
e ~ce ptions will be d e nied, leaving the effects of the provisions 
to be evaluated in c ompetiti.on terms . 
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B. Sect U)J:!_3_6_L2)_ 
As we have seen the s . 45 exemption does not apply to s . 36 at 
377 
all . Instead s . 36(2) has its own spec i fic excPption in respect 
of intel l ectual p r operty rights . 
Under s . 36 there are thus two questions that must be answered in 
order to dete rmi ne whether conduct in relation to intellectual 
property rights is unlawf u l . F i rstly does the conduct breach 
s.36( 1 ) a.tall , and seco11dly , if so, does the s . 36(2) exception 
save it . In particular factual s i tuat i ons , it will be easier to 
add ress the l atter question firs since if i t is answered 
posit i vely , the first, and complic.=i.ted, question mdy be 
i gnored . 
1 . Introd u ction - Abusing a Dominant Position in a Market 
Sec tion 36 i s aimeJ Rt preventing dominant firms using their 
power for the purpose of preventi11g or eliminating competition . 
It is thus concerned with monopolistic conduct, that is 
3H 
unilateral anti - competitive conduct . 
Tl e st-ateJ purpose of the Commerce Act 1986 is especially 
irn portant witl 1 respect to s . 36 becausP t1,ose most r1ttec Pd by 
c o n du c t c o m i n g w i t hi n t he pro v i s i o rt w i 1 l be t he t r ,-1. de r s who u re 
Pr evellted from competing . The wc1y s . 36 is tran1Pcl tends to tocu~ 
37~ 
dt t ention on the interests of such trAders . The section ref~rs 
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to dorninant firms using their power to affect some other person, 
r11ther than affecting competition per se . Further, individuals 
are given a right of action to r ecover dRmages for loss sutfered 
and a trader bringing such an action wil 1 be seen as the person 
visib ly harmed rather than the general public . 
A tende ncy to give too much weight to the interests of the 
i n div idual trader affected should be avoided. It is 
i11consistent with the economic objects of the . .\et, that is 
whether competition is affected at1d the impact in the market dnd 
?. to 
h e n c e on the c o n s u, n e r . Th e p r i v ,'1 I: e r i g h t o t a c t i on i s i n c l u d e d 
in the Act to facilitate enforcement, it should not result in an 
i n ference that- s.36 is int ended to protect-. the interests of 
i udividual traders bringing the action merely from strongly 
311 
c o mpet itive behavio11r by larger firms in the market. 
\\ i tl1 competition as a goa.l, the Courts must ensure that 
l Pgitiniate pro-competitive conduc:i is not penalised e\·pn if thctt 
382 
r o n d 11 c t i s h a r d n. n d do P. s J a ,n r1 g e s m d l l e r c o m p e t i t o c s . 
T 11e lr1ck of cle,'1r cr it eria i.n s.36 i11creases \Jncertainty ac, to 
111nl conduct it p r·ohibits . Thi.s irlL1,Y cause ti.rms , iti endeavoucing 
t o cump)) with tl1e law, to a\·oid such hard competitive 
p r aclicP.s . To the extc·r1t tll ,tl t!ti--, is su, compP.t:iti c;n is 
l :.. c,~enecl rdth(-'C lhc1ll prornntPd. It is ro bE: 11oped that t11e 
l . {) u r l s w i l l e 11 c, 11 r P t h a t t I , c, i r cl e c i '"' i. ri 11 s d o , 1 o t i rt c r e ct c., e t h i s 
P f 1ecL b11t rc:1ll1!-~I~ C!-·cli1c·e i.t then~b_v reass11cjng tirrns that 
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p1·0 - compe t i. t iv conduct is in fact not prohibited . 
.3 i3 
~ ''person" includes .::111 "c1ssociatil)n of persons", b11t to come 
withi.n s . J6 thdt- association mllst be a. supplier or ctn a.cquire1· 
JH4 
of goods or services . 
2. ,.'.\ Donii.nant Positi()ll in ,1 :"ln.rket 
Fo r a firm to contravP- ne s . 36 it must have ''a dominant position 
~'I<; 
i n a market". The section only applies where a fir-n1 is not 
!i t(. 
Sllbjf:Ct to effective competiti on . "Dorni1rnnt position in a 
mo1rket'' is defined in s.3(ti). This definition largely originate · 
3H 
f r om E . E .C. law . It provides that a supplier or ctn acquirer ot 
goods or services, either alone or together with an 
lii 
i n terco nnected body co rporate, who 1s in a position to exercise 
a domi nant influence over the produ ction, ?,cquisition, supµly or 
p c i c e o f goods o r s e r v i c e s i n a m <'1 r k e t ha s a do rn i n a 1 1 t po s i t i on 
i.11 thctt market . To determine wt1 ether thdt person is i.n such a 
p (I ~ i. t. i. o n , re g a r d s s rw l 1 be 11 r1 cl t o t l 1 e ma r k e t s h c1 r e , t e c h n i c i:il 
~f9 
1,' u w l edge , access i o m d t. er id 1 s or c A pi ta l t b ct t. t h ~ per s ') l t has , 
d i cl tlte e:-.te11t u[ constrc1inLs on thc1t person by the conuuct of 
c t rn p e t i L o r· s , po tent i a. l corn pet. i t ors . s up p l i er~ o r· d c q 1 t i n=i r s 1 n 
I li a t- murket. Th i s po s i t i on i s t a r g 1 ~ t P. d s i n c P i t 1 s t l 1 c, t c on t r o l 
w I i c h g i. v e s t he f i. r m t he f re (') rl o m t o de p rt r t f r o rn + l 1 e P f E i. c i e n t 
p r icing , out-put and costi ng clecjsio11s thr,c would be torcec1 upon 
; t i. 11 a co mp e t i t i v e m <1 r· k 1::: t . 
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Co nsiste11t with the wording of the statutory provisions , the 
Co mmerce Commission has adopted ct tf:-Jst in respect of clorninance 
wh ich encapsulatPs bot!1 structurctl and behavioural aspects . 
390 
I n \ews Liinited/I>JL the Commerce Con,rnission stated: 
"A person can be considered to have a dominant influence in 
a mar1<et when tlwt person is able to make significant 
btis in es:,, decisjons , particularly, those relt1ting to price 
and supply, without regard to t1H'! cu111petitors, suppliers 
and customers of thctt per·son•· . 
Se ction 36 has been addressed tor the first time in a final 
pi oceeding by Borker J in :\uck.lal!d Regiona_l ,..'.\uthorit-v v .~1tuaJ_ 
Re n ta 1 Cars ( :; u ck 1 and . ..'.\ L rp or t 2.__ Lt cJ • , Ta s m r in _ Rent a. 1 __ C c1 r s Ltd . , 
3 ~/ 
ard_ Duniiniun Budget Re nt A Car (l91:l4) Ltd . Tha.t cus e concerned 
t he warring rentnl C,3r operators and the _; . R . A . which operates 
A c kland Inter n ational Airport . Tl, e A . R . :\ . had in 19 8 2 granted 
l ic ences to the first and Second Defendants (Avis and Hertz 
r e spectively) to provide and operate rental car servi c es at the 
n ~rport . There were collateral contractual commirments made by 
t he A . R . A . to limit the number ot car rental concessions a.t the 
a ir port to two d,1ring the curren c y o f e,J c h licenc e . 
B1 d get ha<i commenced pr o ceedings c1gc1inst the A. R.A. iu 19 8 4 
n l l eging a ,, onspirncy b e h,P.en th e .-\ . H . A . and ,-\vis and He r tz, 
see i- ing to prevent licen c e extPnsions which wece avail.,ble tu 
A\i s and Hertz in 108- . These lic e J1ces c1nd colla t ero.l c o nlracts 
h ,1 d been e t f e c t i v e 1 y up he l d , a 1 t ho u g ! 1 B t1 d get h ,01 d o b t c1 i n e cl 1 e c1 v e 
392 
t o appertl to the Privy Council. 
- 121 -
~ith the coming i11to force of the Commerce Act 1YB6 Budget 
c,11dclenly had r.t much stronger case . The A. R. A. was in an 
i :iv idious position, with Budget alleging it was contravening the 
new Commerce Act 1986 , and Avis and Hertz rec1dy to bring 
proceedings for breach of contract if the A. R. A. repudiated the 
agreement . So the A . R . A . co mmenced proceedings seeking 
decl~ratiuns as to its lega l po ition in light of the Commerce 
Aci 1986, partjcularly in respect of the co] lateral contracts 
with Avis and Hertz lim i ting the number o f concessions to two, 
and whether it was now entitl~d, or indeed obliged, to consider 
a request for a licence by Budget notwithstanding those 
col laterctl contracts . 
Budget claimed that by virtue of ss . 27 and 29 of the Commerce 
A,.t 1986 A . R . A . was free to negotiate with Budget concerning , 
a11d grant to it, of a licence to operate as a rented car 
opera tor ~t th~ airpo r t . Budget also clajmcc..l tbdt A. R. A. as 
airpo rt ad rninistrator wcts in a dominant position 1n terms of 
s.36 <'Ind WdS th11s prohibitecl from using that poc;itinn r:o prevent 
c _i 111 pet i t i v e c1 r. t i_ v i t y in the car re n l eil rn ark P. t at th e u i rp or t or 
dl'Y otf1er rP.levc111t 111,]rket. 
,\_tt=·r dr!ciding· t1t,1t lhis WdS an appropric1te case to grant 
d P c l rt r r1 t i o u s et n d cJ e a I i t1 g 11 i t h c e r l et i n p r e l i m i n a r y e v i de n t i a l 
111 1 t t- er s , B c1 r k P. r J went o, 1 to co II s i. de r the subs tan t i v e rn <'1 t t er s in 
issue . A l t- l 1 o u g h 1- J I f.! c " s e d i d no t- c o n c P. r r 1 i 11 t e l l e c t u d l prop e r· I. y 
rig lt~c,, t11e s . 36 ic;sue is of in1portc-ir1 ce cl':> ii· dernons:rat..es an 
dppcoc1c h whjrlt mcty be equally applicrtble to intellectual 
µrope rty righl: licensing . 
Budget contended A . R .A. was in a dominant position in both the 
mar~e t of concessions for rent al Crlr operators at Auckland 
Airpo rt and the market for rental car services at th e airport , 
nnd that A . R . A . was using tlu,t po:c.itiun Eor rhe purpose of 
re':->tr i ct i ng entry of other persons , such as Budget , into the 
l d tte r market or any other· market . 
Bc1rker J si_ctted that "in \-iew of the definition of 'd omi nant. 
pos itiot1' under s . 3(8), it is d i fficult to see how A . R . A . is 
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other than in a dominant posi t.i.on in both marke ts' ' . 
It must not b e assumed that every l icensor or intellectual 
pro pe rt y holder will be in a dominant position in a nrnrket for 
the licensing of tl 1e right . t-\s i n e\·ery case falling for 
dere rminc1tion under the CoinmercP . .\ et 191:30 dealing- with 
dor11 in<'u1c e , it must bP nscertc1inecl whethe r th <'-? ,1.l legt~dly dominant 
f 1 r m h a ;-, e f E e c; t i v e c o m p e t i t i o n i n t he re l e v a n t m c:1 r k P t fl s 
µ r o p e r I } de l i n e ,1 b e; d , t a k i n g i n t- o c o n s i de r ,"1 t i on , i. u t e r c1 l i. a , t h e 
mnt tcrs expressed in s . 3(A)(a) - (c) . 
tlis C{:l se was such that it could well be said thn tliP .-\. [~ . A. 
11 , 1 s i n a d L' m L 1 , .::-111 I: po s i t i on . 
Bctrke r- J said "the ta c t th,::i.t there is only 011e supplier mere ly 
rtlfc1ns that there is a monopoly . 
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Prc1ctices Law (1978), Vol . 1 94 - 5 . As Dr Bol Lr1rd ::iaicl in hi.s 
394 a f t i d fi v i t , t he re are no s 11 b s t i t 11 t e ::, d \. a i l a b I e · · . 
( a ) Use of a Dominant Position 
To breacl1 s . 36 a person in a dominant position in a mnrket ~ust 
3<;,., 
" u se'' t.hat position . The Trade Pra.ctices Act 1974 ( ,.\ust . ) 
J9, 
r e fers to ''take advalltage of". This difference in wording 
s hould not result in legitimate conduct being prohibited 11nder 
J97 
s . 36 . I t must be the dominant posit.ion that is use d , not merely 
co st efficiencies. 
TltP. Feder,::tl Court- of Austrfll ia lias de ctl t at th e interlo c utory 
s t age w i t h d mono po 1 i s d t i on c a s e i 11 \" o L v i n g i n t e l 1 e c tu a l 
In Warman International & Other::, v En~irotech ----- ---- - -- ----
p roperty . 
39i' 
Aus tralia Pt~ Ltd . le.. Others severa 1 compEtnit'S had been 
a c, s o c i a t e d w i t h the d e s i g n , man u f a c t u re a n d s up p 1 y o f '· Vi a r m t:1 n " 
s l 1rry pumps enjoying in tile region o[ nin,_,ty per c ent ot th e 
..\ tist ralian slurry pun,p mctrket . Th e se con,p a nies h a d ("1]1no st the 
Sctme market share in r·pspf::!ct of the spar·e pnr-ts for t"he pumps . 
'l r Symonds, the second responde11t, ltad beP.!1 e mp lo y ed b_v on e of 
t I e a p p i i. c a n t l..: o rn p n n i. e s d s ct ':i d l (, s e n g i. i H"" e r- . He ha r! a cc e.,,s to 
c:Pr t,1in information relctl: ing to the~ rn<1nt1fa ,· rur e oi purnp p<trts 
1~ h i. c h w c:t s o f c () 11 s j d e r ,-t b I e v ,:il u 1 • r o c o ni p ,~ t i t o r s cl e s i r i 1t g t o 
r P u rod u c e l'i et r- m c1 n p um p c; FI n d pd r· l s . En v i rut~~ c It, the first 
r f-'..., po r Id er I l , con du c t ed. ,'l b 11 ':i i 11 e c, s w h i c h i n c l u de J t he s 11 pp l .Y 
- 1'24 -
r ll rough another compan~, of replacen,ent pc1rts to suit \varma.n 
J)ll CIIPS Symon d ~ 1\· as a u i re c t or of t J, ct t c omp c111 y . 
e\ i d ence thr1t he used m,n11. c1ls c1nri dt·,twingc; o E \vdrmt'ln pumps ,1tHl 
p'i rts f()r i he purposes oi that r:orn p c1ny . Tlie ct p plirants were 
gra. 11 t ed ctn Anton Piller or·der Mt1d seized srecifi.eci docurnents 111 
l:lw r P. s pond en t s · posse~ s ion . Th r: ftp p l i c ell 1 t s s o u g h t 
i. 1t erlocutory r1nJ final i1,jun c tiolls, inter dli,1., r e straining 
E11 virotech Erom engaging in misleading or d ec e ptive c onduct, 
c untrary to s . 52 of the Tra d e Pra c ti c es Act ~974 (Aust . ), by 
f r1 1 s e 1 y rep re s e n t i n g t } 1 a t i n £ or m ,1 t i on c on t a i 11 e d i n i h "' man u ct 1 s 
a· 1 d t) t he r d raw i. n g ':i we re l l I e 1 H ·o p P c t y o f , a 11 d r on f i de n t i ,'d t o , 
Env irotech . 
The applicants c1lso clc1in1P.d tha t th e respondent s' co n duct was an 
i 1f ringement of cupyright n.nd a hr-edcl1 of c onfiden c e . 
As a def e nce the resp o ndents al legcrl. that t he prus e cuti o 11 o f 
c, 1,c i1 <.il1 a c ri <) !l wns pre c lud e d by s.4 6 . a.rgujug tli , r c l1e 
.-1 -i p l j c ct n t_ s , b 1-; i. n g a c o ni p c1 n y 1 1 c1 v i I L g c1 "' u b s t ,:1 n t i ,, 1 d e g r e P. o f p o w P r-
i n a mark e t , w P. re t a k i 11 g ad va n l. r1 g e o f t h d. t p o wt· r by a t t e mpt i ll g . 
b.\ t he s e pro c eed i 11 g s , t o e l i mi rH 1 t P or "' u b '=> t- <'1 n -c i c1 1 I y d c: m <'1 g "' a 
( impe titur. 
[n gr c-1nting th e r e li P. f so u gi1r, t he fP <:e ra. l Co1 11 ·r )1 .:;,, cl t h ,:11 
1\ 1S a serious qu e sti o n C•) i)8 tri Pd d=- t.: <, tltP rl','3 p o nrlen t s · 
r o1 1cl 11ct in co11travention or s . 5'2 . hil co :-.: J lield t h ,.1 t , a 
l <) c1 l i rn i t: 1, d P. x t: n t , Er 1 v i r o t e c ! 1 it ,, cl [ ,d s e l y r e p r e s e n r e d t o 
:1ere 
1 east-
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o thers, in the course of trade or comr,1erce , th,tt it w,3.s ii1e 
En v i.roh=:ch ll<tti 11 0 legc1l entitlen,ent, and to ""hich hurni,,n was 
.399 
e ntitled to rnr.dntain a claim ot contirl<::ntiality . 
I n the same way s . 9 of the FcLir Trading Act 1986 ma.y be used to 
re strain the use of confidential informc1tion. 
I n respect of the defence under s . 46 , Wilcox J referred to the 
"i mportant limitatjon to the operation of s.46 imposed by the 
w , H d s · s ha l l t r1 k e i.l d v a 1 1 t a g e () f t h c.1 t po we; r · '· . \\ i l COX J [ 0 ll ll d 
t h n t the o b v i o u s d o rn i n a n i_ r o 1 e t ha t \, a r ma , , e n j o _ye d i n t he '::, l u r r y 
pu mp rn d. r k e t m j g h t pro p e r 1 y be de s c r i be d a s " a s u b s Lu, t i a l de g r· e e 
400 
of power" . The Jnc1ge then said: 
''But in these proceedings it does not seek to tctl---.e advc1nt,1ge 
of that power . Rather it seeks to take advantage of rights 
w f I i c l I i t c l a. i ms i n re s p e c t o f pa· r t i c u l a r do c um e n t s . Th o s e 
rig}-,ts depend upon the nature and source ot the information 
in the documents . The rights, and WacmEtn's po .sition in 
t h i. .., Court , w o u l d b P. ex ,-1 c t l y t he s ,'t r n e i f i t iw l d on 1 y t en 
p e r c e n t c, f t l , e mark f-' t ; j n d e e d e , -e n i f i t c e , i -; e, l a l t o g e t her 
t O Jf! Cl ll ll f.-1 C f- U rf-' p l l Id p p cl r f '> • ' " 
C ') u 11 s P. l f o r t 1i e r e .., p o n d e n t =- h c1 d r P. I i e d o n s e v e r- r1 l r: n i t e d ~ t a t e s 
401 
J~c ision:~, i11 pt1cticular h'obe In c . ,. Q!"-:J11]2_§_!: ..:~~n 1 ) Co . Wilcox J 
11 o t e d t h ,'\ t t he re i s no t i n t h , A s t r a l i. a n _..\ c t , cJ '=> t l I e t' e i s i t 1 
402 
l h e S h e r ni c1 n . ..\ ~ t , 1~1 g e n e r ct l p r· o h i b i t i o n u p u n m u n ,J p o 1 i s a t i o n . H i s 
4oJ 
½nn ou[· contintred : 
"Sect-ion 46 ..,trjkes 01il_y r1t t-hc c ondu c t i t dr>tin<jS F11 1d thnt 
co n du c t i s 1 i r:i i t e d t o r J 1 e t a k. i. 11 g .s. d v a n t a g- e o E c l 1 e m ,,. r k et 
puwer ul thi! n ~ levant curpordtio11 . -~·o i-:x e rcis <J in g o od 
f a i t h a n e x L r ct t 1 P o u s l "" g .-: l r i g l I t , t ii u u g Ii t he e t f e c t rn a y be 
t o 1 e s s e I J , o r e \ e n e l i m i 1 1 ,·1 t- P. , c o m pet i t i o n . 1 s t o t n k e 
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ad v a 11 t age o f t hat r i git t , not o f m c1 r k e t power . '· 
'lhe exp ress inclusion of s. :l6(2) in the Cornrnerce Act 1 9H6 
i 11 i i c d t P. s t h e s a m<'! a pp r· o a c it 1 n \ 8 w Z e .-:1 1 a n d a s w ,:1 s t a ken by 
404 
\d 1 cox J in \v , trnian . 
~~ 
In c v Ectstman Koclnh Co the Second Circuit 
ol served that a '' l a rge firm does not \· i olate s . 2 [oE th e Sherman 
.\ e t] s im p ly by reaping t-.lte compe ti tive rewards attributable to 
..._:1, 
its efficient size" . The Court did nc.1t reg,1.rd suclt conduct as a 
" u se'' of monopoly power . 
111 the Unit ed States in respect of predatory pr·icing, the 
111 c1 r:,:; i n a 1 cos t test has been u '=> e c1 to determine whether a f i r m i s 
ctct ually using its market power o r merely its costs 
e fic ienci e s . In ;'o;orth Easte r11 Tel_~_12hone Co v . ..\m erj.can 
~ 7 4of 
TP._lt?JJhone & Teleg_rarh Co_ , the Second Circuit citeu B~_rl~~..,L_Pt.i9to 
4°9 
<'JI11 I said : 
·' P.. d o p t i r I g rn a r g i n c:il c () s t a s t h e p r o p e r t e '-:> t o f p r e cl ,1 t o .:.- y 
p r i c i n g i s c o r J s i s t e n t w i t h t he pro - c o Ill p e !_ i t i v e t h r u s r u f 
the S 11erinc111 Act . W} 1 en t he p r i c e of E1 cl c, in in et n t .t i rrn ' s 
p r o d , 1 c t e q 1 t , 1 l s l l I P IJ r d u c t · s rn c1r· g i n d L c o s t s , " u n L y l e s s 
ef[ic i ent [ir·111c, will c,uf[er largeL- losses per u11it ot 
o utput; more effic i ent firms wi L L be losing- LPss. or e\en 
t · · t 1 1 " [4 "') · ' · · ] f t opP.ra Ing proL L c1; v ... rn .=1rgLn,t I cost pr1c11Jg T ·111s O':> er':> 
compet ition on the basis of r·e l ative effi c iency . 
Establishing i'I pricjng flour t1bo,·e mctrginal cost would 
P. n co u r d g P. t h P. n t i l i z a t i o n o £ prod n c t i v e re sou r- c e s and 11 o u 1 d 
p r o v i d e ct µ r- i c e ' · 11111 b 1 · e L l fl ' · 11 r I r1 e r w h i c h l e s s e t t i c i e n t t i r rn 
co uld hide f rorn the stresses and storms of. conrpetition . '' 
T 1t c~ rn n r g .i rt cil c o s t t e " t m c1 .r ,1 l s o b P. u c, e d ! o i m p l y a p r e c: a t. o r y 
Pllrpose . If a firm's pr·ice is bt->low marginal cost , 
- l 2 7 
b~" sa.id to be .::i.cting irrutiondlly . Sl!ch conduct can only be 
expla int~d by inferring that the firm had a predatory p1irpose. 
( b) Purpose 
Tl, e dominant position in a market must be used for one of the 
s pecified purposes 1n s . 36(1)(ct) - (c). T11e purpo . .,,e cctn dpply 
411 
t o that or any other market . ..\s we have seen "purpose" means 
411. 
goal or objective, rather than immediate intention. It is a 
state of mind, and t11e state ot affairs 11eed not actually be 
ac hieved . Two provisions undet· former Legislation repealed by 
t Ii e r o mm er c e . \ c i 1 q 8 o were s j mi l ,1 r to s . 3 6 b u t re t er to 
p "'a. c t i c e s t h a t h r1 d t he " p u r po s f.~ " or were " L i k e l y t o h,,, v e t he 
413 
etfec t" of producing certain results . This absen c e of "~ffect" 
i n s . 36 limits the purport of the section to the situation were 
the purpose cctn be ascertained. 
L'tll ike "purpuse" in sections like s . 27 which deal with 
provi~ io11s of agreeme1Lts, t}1e p11rpose ins . 36 rnu"'t be 
41"!' 
d":>C et·Lained subjecti\·tdy . The purpose neeJ only be one of the 
p u rposes a pers on hud for using his or her ciornir1ant position , if 
. 41$ 
it is a subst,111tial purpoc;e, 
3. The Enfurcing of lDtellectu cll Property Rigl1ts Lx: r. ~ption 
s ~ct i.011 36('2) p1·ovicies : 
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''For the purposes of this section, et person doP.s not use a 
dominant position in a mr1rket for a11y of the purposes 
spe c if ied in par-a.graphs (<'1) to (c) uf sub- sec · i.on (1) of 
t-his section by reason only tl1e1t that person entorces or 
seeks to enEorre uny right under· or exi'.:>ti.ng by ,·irtue of 
c1ny copyrig11t , pc1tent, protected plant variety, registered 
des j gn u r t r n de nw r k . " 
Eag]P.s licts said ''section 36(2) is wholly neutral in its effect . 
It defeats presumptions of vice but sets up no presumption of 
4 '" virtue in their pla ce ." 
Original ly the draft Bi 11 did n ot include s . 36(2) in its enacted 
f')rm . It was thought that it was unnecessary, since an action 
t o enforce an intellectual property right WctS not taken with a 
p irpose such as envisaged by c laus e J6 of the Bi 11, but ratl1er 
4ft? 
wi th the purpose of protecting the right in question . Out of an 
aound ance of caution the specitic exemption wc:1s added, 
origi nally placed in clause 45 . To limit the exemption, the 
1~JrJs "by reason only" were included . Thi .s emphasises that only 
the barre exercise of certain intel l er.tual proper-ty rights that 
ic. not to constitute "use" of a dominant po~itio11 . 
This lirnitai.ion rneans a disti11ctio 1t n111st be drawn between 
inte llectual propPr:-ty ctctiuns brought for the pi1rpoc...e of 
pi-otecting rig11ts so as to be able lo e,{ploit ) 1 (' li1 S U C C e S S [ IJ l i .Y 1 
,-1n d a.ctious brougl1t with a purpose r.ontained in s . J6(l)(a.) -
( ) . Su -. h d d is t i 11 ,- t i on is r1 u r e c1 c.; y to cl r ct w. Ho w,_ ,. P r t he 
4/~ 
d I o.; t i n c t i o n w n. s s 1t ow t1 i n [( u b E:-' I n c . v L_!!;_mpsP..}_ Pump~ Co . whPre, 
11 l t h o u g Ii o 1 t '= o f Ku be · s p .--1 t e n l s w r1 s i n t r:- i n g e cJ , r h e r e ct l p u r· p o s P 
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of the action ~as to further a n ex is ti ng monopoly and to 
e1i_ minate Dernpsey as a competit or . 
\~a le has said that the ''line has to be ~ra wD between imµeding 
co111petit-ors only to the extent i nherent in the pc1tent grc1nt and 
-419 
impe ding them unne cessarily". 
This sam e lin e Jr- aw ing process rnust , it 1s submi,t-ed, occur in 
respec t of each intellectual pro1iecty riglit . The Cnited Stc,tes 
clPJJruc1ch l1as been to ide nti fy circumst,1ncF:·:; \~llic-11 indicate c1n 
4:i,o 
har ra.ssing purpose . Due to the pc:rceived inct bllity of rl1e 
co u rt s i n A u s t r a l i a t o m ,'1 k e t h i s d i s t i n r t- i o n , t 11 e l e g i s l ,-t t u re 
'421 
h·:iS now d irected t h e courts to do thi.s . 
SPct i o n 36(2) really operate s as an evidentiary pro\-isioo . By 
\' i rt u e o f i t , e v i de n c e o f a. pro s c r i bed p u r po s e mu s t be f o u n d 
othe r than merely 1n steps taken to enforce or- attempt to 
A ll f O r C e d 11 i rt (- 8 l l e C t U a l p l' () p e r - f y (' j_ g t ! t . 
'fl.l, 
t l I e pro v i .s i_ o n m r t y n n t e v e n go t l I i c, t.-1 r : 
Ea g 1 e c.; h d s a r g u e d t iki t 
"Section 36(2) mc1y simply be int e rpre ted to mPtin ihctt t10 
ct cl v er s e i n r e re r I cl~ s arc~ to be d r f t 11 n l r o ri 1 t i1 e r~ n r or c ,~ me n t o t 
J,_!_~~li\-ic~1,1._l clctl!Ses in dn intell,~ctual propf:r-ty licenc'8 . Th~ 
rc~lerence to ",=my rigl1ts", il c-:011ld be arg11 Pc! . 1lor,s not 
preveni the overdl l tenor of an -t~r- eemr. 11t trClrn tJein~ 11s1?d ds 
e\idenC'e of an unlnwtul p1 1rpose . Tt thdt bt 0 the Cflse . it 
w u 11 l d t l I e n be po s s i b 1 e t o d r d w .-1 d v P r s e i 11 r " re n c e s t r o m t ll e 
ernp l1 a:--, j :::; gi\er1 t o pc1rticulL1c c1c111ses by licensors in their 
dectl ing..., w; t-11 t tcensPe:-, (or cJve!1 trorn thPit' st: l eC't i_\-p 
e 11 [ o r c e 111 .'J n t o t t he s Ft m r:;! ) ·' • 
S · c t i o 11 3 6 ( 2 ) ct p p l i e s u n l y t o e n t o c c i 1 1 g o r s ., e I-~ i n 6 t o e n f o c c e 
i 1 t- fd l e c: t u ct 1 p r op f-~ r t y r i g-1 1 t s , w l JI:~ r '= a c; s . 4 5 c• p p i ;__ e s j 1 1 s t c a J t o 
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the entering find giving effi::ct to c1greements . Tl1is is nut so c1S 
t o prtJviJe a "narrower" exception in resp(!Ct of rnonopolis,1tion, 
l>ii rdlher t<) conform to lhP. unilc1tera.l conduct c<111ght- by 
:,,.36(1) . Section 3b(2) ensures that the courr_s do not L:1ke the 
L1.re enforcing of intellectual property rights as evidenr.e of 
u s e o f a do m i. n a n t po s i t i o n £ o r a p r· o s c r i b P. d p u r po s e . 
As with s.45, s . 36(2) only app li es where tl1e intelle c tual 
p r operty right c1ctu,tl ly exists . This causes particular prob l ems 
s 1 n c e s . J 6 ( 2 ) d pp l i e s on l } t o e n f o cc i n g o r a t t e rn p t i n g t o en f o r c e 
i n tellectuctl property rights. l l rnay 1oean t11c1t tlie new practice 
wi ll be for defenddnts in i11tellectual property enforcement 
a , tions broughi- by plainti.trs wi.th a dominant position to 
co unte r c l aim a breach of s.36. The d iffi culty of applying 
i 11 te lle ct u c1l property laws to particular fact situations often 
r e sults in claims beir.g brought with a. reasonable belief of 
s 11 ccess and yet fai Jing. In suc11 cases s . 36 ( 2) dnes not a.pp ly 
lP <1 v ing the court to t r1ke the att-empteci enforcement ot tl1e 
i r Lel lectual property right fully ir1to account in d e termining 
1, h etbe r the plaintiff had a purpose proscrib(, d by s . 36(1) . The 
n t1 ture of some intellectual property rjgltts rneans that: such A 
p ,1 rpose ma} wel l be inferred as wi.11 the fai lur1~ o t the 
e11 forcement clc1im itselt . 
( 1) L11regi::,r,"! nid Trade :"lcJ.rks 
.\ <:, w1:: hc1ve '->Pen there is ir1 ~.Jo(2J no comma tfehH'e :1 "registPl'ed 
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desig n'' and "trade mark". Eagles is o f the v i e w thAt 
unregistered lrodP. marks are ''unecruivocally outsidP its 
423 
protection" . It is submitted that it is not nearly so clear . 
..\lthough the differen ce in punctuntion does point to that 
conc lusion, Lo rd Reid's warning as to its u se as a tool of 
l.fl'+ 
interpre tation must be t r1ke n heed of. Ce rtainl y there is no 
l ,gica. l reason for the irtclit~ion of one and exclusiori of the 
oThe r. 
(h) Trctde Secrets 
T'1 e s e are c 1 e ci r 1 y e x c 1 ll de cl f r o m the am b i t o f s . 3 6 ( 2 ) . Firms in 
d do minant position in a market who attempc to maintain that 
p)s ition by bringing an c1c tion for breach of con tiden ce are 
like l y to be ca ugh t in contravention of s.36. A predatory 
p11r pose is mor e l ikely to be inferred if the action frtils but 
"I "lj,-
tiie gener.r1l case will be as in the \\"a.rma.11 ciecision . 
4. Conduct in Relrtt i on to Intel 1ectuctl Prop~rty Criught by 
SPcl ion J6 
lht~[·e will be situritions where an intel lectu,tl proper·ty right 
~n ulci confer a true mdrket 111onopoly, and so by dPfinition the 
01\n er or propt·i.elor ot tl1at rig1-it wili be jn <L r\c)'(1i11ant po':>i.tion 
in r1 mark.et . ThP. rrktrket wi 11 be defi ne 1l as 11rtrr o wly os tl1P. 
S II 1J j ~ C I: 0 f t ] J (:: I' i g ft t . .-\ t I o b v i n u s e x u ri1 p l e i c; et pell e 11 t w h i c h 
c:11 11/i::r-s d 1r1ad,r:t munupuly c;inc: e 11() substj t ut i. on is p ossible , for 
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P. c"l.lll[)lP, since the p,:1t-ent represents a co n siderable technologic,,.l 
T 1i f:! own e r c u u l d a ,- g 11 e t ha t I 1 e i s n o t i. n <'J 
d o mina11t position since potential cumpeti.tion will "keep him 
honest" . However such potential competition even if it is 
likely to mater i al i se well before t h e end of the period of 
p r otection under t he i n tellect u al property statute, would 
u c, u ,ll l y , i n t h i s c c1 s e o f ,'1. pa. t e n t c o n f e r r i 11 g a . rue ma r k e t 
rn o 11 op o 1 y , 1.> e i n s 11 f f i c i en t to A. f t e c t t he e con o m i c de c i s i ons of 
t- lt e rig l1t - holder . 
Th e scope nf the provision i s considerably bror1der . Wher2 it 
c1 n be c;aid tha.t there is a mn.rket for the licellsing of a 
p1rticular intellectual property right , a person who owns that 
r i ght may be saicl to be in a dominant position in that market, 
s i nce mctrkets cE1n be of ser\·ices as well as goods . There is 
on ly l i ke l y to be a. sepci.rc1te m.-:irl--.et. fo r the licensing of the 
riglit whece ther<~ are no substi.tut0.s avdilable, as was the case 
4l.l. 
i11 . ..\ . 8 . u. . v ;'1utuc1l Rental Car~, ,\hi c !1 a l though no an intellectual 
property c,1se , wa::o conceri1ed with licensing . There appears to be 
n o di s c 2rnable disti n ction b<~tween intP.llectunl property 
l i r, e t t s i. n g r1 n cl o t 11 e r l i c en s i n g an cl £ r a n c h i. s i n g . 
. \ though coming v,ithi.u rl1e ,unb i. t of s . ]6, su c !1 c.1 person would 
n ) t w~ c e s s a 1 · i l y " use " t ha t po s i t i. on t or a p r- o ~ c r i b c: d purpose . So 
l rng as the licensor is oni} e\.p l uii ing his rjgl1ts reasonably, 
liP should not contct1vene s .. 36 . 
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1,.,i11 g a. pd.t ent to coe rce the sale of non patented ,,rticles 
4;1.7 
vio lat e s t1tt~ mon upo lisati on provision o t the Sherman ..\et. In 
\ew Zea.land it wol1ld not be saved by s.J6(2) a 11d i.n any e\·ent 
\\ o u 1 d b re a c h s . 6 6 (1 ) ( a ) n f t he P cl t en t s A c t l 9 5 3 . 
In the ullited Sta.tes it h a::i beP.n helci re ce ntl y thd t ob Lai ni. ng a 
p1te nt by fruud and then defending it groun dless l y by bringing 
proce edings in a sit uati on where the patent dominates the 
mnrket const j tutes monopolisa.tion in contraven ti on of the 
.q2.i 
S11erman Act . 
However a domina11t firm is n ot r equir ed to pre - disclose 
429 
t e c hnology to ,:l competitor , and may mak e technologicai advances 
4 ?.o 
wit hout helping manufacturers of peripheral equipment to adjust . 
Of particular rele va nce in ir1telle c tual property cases invol ving 
s.36 is a co ncept known as th e "bottleneck facility". 
43, 
J sa id in ,..\. R . ;\ , v : lu tual Hentctl Cc1rc, : 
. .\s 8;1 rker 
·' t h i s t e r m de s r-r i bes a fa c i 1 i t y w hi c h i .., i n cap a b l e o t 
ciuplicc1tion and of ci r c um,·ent i on a n d to which others must 
hdve access if they are t o cornµete i.n c1 given n,arket . 
f h e e .· ,_; l u s i. o t 1 o f o t her s Ii~ m"" ,1 t 1 s o f t h e bot t l e 11 e c ~ f c1 c i l i t .Y 
i s a n t i - c o rn µ e t i r i " e ; i t s ho l t I d b e e L i m i n et r u d by p r o v i c i n g 
f or tile admission of ut h e rs to he joint \enture if the} 
meet reasonable objecL'i.ve criteria" . 
Th e concc->pt origin,1tes from 1- he l.'1ti.red ~Lites. Bc1 rker J 
r •£erre d tn two Lnj t£~cl S tc1tes ec!S ~)s . 
-4H, 
- 134 -
bought up t tormi ll ,d facilities on the ."lississippi River c1t St 
Louis effect i vely denying competing companies the only access 
across the r- i ,·er . I11 a cas~ regarded as ''tlte judicial. birth of 
43~ 
the ' bottle neck' moilopoly theory" the :Supreme Court , in a 
niiinio n of tlie C'ourt deliverer! by :"!1· . Justice Lurton , held the 
cc11 1duct to bR rnonopolisation . 
"'13~ 
B u· k e r· J re garde d tl e c h t \ · Pr o - Foo t b a l 1 , I n c . ct s i l 1 u s t r a t i v e o f 
seve ral American cases . In tlrnt case a group of promoters had 
sough t in 1965 to obtain a profes~ional Eootball league 
£ r- et n c h i s e . They bro u g 1 t t a n a c t i n n a g ci i n s t t he own e r s o t a 
profe ssionc1l football team in c1 rivdl league claiming that a 
t e s t r i c t- i v e c o v e n ,:1 n t i n a 1 e a s e be hv e P. n t. he D i s t. r i c t o f C o 1 um b i a 
A1·mory Board and that team in respect of the use oE t he Robert 
F. Kennedy Stadium in Washington D. C. was an unlawful restraint 
of trade preventing the use of the stadium by the plaintiffs . 
The rest ri ctive covenant provided t-hat : 
" a. t no t- i me du r i n g t he t- e nn o f t h i s l e , , s e ,1 gr e em P. n c ':3 h n. 1 l 
r_i te stadi.1110 be ler or r entP.rl to ,0 1n_\ pn>fi--:)ssion<1l fr.·otbc1l l 
LP.drn other t.hrtll th;e~ v.·.-1sltittgt:Oli kf!d Skins· . 
1 •1e plaint i ffs contenclP.d t!tal the stadium was the only onP in 
1 lie drec1 tl1c; t was suit,:lble Ecir pr-ofessi.onnl Eootbc1l l, and tl10.t 
I lit-: co v Pr I c111 t p r c~ v e n t e d t h c! m from o 1, I: EJ i I! i. n g i r s u s e , w li i c h 
f 1rt her prevented t-hem from bei1,g <1ble to subrni.t dll c::iccept.:ible 
lr,nwh ise <'1pplicdrio11 to t-1te gnvPr n jng spurting body. This in 
r> ffect p r even ted thern Ernm competillg ag,-iinst. other professi.ona.l 
fno tlrnl l tP.dffls . 
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Th e Cnited St:,'-ites Court of ,-\ppeals, District of Col11mbia 
C i r c u i t , i n a; 1 op i n i on for the C (Ju rt .t i J e d by Iv i l i< P. y C i r c u i t-
Jud ge , found th.-tt the relevc1.r1t mc1rket w<",s the busin~ss of 
pro fessional football. within the area of 'letropolitan haslii.ngt on 
o.c . Th i s 1 i m i l e d a t' e a w a s " i h e are n w h i c h t he a l l e g e d 
re straints r.1ffe,;t [f'd] " : 
..,.3 £' 
L;_Qj _!"_e_d St c:_1_~2_ v C n 1 \J n1 b i.=t Steel Co . 
\\ilkey Circuit Judg-e stated "i-he relevant geographic market is 
43'-
't he area of effective competition" . The area "in which the 
se ller operates, ancl to which the purchaser can practicctbly turn 
-+37 
fo r s11pplies". 
1t e re f e re n c e t o t he a re a o t e f f e <' t i v e corn pet i t i on m 11 s t be t c1 k en 
as indicating the area bordered by the restraint in su c l1 a way 
' rts to prevent the entry of substitutable services . This seems to 
indicate tha.t the finding tlia.t tlte facility is a bottleneck 
nec essarily means thctt there is c1 separate market . 
\1 i l kc:;, y , C i r c u i t J u d g e 11 e 1 d t h ,, t t he c o v E: n ,1. 1 1 t c o 11 1 d c o 11 '-> t i tt i t e a n 
i l l f-! g a l re s t n-t i n t o f t rad e i n v i o 1 r1 t i o n o f s s . l , 2 , a n cl 3 o t t he 
Sl1P. rrnan .-\et . The Court did recog11ise huwe\·e.r thc1t: shctring of 
,..., ...,ellt-ial fc1ci..litii:-)s is n ot req111rPd if jr,1pr,1. ct i.c cil or if ir 
WO I J[ d i lL h i b i t uv:~ 0 C C \.1 p ,"'! tl t ' S d b i. l i t .Y t O S e C \I e i t S CU S t O Ill P r S 
<:de quately . 
f Ii C ,JU d g P. c-1 C c; e 1J t P. cl t rte CO lL t . r1 t i. Un O r 1-f t, C h t <'H, t O the 
' b o L t l e ll P. c k " m o no po I .Y p t' i n c i p I e . 
"'f-3S 
T h e pnc,c;.,gR l:L1rkP.r J quoted 
"f39 
t rorn Hecht W,"ls 
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1 n p <'1 t' t q u o t- e d by \v i l key , Circuit Judge 
4~0 
originally from \iec1 le, Jlie ~n."t i_- Tr~~L_L_c!._ws _ o _f_ tl}e_ Cni t_ed States . 
"441 
.\'(:? ale said: 
" W he re t ct c i 1 i t i e s c a n no t p r Ft c t i c a b l y be du p 1 i c r\ t e d by w o u J d 
be competitors, those in possession oE them must allow chem 
to be shcireu on fair terms . It is illegc'll restraint of 
1-rade to foreclose the scarce facility . " 
Furtht:~r Wi 1 key, Circuit Judge said : 
~. 
''To be ''essential" a facility need not be indispensable ; It 
is sufficie!lt if duplication of the faci l ity would be 
economically infeasible and if denial of its use inflicts a 
severe handicap on potential mRrket entrants . \ecessarily 
this pr i nciple must be caretull y limited : the antitrust 
laws do not require that nn esselltial farility be shared if 
s 1 ch shartng would b e im1n-nct-icr1l or would inhibit the 
defendant's abil i_t-_y t-o sen·e its c 11:-:,torners adequately . 
ha rker· J c1do11ted these prtssctges in -~· R__: ·-\..~ c111e:I fou11c thrit : 
443 
"a gateway facility is likely tu b e get a s e parate and 
identifiable geographi c market and thdt ex c lusion from that 
rn,-1rket by meft11s of the gateway , l2£Lm~ fac_i._2_ indicat-es 
a1iti - competitive intention unless the exclusion can be 
explaineJ by reference to reasonable constraints in the 
c i rcumstances : an agreement to exclude ot· l1ers arhi trari ly 
must: be taken as having the purpose to monopolise . " 
Sittc e .c\ . . P . A . clid not r1dv,,nce ,-\llj,' su c h constrctjntc., Budge t wr1s 
:e l d to succeed u,,d e r s . 36 . 
·"' h e !:h,r example of the "butt le ne c k" principle may, it is 
s11 1m1i tted, be fotrnd in Gctrn c u _, _ I_!~ ~ · v PJO\:__Lc:J ~ n_c: e:... _Fn1i t &_ Produ c e 
4-+4 
Buj__lding , Inc . In that case the Plaintiff Gam c o brought an 
c1~ tjo11 against tl1e defer1ddnt as lessor of a b11iltling which had 
s u b "' -\. ant i,:i. l ad v an t ,:1 g e s f o r l o c <1 l fr u i t: and v e g e l a b 1 e 
w h o l e s c, l e r s , o f w 1 1 i c h t 1 t e P 1 ci i n l· i f t w r:1 s o r I f~ • 
due to the bulk consignments oE tresl1 trui t a nd \· t·getrthles Lieing 
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receiveJ by street, tor rail spurs of which the building tendnts 
lrn d e x c 1 11 s i v P. u ~ e , and a y a r d . Retail buyers habitually 
c:ungreg,i.ted tl1Pre and the !->hipping facilities wet'e the best ir, 
the rown. 
S ince 1929, when lhe building was erected, practically all fruit 
et n d veg e tc1 b l e de ct l er s i n t he ,,. re a at one t i me or an o t her ha J 
held leases or stock in the Defendant corporat ion. 
When the plaintiff was organised 1n 194 6 as successor to allother 
who lesale c;oncern it was grctnted a one year l ease of four units 
i n t l t e lJ u i l d i n g . At the expiration of the life of the lease the 
P laint iff was refuserl renewal . The Plaint-if£ was in impending 
f inr1.ncictl difficulties Rnd so the Defendant consistently 
d eclined to renew the lease. The Defendant groundl?.d its refusal 
o n a covenant in the original le ase wherein the Plaintiff Agreed 
not to ''transfer or permit to be transferred any interest 1n the 
b usiness" without written permission from the Board of. thl?. 
l e[endclllt corporatio n. TwC> yectrs later the Plaint-it£ was 
11 otifi1?.d to q11it . I t L, i. 1 e d t_ o c um p l y and t he De f P n d ,,. n t 
cl irect:urs insr:ih1red suit for trespass and ejectment, succeeding 
i n the Rhode Is Land Court" c1nd c1gain in the State Supr0me CoLtrt . 
01 1 ,lie jc;s11e of ''essentic1l fctcilit_y··, bet()rf' tl1e Lnitecl '.'.'>tcites 
0 1Jrt of ,\pp1icds Fir·st Circuit, the Defendants cot1tP1tded th,1t i::l 
d is c rimir1c1Lor·y policy i.n cegard t.o the lessees in the buildin~ 
r nu l d tie v f'r nm nu n t to m <Jn op o l i. s c:\ t i on IJ e call s <~ u the r a l t- e r n d t- i v e 
- l3fl -
c:..elli. 11g sites were r1vailr1ble . The Court rejected thi.s argument 
.., t ,t t ill g t h c1 t "ct mon o po I i z e cl res ource s e l r1 o rn lacks subs t it u t e s ; 
445 
.;lternati\·es will not excuse m011opolizcttion" . The Court 
fou nd that to impose upon the plc1int:itf the additiollal expense 
o f developing another site , attracting buyers and trdnshipping 
fr1 1it and prod 11 ce by roctd was clenrly to extract a monopolist's 
"W'-
1d vantage . 
Addressing the limitation on the principle, Clark, Circuit Judge 
-f47 
stated: 
"Admitedly the finite limitations of the bujloing itselt 
thrust monopo 1 y power upon the de f end,rnt s anrl they a re not 
required to do the impo .c:..sible in accepting indiscriminately 
all v. ho would apply. Reasonable c rit erid of selectior1, 
therefore, such as lack of available ~pace, financial 
unsoundness, or possibly lo w bllsiness or ethical stand,1rds, 
would not violate the stcrndarrls of the Sherman ..\ntit rust 
. .\et. But the latent mo11o po list must justify the exclus ion of 
a competitor from a mnrket whi c h he controls. \'.here, as 
here, a business group understandabl) susceptible to the 
temptations " of exploiting its natural advantage against 
competito rs prohibits one previously acceptdble from hawking 
his wcires beside them any longer at tlte v ery moment of his 
d[filiation with a potentially lowf~r pricP.d outside!-, they 
rnc1y be cnl led upon for a necessary e.'.:plc1riation". 
41;r 
So it was held in Gamcn lhat tl1e discriminator-y (~X(~lusion of a 
pnr·t- _y frnm wc:1r t> l1t) ll.':ii11g frtc i. lit i.es with speci fie mc1rket 
tli.ri.butes in tei·ms of hu)er attr·action and econornical deliv cy 
E.=icilitiP,S constit11ted monopolis,ttion . In that ca.,;e the 
de [end d n t g t' o up w n. s a l so a comp et it or of t ll e trader 1· et use J 
r1ccess . This i.'> the cornmo11 factor in all of th1~ Unit-ed States 
4~9 
' e s s ~.:? n t i a 1 f a c i 1 i t y '' c ,3 c; e '3 e x c e p t lj "! r' ~1 t_ . 
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t;e neralJy though a firm has the right to determine with whom i.t 
450 
will deal . 
In Australia the Trade PrRctices Commission referred to the 
' bottleneck facility·· 
The Federal Court of Australia hcts not yet dealt with the 
"bott leneck" principle . Two cases are worthy of consideration, 
s ince both involve facts ~hat might be said to provide for an 
dpp l ication of the "bottleneck fctci 1 i ty", c1t1d yt:t t-he Court h-5.s 
trec1ted the,n bot11 ctS straight ''refllsal tu supply" cases. 
In Berndon Investments Pt.L:_Ltd . v F_i _tz rQ.._\ IsLrtnd (_S.-\ .) P_!_y . 
~5-2 
\:_t5J. both pa.rt i e s ran c r u i s e s from Ca i r n s to a r 1 J from nearby 
isl ands around the Barrier Reef , in particular to Fitzroy 
Is land. The respondent had constructed a jetty under licence on 
Cr own lan d near its resort 011 Fitzroy IsL=tnd . The us e of the 
j<-: tty wr1s irnportc111t to t11e business of conducting tours to t11e 
i s l and a n d 1 a tt d i ll g pa s s ,~ n g ,~ r s l he r- e . 
In 1983 thP. responclenl wrote to the appl i cr:1ni: varying thP terms 
o f the n.rrangement by whi c h th e applicant was enti ll e J to use 
t lte jf--'tt) . Th e n e w t e ri n s w <~ r- e t· o i 11 c 1 u J c s t r i c i t i 111 ~~ s w ~ t h i n 
whic h the Elpplicctrtt's \·e~c;el coulci use rite j e tt y , the pc1yment of 
, i jetty te e of S.5 per pc1c,·:,er!ger, the rrwnd,"t"i.ory taki11g 0f lunch 
cl L t. h e re s po tt de t 1 t ' !:-i n~ s o r' t o t 1 t he i s L ll d , p r o l t i I> i t i n J pa s s e n g e r s 
,ell tickets on behalf of i.he respo1tdent for gl,'l.ss - bot-tom bodt 
rides . 
\ot su r pr i sing l y the applir..=rnt did not accept he terms of t11e 
.Jf fer co n tained in this letter . The respondet1t 0ccordingly 
refuse d to permit the applicar, t to disembark passenge r s fro m its 
f' sse l at t h e Fitz r oy Islc:1nd jetty . The app l i car, t comrnencPd 
pro ceedi11gs alleg i ng a contravention of . 46 of the Trade 
Pract i ces Act 1974 (Au5t . ) . 
Fo e t1 1e pu rp ose of the i nterlocutory procee<lings Fi.tzgerc1ld J 
co nfined !,is a n alysis to the condition relating io tl,e jetty 
T l1e Judge refused to accept that there wa:, c1 market in 
re :,pect of tours to F i zro_y Island . Hence it was concluded that 
tl 1c r espondent was not in a pos i t i on substant i ally to control a 
nrn rke t. 
Il1 is case could be analysed as a refusal to supply an ''essenti,:11 
t.-1 c i 1 j ty '' , na.rne 1 y the jet: ty . In s11cl1 Ft cr1se the na.lysis would 
, entre on wl1ether o r not there were s1 1bstit11i es av ilFi ble for 
'lie jetty . 
:n a recent Australi.=in ca.se , \\-il_li,0 1r1~-'..,_& __ . .\11c-,th_P.r_ v JJaQ_P.1'.:c;a\·~ 
f> t __ ·_. __ Lt d . , Pa p e r s FI v e h ,1 d a s i x t y lJ e t- c e n t s !l f t re o f t he ma r k e t f o r 
t I 1 <-! c o l 1 e c t i on c1 n d t re E1 t men t o t w ...i s t e c um p u t P r p .=, p P r i n t h e 
in 11Pr ~_yd n ey rn<,-,t:ror, o lit,111 ,1cec1 . A dire c t o 1· u[ the respondent 
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dcquire a lease of certain premises for the purpose of 
P s L'I b 1 i s h i n g a b 11 c:. i n e s s 1 n c o m p e t i t i o ll w i t h P c1 p e r s ave . T 11 e 
d i re c t or a ppr o a c lH~ cl t he a. g e n t o f t it e 1 e '::l s or w i t h a v i e w t o 
ob taining the premises for Papersave . 
Williams sought an injunction in the Federal Court restraining 
Pape rsave from securing the lease on the ground that by doing '::iO 
the respondent was misusing its market power in contravention of 
s .46 . 
S 11 e pp a r d J d i s m i s s e cl the ?1 pp l i c a t i o n E o r a 1 t ho u g h i t w a s t o u n d 
tha t the respondent had a "suhstantial degree of power in the 
~-.... 
ma rket'', it was not e'::ltalJlished the1t the respondent was takjng 
ctd vrtr1tag~ of its power in that market for any of the pro crlbed 
"fS!i" 
p urposes . 
Th is case also might be seen as a refusal to Sli.pply, and in 
par licular a refusal l:o supply or dllow access to an "essential 
fac ility" . lfl1 e the r a f rt c t u a 1 s i t u A t- i o n g i v e '::l r i s e t o a 
"bottleneck'' must be a mctt-ter of degree. It seems that the 
"bottleneck" casi~s incty be ser~n rec1 l ly cts one rype of refused to 
...S---6 
~upp ly. 
Rt--> fusal to grant- a pctlent i icence - ever1 11hP.n the p.itent gi\·es 
rise to market power amounting to dominctncA - has no t been held 
4~7 
to be anti - co111petiti,·e in tlw Cnited Stn.lP.._, . Thc1t would be 
c o 1 1 --, i s t e n t w i t l I t h e c urn p u l s · H ·} L i c e n c 1-: pro v i ~ L u n s o f t he \ P w 
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z e,)lc'1 ud Patents Act 19."i J . 
C i r cums tc-n1 c e <:> can 1J e en v i s a g e d where i t co u l d be s t r on g l y 
d sserted tlvit a comme rci.al ly significant patent dmounted to an 
·e-..se11t-. 1 a. l facility'' . On the " e':,sentia l fa.cili.ty'' doctrine 
re fusal to li ce n ce might const itute monupolisalion . 
-\r1y in co n~ist e ncy i':> nvuided in \ew Zec:-1l..=1nd by t11e expres':> 
,., ...._ c ept i o11 jn s . 36( 2) . Ref u sal to lic e n ce would, in effect , be 
~· ll fur c e rn en t o f t he r i g h t . 
T11e exception would not apply 1rnwevt]r if the fll<'trket power or 
'essent i al fctcility'' arose Erom conduct such as patent pooling . 
That would be saved neither by the lnited Stc1ies cases nor by 
s .36(2 ). 
C . Trncle Sesrets - Section 7(2_)_ 
\c)i.thP.r· s . 45 nor s . 36(2) app l .) to trade secri-::ts, alt:l1011gh W P 
h a.ve ·-; een thnt some protection 1nc1y be ·:1fforcled undic:r s . 4S. 
':5ect i oll 7 provides : 
"7. Law relating to restraint of trade and bre a ches 
of confidence not affected - (1) \othing in chjs .-\et li.mits 
or affects a.ny rul P of law r elating to restrc'lint o f tr,Hie 
not incon::.istent with c1 n y of th8 µro\ i'-> ions of thi':j Act . 
(2 ) \otl1i11g in th i s .Act- I imit'-> () C dffP.cts any rul e oE law 
r e l a L i n g t o b r· e fl c h ~ c; u f c o 11 r- i d e n c e . 
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(J) \fo r11le of law referred to in subsection (l) or 
subsectjo11 ( 2 ) nt t}iis sectio11 affects the interpretation ot 
any of tile pco\'i~i.uns of tliis .-\et . " 
The whole provision n eeds to be e-xc1mined in order to establish 
the effe c t of s . 7 ( 2) . Subsection (2) , unlike subsection (1) , ic.; 
n o t l i. rn i t e d t o r u l e s o f 1 a w c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t 11 e p r o , · i s i o n s o E 
the Act . . \ls o by v irtu e of subser.tion (.3) tl,e r\JLP, of la\\ 
re lating to breac hes of contirlence are not to uffect the 
inte rpretatiun o f the provisions of the Act . 
It seems ~u l1c1ve been inlen<led that s . 7(2) Gperate to e»:enipt 
ctct iolls in n=ispect of brea.ch of confidence , including trade 
-4SS 
'='eccets, fr o m th e restricti,,-e trade practices pr·o,·isions . 
.\s we have seen, the Commer ce BiJ l o riginal ly incl11ded trade 
sec rets within the exemption in clause 45(1)(a) , although this 
This would seem t o indicate that tile 
lr,:1ft.ers' i.1it.ent fo r s . 7(2) di. f fered from thc1t expressed in the 
"f.>~ 
~ep~rtme ntal P~per . 
~&o 
.\ l t h rn 1 g h t 1w o rn i c, s i on o f t rad e s e c r P t s f r n rn s . 4 5 w a s j u "' t i fi. P d , 
u n i e ~ s s . 7 ( 2 ) o per u t e ~ a s i. ll t e n d P. d by t he De p r1 rt rn e n t , i t c; 
o rnis..,ion f r om s . 36(2) is not justified . for then t irrn,_, in d 
dom indnt posit i on. nia.y be ieEt in a diff i cult pusit-ion 111 
restrain ing rnisu..,e of conE id ent i i=il inform<'tt inn. 
\11 ,-1rg 11m ent for n r)t in terpret in;- s . 7(2) ac; orer~,t i11g ,-1c:; c1n 
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"x em pt i. o 11 i. s t h <'t t t- o d o s o me ct n s i n e f f P c t- t h ,1. t t r I e ~ c t gr a. n t s a 
rn u r.:: h w i ci e r e x e rn p t i on f o r b r e a c h o E c o n f i cl , 11 c e d c t- i n i"1 s Ti1 ,, n t o r 
t h e t- r u e i n t e l l P. c t u a. l p r o p e r t y a c t i o n s w i. t t , o u t a pp c1 r P. n t r e ;1 s o n . 
Ho wever the VPry nat-ur:~ ot brl~aches of co11fjdence .=1nd 
pt·oceedings to restrain them mean that competition i ssuPs <1re 
no t in vo l ved . If in pcirti cular circumstances rni<:, - u..,e of a 
, lornindnt position ciri~es , it will be as f t rPslllt of Addit:io11al 
c onduct beyund the ;:1ction to restrain breach ot contiuence and 
so will be subject to the trade practices pro \ isions regardless 
of s . 7(2) . 
..tµ./ 
Ea gles 1,as said s .7(2 ) cc1n11ut be read this widPl_y : 
"~ecti cn 7(2) seeks only to preserve the right to protect 
t he j n f or mat i on i t s e l f E r o m d i s c 1 o s u r P i o p •" r s on s o t he r t h ,:1. n 
tl1e licensee . Conditions attached to the utilis ,3tio n uf the - - --- -
informat i on by t he licensee acquire whc1tever validity they 
have t h r o u g h c on t r a c t a n d t he i r b u s i n e s s e f f i c ,, c y t h r o u g b 
economic mus c le . They are not themselves protected or 
c re a l· e d by t ll e s u b s t a n t i v e J a w o f b re ._ c l 1 o f con f i den c e . " 
F u rt h 1~ r · F. a g 1 e s t h i n k ,; i t p · > s s i b 1 e t o d i s t i n g u i s Ii be n-, e e n 
ce':->tr i1~t i. u11s \\hi.ell simply spr-dl OL~t- expressl:, ohlignti1J11::, \\·Lich 
equ ity iinpuses sub si Jentio and contrc1ctual e:,pc.1nsio11 ut th~'=>e 
46.t 
olll igc1ti.()n':i. An ec(n.l!lpl,~ might L> e seP.ki.1,g t:o restri ct the use.~ 
lice11 ..,P P r:.-tn rnc:1k rj uf pllblished inf on,1,.1ti.011 be)·u11d rhe limited 
44.3 
p r o t e c t i o n o f f 1::~ red u n de r l It e '' '=> p t · i 11 g h n n r d do c r i n e " . 
W!ti.l st such r1 recH.iirig clowt1 ot s . 7(2) Sf:Citl'=> more consis~·ent 
ite Ac t, it 
c t-i r 1· ,1 i. n l _y i s c o 11 t r fl r y t- o t h P r e i'I -; on , 1 b l y p 1 " i n w or d i n g u , e d , .rn d 
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-4b+ 
1 · e i n t u r c e d b y t 11 e De p ,:i r t me n t ,:11 Pdpe r. It does at leust seem 
thctt unless Pdrlia ;,1ent intended ,-, . 7(2) ro :1c1\·e tr1is hro,01d 
P t f e c t , i t w o ll l cl ha\, e been cc, n-" i '=> i e 11 L t o i n cl 11 cJ ~ t r ,1 rJ e s Pc r ,~ t ., 
in s . 16( 2 ) . 
I t can be bor n e i n rn i n d t h et t the r u 1 e s o f 1 <'H\ 1 f; ft u n a f f e c t e d 
due l:o s . 7(2) include a pul.Jlic i.t1t8r-est li.mitctti.on . 
D. Sectio 11 41 . 
Sec:tion 4:3(1) provid8s t1lc1t \-he r estr-ictive trade prc1ctices code 
in Part II of the .\et does iwt- apply to ''ctny act, mhtter , or 
thing thdt 1 s , or- i s of a kind , speci.ficc.il ly c:i.uthorised by any 
e11a.ct ment or Order 1n Cou1tcil '' . 
Tl1e term " spec i f i c,11 J_y authorised" dnd the meaning gi\·en to it 
~>) --; , 41(2) nppecir· to be 1J sed dS ,-t di.::-ect resul.t of juui.cidl 
i1t!:.Prpretr1\- i on of the except.ion jn l11e ('oinmerce .-\Cl 1973 which 
41,:,-
u s •: c1 t h t-: w u c d s " P x p r e ..., s l y a 11 -\ I I n r i s e d " . I ll A B C (' o n t- a i. n 2 r ~-i_n ~ \ \' 
4(.(, 
v TlH~ \?.. Vv'ool Boc1rd a si_atu1-or-y powel- lll t-lie \~ool lndustr-ies ,\e t 
1CJ77 P.Ili:l.hliug the B0,11·d to 01<1kP. contr·acl:s wa-o hc:ld to dmount to 
cj ', p r e -,, s a u ~ 'n o r i t y t- o m ,-1 k e et p a r t :i. c u l a r t r e i g 1i r r c1 t e et g r- e e 111 P 11 t 
con tdining a restr i ctiv<~ tr>td<' pt·t,,:tice . 
111 u t .. c-1 n n r -:-- u ',1 I y . o e c t i o :1 l () ( 4 ) u f t lt e T r (1. de P 1 · ,1 C t i. C e -3 AC t 1 CJ "i fl 
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,1lso 1..1.sed tl1e words ''exprPss ly authori .sPd" . In tJi c;_."laster · c, 
467 
\~ice_(\i'.L_Ltcl...:_ _& __ C~_t-ltS:.!-'~ ,. Sjn1mon_s_ & . .\nu h·~r~ llaslam J refu::.ed to 
L1ccept that the Coµyriglit Acl 19J 3 "express Ly iH!i horiStiCi" dl1 
agreement or arrrtngernent·. between whole::.dle1.·s ot grrnnopho11e 
records to fi.\: prices . 
46f 
I r 1 :'Ji e s ,'\.: Car L'l w 1. i_ d . v ..\uck l ,'l11d Regionct L . .\uthurrtl. i. t l\as 
argued tha.t the E:..:ominer of Commercial Praci.tices w,ts trying to 
lool, at a trac'le practice "expres=>l.Y authorised" by the . .\irport 
..\utl1oritiPs Act 1966 in gi\·ir1g the Hegi.onril . .\utlwrity power to 
r11anc1ge ihe ctirporr and gr.=111t r1n e :u:lusive licencf• to c;perate a 
4'-9 
du-::;·- free goods shop at the ,1irport . Casey, J . str1i.ed : 
"I could not see rhe11, a11d c.=1nnnt see now, how gener,11 
po1\ers to ma.nage an L1irp1..,r alid gra.nt l i.ct>nces amount to dn 
express authority to engage in cJ trade prc1ctice within tlie 
rne,:tning of the Act . The word "express'' seems to import a. 
pctrticl1lar referPnce to an actual trade practice under 
re~ i ew and in my opinion it is not enough merely to show 
t h n t t h P. s c o p e o f a c t i v i t i e s a u t l I or i s e cl by t 11 e e rn po we r i 1, g 
slat11tP. may or m,'ly not include trade practice'> rele,·,Jnt to 
tltP. Curmnerce ..\et . I do not beliP.ve tli;=it: parlic1rnent 
.i_ n h-! n <.I~ cl 1.. o g i.\. e s u t' li ,-i ,, t ,"l. \- u t u r y car t P. b lrin c. he . " 
Cc1 sey J cl is tin g11 i. s lied the St oct__J:;s clJ_c1 n 6 q_.~~ so~ i~.!) or.!_o_f_.\ e1r 
47.., 
v ('r,r111nerce r.omrni ss_i. ot1 , where ru I ~s mc1de by th,~ stock 
l<\: <; 1w11Ji-:> 1t11de r· lhc~ Sl-wrebroker's '\rt .:.908 forbiclclini its m,,mbers 
o l1a.,·c br<Jnch otfices ;rere tre<'!tt-'d as p,.1rt uc the . ..\et c.1nd 
"express l_y aut]-orised'' the pt- ct,..:tice cornpldi11ed uf, c1nel fol lowed 
"t 71 
i[:'!Y v '.3irru11ons . 
In . ..\ . R .. ..\ . \. :'!11tua 1 Ren t.:i l 
"172. 
L ,'l r s l:l ,irk er . J re J- r: r 1-f: d b c i e f l y 
s . 4 J , g i v i r I g it n v er .Y 1..-1 r r mv i n t <} r µ rt" i 2 i. i.,, n . His HCJ11fJur 
to 
"'11J 
.., tn ! ed : 
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'' T Ji 2 r e 1 ..., n n e n c1 c.: 1. rn e Ii t w h i c h ~ p e c i f i c fl l l y r e _q_i J j_J:? s_ t h e 
grutlling of conc:essiuns for re!ltal cd[' uootlts , the . \ir~,0rt 
Author; ties ,.\c;r 19(,6 permit-s t11e grc1ntin~ of co11Ce':>sions 
f o 1- n =: 1 1 I. d L c: ,, r s a n d a w ho L e v .-tt' i. e t y o E o t h <J r c o n c e s s i o n s " 
( 1ny e rn p h c1 s i s ) . 
Sect i o11 43(2) effectively overrules the decision in ABC 
414 
C~ild~~r Line\\' v TrtP- :-:z Wool Qoc1t·d . That subsection 
p r-u ·ides : 
"For the p11rposes of subsection ( 1) of this section, and the 
enactmerit or Order in Counci l does not provide specific 
authority for an ~et, matter, or tl1ing j f it provides in 
g f-! n e r a l t e r rn s f o r t h.., t a c t , 1 ,1 r1 t t e r , o r- t h i u g . 
notwithstc111ding that the a c t , rnc.1trer , 01- thing re4uires or 
rn,1_y be subject to <1pprov,'11 or- authorisation by cl ~·!inisler of 
the Crown , statutory body or a person holding any particular 
office , or , in thP- CdSF! uf a r-ule 1,1acle nr dI1 act, matter, or-
titing clu11e purs11ant i-o any enr1 c tmeut, c1pr.1ro\-=il or 
a.ut!,cJri_s,-i.\- iun lly Order· Lll Cu1tt1c i I . '' 
Help as to tl1e nieanj11g ()f "specifically authorised" m,Jy be 
gleaned fr-om the cases on s . 51(1)(a.) of the Tnlde Practices Act 
The Australi.=tn cou11terpr1rt- uses the phrase 
''sp~cifi_cal ly authorized or ,':lppro,;ed" . 
'17:l-
r:___ o - o ~._1 U _\~~ ]:\ u j 1 d i I i. g S o c i e t v \ e w S o u L h \,· d 1 e s l P. g i .s l ct t i on 
1·equired building ':,OCieties to b,=ive the cap.tciry under- their 
P. 1iles to no1ni11ctte Ftn insurer for rnortg ;_1ge related insitrunce . 
,; t t t ho r i r y e rn po we r i n g t h i r 1 g s l o b P. du tH~ ,, r I i c h may c o m p r i s e a 
r·estricti,; t~ t1·ctdc: p1·c1< ·ticP., tl1<1t does not oper-._ile dS an 
c1 uthocis,1ti cJn within s:Sl(l)(ct) to i_hi.ngs ,=1crudll_::.· done which do 
co mp1·i sa ,, r e slricti,·e tr<1cl(; prc1ctice , 111 i- h c,t ca ';e It(,, lending 
ur rnune~. on tt-'!r·rn-, that the borr·o wPc ' s inst1c,t1H.: e w,1~ plr1ced with 
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c1 nomit1dteJ I nsu e r . 
47b 
BrAnnan ,J , referring to t l 1e r1n1b it ot s . .5l( l )(b) , said : 
''The boundaries of this .-\l::,atia are to he chosen, i.n the 
first instan ce , by the lr1ws of the r ele ,·ant St,-ite . But the 
a ppr op r i at e S t c1 t e l e g i s l a l i o 11 w l 1 i c h e · e r c i e s t he e x e r;1 pt i. n g 
power 1,rnst spP.ci ficc1l l y au l1orize or c.tpprove the act or 
t l , i II g , i h a t i s , i l m t I s t n 1 .-1 11 i [ e s t a 1 e g i. s 1 a t i v e i n t e n t i o n 
that the a ct or thing , if done or exis j1,g, shell l not- be a 
Lin k in the c ha.i11 of proof of a lic1bility, wh A\l1er ci,·il or 
c rin1i n,:1 l . To bt::;' sure, the Laws of the State do not us u a \ ly 
trouble to give l egi sl,3ti,·e aEfirrnation of t'he lawfuln~ss of 
ac ts or t1,ings whi ch c1re not otherwise proscr i bed , b11t r.1 
legislative ass urnpli o n of tl1e ]awfu ln ess of an a.er or thi1,g 
i~ not icintdniount t o r1 spec i fic dutr1oriz,1Lion or r1pproval of 
tl1cit ,1ct or tlli.ng . \\'h.tt i s necP.ss,--i.ry i.s tlrnt tl1e S1.nte l a w 
'->h o u 1 d e x h i b i t :t c; µ e c i f i c 1 e g i s 1c'\t i. v e i n tent i on t o au t ho , i z e 
o r up p rove t h e a c t or t hi n g , e \ e n tl 1 'Jug h c h d t c1 c or t hi 11 g 
wo u ld not - but for the pcovisions of the Tr,:icle Practice's 
A c / - he unlawful.'' 
It 1s a11 "act, matter or thing" that must be specifi.cally 
~77 
au lhorise d . i n Ausfie)d P__!::_l_Ltd . 
-41f 
of .--\ustralia Ltd . it was held that in s . .51(l)(a), which refers 
to "act or thing" the entering into of an agreP.ment was not an 
"act-. " . 
E,·en if s . L, 3(l ) was given a more liberril interpretation, which 
ii 1s suhmitted wou ld be cont rnry to t l1 e i.ntent of tltt: 
l e g i s 1 a t u r e , t h e e \. e rn p L i u 11 w o \I l d J e j n a d e q u rt t e r o e '-: f• m p l a c t i o n s 
for infringe ment of so1ne intellectual property 
The 
Pntent-s ..\ et lY5 3 li,JS no section ou ... li ning infringe111 e nt at. all , 
rlle rn ,:itter being cle .-tlt wilh 11ncle1· the commo n ~,i11 . 
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The competition implications of th e se-p{trnte in eilec tu,tl 
pro perty rights v~ry greatly . The commercial situations 1n 
wh ich they are e\:ploited encompass almost the who le field of 
tr ade . It is i mpossible for legislation to provide for al L 
c ircumstc1nces . lvhE1t is important i.s to hc1ve LI statutory base 
wh ich will enable anti - competitive abuses of inarket power 
der ived from intellectual property rights to be identified and 
18c1lt wi t h . 
Oil the other hand traders need reason E1ble certc1 1n y so they may 
k now the type of arrangPments they ca.n and cannot m._i.ke in the 
P x p 1 o i t at i o n o f t lw i r i n t e 1 1 e c tu c.1 1 prop e rt y r i g 1i t s . 
In the European Community th e problem is dealt witlt by the issue 
o f C o mm i s s i on Re g u 1 a t i on s e x e m p t- i n g c e r t et i n type s o f pro v i '=> i on s 
in intel Lectu,11 prop e rty licences. The s e cH · e n e c e " s a r y be c a 11 s e 
u f t 11 e very bro c1 d s cope o f t he h ,1 s i c c u rri p e t i t i on p r u \. i s i o 11 '=> i n 
..\rcicles 85 ,.,nc.1 86 of the RL,11<:! Tce,1ty . 
..\ust rali,1 currently hns stF11utut·y pro-..·isio11!:> P.r;1budyi ng i::l 
sornewhdt siniilax appronc11 t- o th ,,i ta.·en i1t the rornr11Prce A.et 1980 
in i\ew 7,ec1l,,11d. SPctio!l 51(3) of tlw Tr·,1cl<""' Pr,ll'hcec; .-\er 197 1+ 
(i-'i.ust . ) is _, di Fficult- pro"·i.siun to f\)l im~ !Jut i~ de"igned to 
c1d<lre ss the-' s<11rtE:! j~"ues as 011r- s . 45 . 
- 1:::iO -
rhe reco mmend t1ti. u ns of the . \ustrdli,'lll [ndustr-i,1i PropP.rty 
479 
.\cl\'isory Cornn1itte1-> inrl.i. cates a rathe r extre111e position requjr-ing 
,·d 1 pa te nt r:-•lcdP.d r.011<.luct robe subj e ,~t ro thP. co mp et i tion l.rn':> 
inc lud i ng 1.11<)c:;P F1lluwing for pttblic lie11efit d11t '. 1orjsations . 
r!ie \ew Zec.ldnd Legislature in ss . 1(,(2) , nd 45 h:ts t ri.ed to 
p r o v i. c1 e E o r r It e r e d s u n c1 I J l P e x e r c i s P o f i. n r e l l e c t u ct l p r up e r t y 
d g l 1 \: s w h :i L P. L t-: ,, v i n g c o t I cl u c i. g n i 11 g f u r t li e t' t Ii et 11 t h ct t f u r c o n l r o 1 
b_y the tr ade prActi ce s pruvisjons . This app r octch seems best 
1 e c; i gn e <I to r e co n c i l e t l I e re< I 11 i. r Pm f-' 11 t of f I P. x i bi I it y to e r1 ,l h 1 e 
coi ilro l of t11P- ever - 1,1ore supliistic,dec:l ·.; ci1enws L1 t ':> Orne tr,:1ch.:!rS 
to extract excessi,·e profits and impede compet it ion wi.tit t lt ctt of 
i 1 1 t e r f er i n g f t s 1 i t t 1 e a s po s s i b l e w i t h t he c o rn me r c i a 1 act i v i t i P s 
) f traders in the e:-.:erc i, e of Uteir i.n tc l l ectu.'l l property rights 
t h e vast majority of which wi 11 lu1v e no serious an~i - cornpetiti\·e 
j mplications . 
iv'he t·her the particular provisions enc1cted jn t"h 8 Cor1.i 11 r'rce -\cT 
19136 ltu \ P. t. lt e se effect.s wj 1 L uec o me c1pp c1ren t on l y O\·er timf' . 
4 ~·0 
The C . E . R . Agr·ee1nenr rP.q11ir~c; ecfo r ts t-o ildrtn onic,.-, trade 
pcac tices rind ut.11er cornrnPcc ~a; L.JI\S and ll·,,., pc1ce is q 1_1icl;:en i ng . 
,.\t the illt er f act-: LhE~ dt [fi.,reJJr.P s ,;u t-rE:ntly are -::-athe r i11 
Adoption of t l1P .-\11slr,1li. ,,11 1P.\C 
r (" c: o rn men ( l Lt t i ons w u u l cl cl I c111 g e t 11 <.1 t , <1 n cl £or \ c·· 1,· Z ,~ a : d l Id t o 
r;o nfonn wollld re(ptire bbctn J on m~nt uf wi.dt ,01ppecH' to La"e been 
t l1ougrittul efforts to str i ke i.!JH rig11L bc.,l.Jnc;.c.:! . 
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